

# RE-THINKING PUNJAB

The Construction of Siraiki Identity



Hussain Ahmad Khan



NCA PUBLICATIONS

# RE-THINKING PUNJAB

## The Construction of Siraiki Identity

# RE-THINKING PUNJAB

The Construction of Siraiki Identity

Hussain Ahmad Khan

Edited by : Samina Choonara



Research and Publication Centre (RPC)  
National College of Arts, Lahore

*Re-thinking Punjab: The Construction of Siraiki Identity*

Hussain Ahmad Khan

Research and Publication Centre

National College of Arts, 2004.

4-The Mall, Lahore 54000, Pakistan.

Website: [www.nca.edu.pk/rpc](http://www.nca.edu.pk/rpc)

E-mail: [rpc@nca.edu.pk](mailto:rpc@nca.edu.pk)

Phone number: 92-042-7311018

Fax number: 92-042-9210500

© All rights including copyrights reserved  
with the author and publisher.

No part of this book may be reproduced by any mechanical,  
photographic or electronic process, or in the form of a photographic  
recording nor may it be stored in a retrieval system transmitted  
or otherwise copied for public or private use without the  
written permission of the author and publisher.

ISBN 969-8623-09-4

Cover Design: Ahmed Ali Manganhar

Printed by: Ferozsons (Pvt.) Ltd.

Distributed by: RPC (NCA) and Ferozsons (Pvt.) Ltd.



All that I am or hope to be,  
I owe to my angel mother.

# Contents

Acknowledgments .....	9
Introduction .....	15
Chapter 1. Siraiki Wasseib .....	43
Chapter 2. Siraiki Particularism .....	65
Chapter 3. Towards Cultural Identity .....	83
Chapter 4. Quest For Political Autonomy .....	103
Appendices	
I. Siraiki Language .....	121
II. Kinship System in Siraiki Region .....	129
III. List of 90 Leaders and Political Activists arrested during the Bahawalpur Province Movement .....	137
IV. <i>Ilahda subay ki himayat main kul jamati conference ki kerardad</i> .....	142
V. <i>Bahawalpur key baes arkan-e-assembly kay muhzarnamma</i> .....	143
VI. <i>Punjab ur Bahawalpur ka mushtarqa budget: siyasi rahnumaon ki ihtajaji kerardad</i> .....	144
VII. <i>Siraiki khaney dey bagheir murdum shumari namanzur</i> ....	145
VIII. <i>Jag Siraiki jag</i> .....	146
IX. <i>Siraiki bheraou (i)</i> .....	147-148
X. <i>Siraiki bheraou (ii)</i> .....	149
XI. Declaration of Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM) .....	150
XII. <i>Pani ki ghaer munsifana taqseen ur khushk sali key khilaf yum-e-siyah</i> .....	151
Bibliography .....	153
Index .....	159

## List of Tables

0.1 Riots in East and West Pakistan .....	31
0.2 Comparison of Aurangzeb and Dara Shikoh .....	36
0.3 Relative Share of World Manufacturing Output (1750-1900) .....	38
0.4 Per-Capita Level of Industrialization (1750-1900) .....	38
1.1 Population of Siraiki Region .....	43
1.2 Languages Spoken in Southern Punjab .....	49
2.1 Comparison of Income and Expenditure of Bahawalpur with other Regions .....	76
2.2 Representation of Bahawalpuri Officers in Administration after the Merger into One-Unit .....	77
2.3 Size and Pattern of Cultivation in Punjab .....	78
2.4 Comparison of Productions with various Districts of the Punjab ..	78
2.5 Exports of Cotton and Rice .....	79
2.6 Comparison of Industrial Units (I) .....	79
2.7 Comparison of Industrial Units (II) .....	79
2.8 Basic Facilities in some Districts of Siraiki Region .....	80
3.1 Newly Introduced Siraiki Terms .....	96
1. Siraiki-Punjabi Relation .....	124
2. Siraiki-Arabic Relation .....	124
3. Siraiki-Persian Relation .....	125
4. Siraiki-Sindhi Relation .....	126
5. Siraiki-Punjabi Lahndha Relation .....	127
6. Siraiki-Punjabi Lahndha Relation .....	127

## Acknowledgments

Most of the research in the book was done during my Masters in History at the Government College (GC), Lahore, between 2000-01. Dr Tahir Kamran, Assistant Professor, GC, not only motivated and urged me to undertake research on the Siraiki issue but also gave me useful sources and invaluable guidance. I would not have been in research field if he had not inspired and supported me. My thanks also go to Mr Irfan Waheed Usmani, Lecturer, History Department (GC), who always made time to read my manuscript and its several amendments, and gave precious advice. Mr Tahir Mahmood, Lecturer, Department of History (GC), Dr Massarat Abid, and Mr Zubair Shafi Ghouri are also acknowledged for their feedback.

In Multan, Prof Anwar Ahmad Khan and Ms Freeha Khan Sherwani are highly acknowledged for giving their helpful feedback. I am grateful to Dr Safia Anwar (Multan), Mr Abad Ahmad Khan (Mailsi), Mr Sohail Ahmad Khan (Multan), Qari Munas Baloch (Bahawalpur) for facilitating me in their respective cities. Mr Baloch provided me *Kaynat (Goli Number)* published in 1972, which proved to be a very useful source. Thanks are also due to Mr Sattar, Mr Asad Langha and Mr Mansur Kareem for their warm treatment at the office of Pakistan Siraiki Party, Multan. Thanks are due to all those people who spared their time for interviews.

I consulted some very important sources at Mr Masood Jhander's library (Sardar Jhander, Mailsi), Central Library (Bahawalpur), Quaid-i-Azam Library (Lahore), Punjab Public Library (Lahore), Government College Library (Lahore) and National College of Arts Library (Lahore). I am indebted to all library personnel who cooperated with me.

My special thanks go to Prof Sajida Haider Vandal, Principal National College of Arts, and the Research Advisory Committee



(RPC) for approving my publication project on the recommendation of Dr Tariq Rahman and Dr Mubarak Ali, who are acknowledged for their encouraging comments.

A great debt is owed to Mr Nadeem Omar Tarar, Incharge, RPC, for suggesting some useful changes in the manuscript and facilitating in research. It was, in fact, his initiative to publish the work. My sincere and deepest gratitude goes to Ms Samina Choonara, Editor, RPC, for her most constructive feedback. Without her invaluable comments and suggestions on both content and form, the book would not have been much useful, what it may be now. My hard working colleagues at the RPC deserve particular appreciation for their silent efforts in the tiresome process of publication. Mr Ahmed Ali Manganhar very kindly agreed to design the cover of the book. I also wish to thank people at Ferozsons, especially Mr Amir Anwer, Mr Fazal Muhammad Khan and Ms Midhat Unsar Lone whose hard work and professional approach made this publication possible.

I am extremely indebted to my family which encouraged me at every step to complete this manuscript. Their moral support always gave me the will and energy when I despaired of this task. My brother, Hassan, helped me in statistical calculations.



# PAKISTAN

The Siraiki region is shown in light green colour.



# PAKISTAN

- international boundary
- - - provincial boundary
- rivers
- ★ national capital
- provincial capital



# Linguistic Division of PAKISTAN



## Introduction

Writers on history have propounded different views regarding the origin of the ethnic consciousness in Pakistan. Akbar S Ahmad, a retired Pakistani civil servant and Professor of Islamic Studies at an American university, like Anwar Syed,<sup>1</sup> in *Pakistan Society* (1986), attempts to establish a link between mediaeval political ideology and institutions with the current rise of sub-cultural politics. He argues that since the inception of their rule, Muslim rulers in India faced the problem of evolving a strategy of survival: first, how to establish themselves powerfully and second, how to define Muslim identity in India. The Muslim intelligentsia responded to this dilemma by dividing into two discursive groups: the first group considered India *madinat al-naqisa* (the faulty state), and exclusively favoured orthodox Islamization, while the second model was secular and favoured the intermingling of Muslims with the Indian indigenous cultural and social order. The movement between these two extremes was the result of external political stimulus and internal socio-political disorder.<sup>2</sup> The confrontation between these two schools of thought later encompassed the struggle between authoritarianism and egalitarianism, ethnic and Islamic polity in the new State of Pakistan.

The construction of such a binary may be useful in the general understanding of Islamic, ethnic and secular polity but it ignores the differences within these schools of thought. For instance, Yuri V Gankovsky, a Soviet anthropologist, in *The Peoples of Pakistan: An Ethnic History* (1964), laid emphasis on cultural development as the driving force behind the construction of identities. Although Gankovsky's work is quite useful, it overlooks the political structure in the process of identity formation or politicization of imagined identity, and tries to interpret this process in the light of cultural bourgeois proliferation.



The political factors in ethnic politics have been highlighted by Hamza Alvi, a noted Pakistani sociologist, and Paul R Brass, Professor of Political Science and South Asian Studies at the University of Washington. Alvi laid stress on the over-developed state structure, weak political institutions, and the perception of "Punjabi hostility" as the major causes of regional politics.<sup>3</sup> Brass in *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison* (1991), termed identity politics as a result of symbol manipulation by elite groups. To him, it depends entirely upon the political elites to create and manipulate the issue, no matter how weak or strong the nationalist movement actually is. He supports his argument by quoting instances like Cow Protection, *satti* and two-nation theory raised during the British period.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, Tariq Rahman, Professor of Linguistics and South Asian Studies in the Quaid-i-Azam University (Islamabad), in *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (1997) and *Language, Education, and Culture* (1999), thinks that in Pakistan 'language has been more or less consciously manipulated by leaders for instrumental, rational, goal-seeking reasons: the creation of a pressure group to obtain greater power, goods and services from the state; to redress the situation of internal colonialism which is perceived as being unjust'.<sup>5</sup>

Most of these interpretations lay emphasis on one or two factors by ignoring the rest. The construction and disintegration of identities needs to be studied as a continuous process which stalls and decelerates with changes in the political climate. Here we will attempt to identify the significant factors which, directly or indirectly, contributed to the rapid growth of ethno-nationalistic identities that were counter-posed to one another.

### (I)

Although it is not altogether correct, some sources claim that due to frequent invasions from Iran and Central Asia, especially during the tenth and eleventh centuries, diverse cultures evolved and developed in many parts of the Indian subcontinent which later became the source of identity politics in the postcolonial states of this region. For instance, Tamil separatists based their claim of an independent Tamil Eelam due to their long rule over northern Sri Lanka. The Chakma in Bangladesh and the Sikh in India base their



politics on a similar philosophy. In Pakistan, the Baloch and Pakhtun are also raising the slogans of separatist nationalism. Similar is the case with the Siraiki people, a linguistic group inhabiting the rural hinterlands of southern Punjab, who are demanding bifurcation of the Punjab because they had a separate province before the Sikh rule and the subsequent European takeover.<sup>6</sup>

Although India was ethnically plural in nature, with variegated languages and diverse cultures, ethnocentric behaviour was prevalent in the elite classes even before recorded history. This is evident in the Hindu caste system where the four working castes that are the Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas and Sudra are genetically determined. This system was further categorized into a great number of sub-castes and their branches that placed restrictions and limitations on all social interactions including choice of marriage, travel, and trade.

Muslim rulers in India declared their aversion for the caste system but exhibited an inclination towards, what is termed in the literature of social sciences as nepotism and kin-selection.<sup>7</sup> The revolt against Razia Sultana and the kingship system, designed by Giasuddin Balban may be quoted as an example. Razia Sultana was the first female Muslim ruler to rule India between 1236-40 AD. When she promoted Malik Yakoot to a high rank, the Turkish *umerra* not only protested against the move but also dethroned her by a bloody revolt.<sup>8</sup> By designing the kingship system, Balban (1266-86 AD) devised a strict policy of racial discrimination. He ensured the presence of Turkish nationals at official ranks. Balban, when he was *naib-ul-sultunate* in the reign of Iltutmish, expelled 33 Hindu and Muslim officials because of their inferior races.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, the Afghan dynasty established under Bahlol Lodhi (1451-89 AD) encouraged the peoples of Afghan origin to gain positions of power.<sup>10</sup> The Mughals maintained the tradition by favouring Central Asian and Iranian migrants, mainly to ensure stability and their control over the region. They were conscious of their fair complexion and used it as a distinguishing mark from the darker, local Muslims.<sup>11</sup> Making Persian the official language and patronizing it not only opened the corridors of power to others, especially the Iranians, but also halted local participation in the management for sometime.<sup>12</sup>

Reflections of discord and the struggle to maintain superiority

can be observed in mediaeval literature. One such example is *Mirza-nama*, written in about 1600 AD by an unknown author,<sup>13</sup> who gives a detailed account of the qualities desirable in a "true" Mirza, alongwith suggestions to enhance his dignity and splendour. Many such books were written at the time. Ziauddin Barni in his *Fatwa-e-Jahandari*, appreciates the policy of racial discrimination and advises Muslim rulers to observe it strictly.<sup>14</sup> Hafiz Rahmat Khan, sovereign of a Pathan State, Rohail Khund, stresses the maintenance of separate Afghan identity in his work, *Khulasa-tul-Ansab*.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, the intellectual activities performed by Eknath, Tukaram, Ram Das and others, to enhance the magnificence and sumptuousness of Maratha ethno-nationalism, establish the same fact of divisiveness.

If the mode of production determines the nature of relations among the members of a community and dictates their way of thinking, then it is difficult to establish any ethnic bias among the Indian bourgeois and the proletariat. In the sixteenth century, well-developed markets were emerging and flourishing in the Indian cities. In that time, the subcontinent had about 120 large and 3 200 relatively small cities. Some cities like Delhi and Fatehpur Sikri have even been compared to London and Paris.<sup>16</sup>

Another evidence which supports this belief is the presence of guilds in sixteenth century India, which were like those operative in England before the Industrial Revolution. No caste system was observed in these guilds.<sup>17</sup> Although the indigenous capitalistic development apparently favoured complete harmony among various linguistic groups, the existence of ethnic consciousness cannot be overlooked or negated. When Aurangzeb attempted to convert *madinat al naqisa* (the imperfect state) into *madinat al tamma* (the perfect state), feelings of religious and cultural difference transformed into politics of high intensity, which supports the later argument.

Possibly, the most significant factor that contributed to the process of identity formation in the pre-colonial period was cultural inter-marriages. The progression began in the tenth and eleventh centuries by frequent invasions from Central Asia and, by the turn of eighteenth century, this course of ripening and burgeoning of the



Indo-Aryan and Dravidian languages and their dialects, came into their own as rich, individual languages. The defeat of the Mughals stimulated autonomous states to re-invigorate the local cultures. There was "a great outburst of literary activity in Bengali, Deccani, Hindi, Sindhi, Phushto, Khashmiri and other regional languages".<sup>18</sup> Waris Shah attracted the masses by his classic romantic epic *Heer Ranja* in Punjabi; *Kafis* written by Bullehe Shah (d.1758 AD) became the most important feature of Punjabi literature; Shah Abdul Latif (AD 1689-1752) composed his celebrated poetic work *Risalo* in Sindhi; Sachal and Sami venerated Sindhi literature, great warrior Khushal Khan Kattak (in the seventeenth century) captured the hearts of the Pakhtun people by his courageous and valiant poetic drive; Khwaja Farid was considered a poet of the Siraiki nationalist movement for a separate province; and Tayaumanavar (AD 1706-44) furnished Tamil literature with his much appreciated contribution in *sittar* poetry.

The development of vernacular literature accelerated when Christian missionaries set up a chain of printing press in India. They focused on printing the Bible in the native languages but during this activity, grammars were composed and dictionaries were compiled by British scholars of the local languages. Bengali language was the first to get the benefit of a printing press. Later, grammars in Tamil language were composed and dictionaries were compiled. Mumtaz Dar, Secretary General (Punjab) of Pakistan Siraiki Party, claims that Siraiki was the first Indian language in which Christian missionaries translated the Bible,<sup>19</sup> but this claim cannot be corroborated through official sources.

Anthropologist Akbar S Ahmad contends that Muslim society was divided before the British came to India. The division was on the basis of two main ideologies: one, that desired for complete religious authority with the *ulema* at the helm of affairs, and the other which favoured the emergence of local cultures and synthesis with non-Muslim groups. The former were orthodox, mainly patronized by rulers like Ittutamish, Feroz Tughlaq, and Aurangzeb, while the later were unorthodox supported by Akbar and Dara Shikoh.<sup>20</sup> These forces persistently opposed each other and each tried to overwhelm the other in various periods of pre-colonial Indian

history.

Muslim rulers, compelled to consolidate the deepening divisions in society, took the conservative path: first, by formalizing and legitimizing their sway over India (e.g. Sultans of Delhi, Jahangir, Shah Jahan), and second, by uniting cross-regional diversity (Arabs, Persian, Afghans and Indian Muslims) into a unitary and effective constituency.<sup>21</sup> Aurangzeb in his mission to depaganize the *dar al-harb*, inflamed religious antagonism in the Rajput, on one hand, and ethnic separatism in the Maratha, Pathan, and Uzbek, on the other.

Mughal India, during the next 150 years suffered from anarchic feudalism, with regional elites becoming autonomous from Delhi. Ethnic and ideological idioms were used to justify and negate claims to power...the Mughals had created an empire but they had utterly failed to create a nation.<sup>22</sup>

In his failure to recognize the multi-ethnic nature of Indian society, Aurangzeb undid all the progress and development initiated by Akbar to form an Indian culture and society.<sup>22</sup> He, therefore, set the stage for ethno-nationalism in India, with the emergence of ethnic states as a manifestation of military strategy. States of Pathan in Rohail Khund, Maratha in Maharashtra and Sikh in the Punjab, were based on racial and linguistic homogeneity. Although the Pathan exodus to India spanned several centuries, they not only maintained their separate identity but also emerged as a militarist group. In the eighteenth century, they managed to win a separate Pathan state. Efforts were intensified to unite Pathan and Afghan on the basis of common culture and ancestry. The work done by Hafiz Rahmat Khan points to these efforts.<sup>23</sup> The Maratha had three commonalities which made their position sound in ethnic categorization, a common place of origin (Plateau region around Pune, India), a common language (Marathi), and a common region (Maharashtra).<sup>24</sup> In his study, Dr Anayatullah (1986) treats the Sikh as an ethnic group due to their particular culture, religion, and region.<sup>25</sup>

In the eighteenth century, the old ethnocentric behaviour based on race began to encompass language and culture due to socio-political developments, especially due to the intellectual works published by the newly fashioned printing press. This meant that



identity formation could be based on cultural affiliations and this encouraged intellectual activities that enhanced the splendour and glory of local culture. Before the European takeover, therefore, culture and language became significant in power politics.

## (II)

In one of Nehru's early speeches to parliament, he held that no one but the locals made it possible for the British to conquer India because of their weaknesses 'they (the British) came and conquered India, controlled India and profited by their stay in India'.<sup>26</sup> Since the English mission to India was an economic one, the institutional matrix was fabricated to extract maximum possible wealth and resources from India.<sup>27</sup> The colony was tied to the metropolitan centre so that her social structure was determined by Her Majesty's needs and desires. The British believed in strong centralization, alongwith the assistance of local bureaucrats, army men and feudal lords, that coupled with an old Habsburg tradition of giving preference to certain groups over the others which created an imbalance in the economic development of different regions and between peoples within the same region. This is possibly one period that may be identified as the time when the rise of ethnic politics in the subcontinent took root.

In a number of articles, Hamza Alvi highlights the role of social formation and class alignments as the 'colonial mode of production'.<sup>28</sup> He explains how this transformation from 'Asiatic mode of production' to 'colonial mode of production', made it very difficult to resolve divisions in postcolonial societies by the underdeveloped state structures. Here we will attempt to gauge the impact of this 'colonial mode of production' mainly with reference to economic disparity and power politics, both of which were at the root of grievances that later took the form of ethnic politics.

Before the European takeover, the Indian rural economy was not only independent (what we call it 'Asiatic mode of production'), but it had established parasitic relations with the big cities.<sup>29</sup> The balance of trade heavily favoured India, but British policies destroyed indigenous Indian industry,<sup>30</sup> which not only upset the independent nature of the rural economy but also reduced the share of Indian manufacturing output in world trade.<sup>31</sup> According to Alvi, the "internal



disarticulation" of the Indian economy and its "integration with the metropolitan centre" was further enhanced by "generalized commodity production" (specialized crop cultivation in specific areas), to supply raw material to metropolitan industry and extended reproduction of capital, which was not invested in India but shifted rapidly to the imperial metropolis.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, India provided a market for metropolitan goods, and that reduced the chances of refinement in the disarticulation of indigenous economy. When Indian industry tried to make a comeback, it could develop in certain regions, mainly in central India, Mumbai, Madras, and so on, but there was no interconnection between industrial development and agrarian development.<sup>33</sup> Consequently, some regions became specialized in agriculture and the concerned industry was established in other regions. The jute mills in Calcutta and cotton mills in Mumbai can be quoted as examples. This uneven development continued along the same lines, maintaining the firm grip of metropolitan capitalism over the indigenous economy of postcolonial Pakistan.

Khalid bin Sayeed, a noted political analyst, in *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change* (1980) points to how the British tried to organize India in terms of 'particularisms and regionalisms that existed in the form of ethnic communities like the Pakhtun, the Sindhi, the Baloch and then a further subdivision of these communities in the form of tribes, *biradarian* (kinship groups), and castes'.<sup>34</sup> This economic disparity was deeply felt by the residents of various regions who were elbowed out by the colonial mode of production and by its continuation in the postcolonial state of Pakistan.

The one single development that contributed to the transformation of the colonial mode of production from the Asiatic mode was the organization of a class of feudal lords. Since the professional elite in European society became critical of state policies, the British began to rely on the local landed aristocracy.<sup>35</sup> The composition of this indigenous aristocracy is interesting because it was specifically constituted by the British. Lord Cornwallis legalized their status in the form of the Permanent Land Settlement (in 1792 AD), imposed in the areas of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. The people who assisted the British army in the upheavals of 1857,

were granted large land holdings.<sup>36</sup> This class adversely affected the units which later constituted Pakistan especially the Punjab and Sindh, which were torn into feudal dynasties<sup>37</sup> that opposed the social progress in these areas and degenerated the political culture of Pakistan.

Realizing the nature of *pir*-oriented culture in Sindh as well as in southern Punjab, the *pir* and *sajjada nashin* were granted big lands by the British government.<sup>38</sup> Dr Mubarak Ali, a noted Pakistani historian who has studied the feudal system of the subcontinent, gives many examples in *Jagirdari* (1996). For instance, Mukhdoom Shah Mahmood of Multan, whose job was to pass on all local information to the Commissioner along with providing assistance to the police and the army, fought under the command of Col. Hamilton with his fifteen riders, controlled his devotees, and did not let them to go into the opposition camp. Consequently, the Mukhdoom was awarded big *jagir* and a handsome monetary remuneration. These feudal lords were also given jobs in administration like honorary magistrates, which established their control over their respective areas.<sup>39</sup>

In order to mould this class to imperial requirement, educational institutions like the Aitchison College (Lahore), Government College (Lahore), and Edwards College (Peshawar) were established. The main aim of these institutions was determined by Lord McCauley's philosophy of producing a class, 'Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect'. These institutions produced an anglicized elite for the British Indian Army and the civil services. They also produced a salaried class which later became a prominent actor in nationalist movements.<sup>40</sup>

After Partition, almost every ethnic political party blamed successive governments for its low representation in the army and in the civil services. Such a recruitment strategy was the outcome of British policies, which were continued by the State, since this under-representation began after the War of Independence in 1857.

By 1857, the British Indian Army (BIA) was made a centralized and uniform entity with the task of shielding the Empire from internal and external threats. The concept of martial races, propounded by Lord Roberts of Kandahar, became a permanent



feature of British strategy of enrollment in the BIA.<sup>41</sup> Districts like Attock, Chakwal, Mianwali, Rawalpindi, Kohat and Bannu, were mainly represented in the BIA (the areas now included in Pakistan). Raverty, for instance, insinuates that the Pashto speaking people were recruited in all the regiments of the army:

What would be better still, as tending to secure a praise worthy emulation and rivalry, and in case of accident, enabling us to employ one race against the other, and prevent combination. We should form them into distinct corps, according to their nationality.<sup>42</sup>

The divisive policies of the British government worked to weaken the anti-colonial solidarity amongst the Indian peoples. The difference remained significant even after independence.

The Indian Civil Services (ICS) formed the steel frame of the British empire. The rationale behind the selection and training of ICS officials (ICSs) was to make them loyal to the Raj, maintaining law and order, conducting the affairs of tax collection, and implementing the imperial plans of development. The ICSs adopted a professional approach towards the politicians, their isolation 'was intended to guarantee their impartiality in a very paternalistic environment'.<sup>43</sup> Only a few hundred ICSs, even during the heyday of empire, upheld a centralized system which made the execution of imperial decree less expensive and more effective. Excessive administrative and judicial powers were given to these officers who controlled one district with the help of a small and low-paid local secretarial staff.<sup>44</sup> By the time the British left India, there were 1157 ICSs, of which 608 were British, 448 were Hindu, and the Muslim officials comprised 101 men, of which 95 opted for Pakistan (83 from civil and 12 from political services).<sup>45</sup> A majority of the Muslim ICSs were Urdu speaking, from Muslim minority provinces, one-third belonged to the Punjab, while only one or two came from the Muslim Bengal.<sup>46</sup> It was this ratio of viceregal system which Pakistan inherited from its imperial predecessors.

The reason behind this incompatible proportional representation of different Indian regions is not very difficult to find in the light of British language policies. During British rule, the state was the biggest employer of educated people.<sup>47</sup> The educational institutions

established by the British charged very high tuition fees (Rs 4 300 per year at Mayo and Rs 1 250 at Aitchison),<sup>48</sup> which made education impossible for the lower classes. The Muslims, especially, had great reservations towards adopting modern, western education. For example, 'in 1853, H H Wilson commented before a select committee of the House of Commons that the *maulvi* held the view that the Government wanted to induce people to become Christians by discouraging indigenous studies'.<sup>49</sup> And when competition exams started to include Indians in the ICS:

It was intended that the education to be tested in the preliminary competition should be an education of the highest possible English and not of an oriental type. In the opinion of the commission (established in 1886, to recommend about the Indianization of ICS) it is necessary to maintain this principle.<sup>50</sup>

The British language policy contributed to establishing the vernacular by standardizing (introducing the local language in the domains of power) and corpus planning (adding new terms to express modern realities).<sup>51</sup> The census not only tabulated these languages but the bureaucratic machinery found this categorization based upon language essential for evolving official policies. These measures produced a sense of identity among the linguistic groups of various regions.

When Persian was replaced by the vernacular languages, the vernaculars were officially recognized and strengthened. This means that the groups which spoke these languages could begin to see themselves as nationalities.<sup>52</sup>

The Europeans also tried to compile and edit regional histories which helped in increasing ethnocentric feelings among the locals. For instance, Dodd wrote the history of the Rajput; Dough researched the history of the Maratha; Burton wrote about Sindh. Similarly, the English also wrote the histories of the Baloch and the Pathan. More importantly, the *Gazetteers* were published which contained basic information about different regions and inhabitants. The print media conveyed all this information to the common people, which made them sensitive to their separate identity.



The All India Muslim League led the struggle for Pakistan, but it was the character and composition of the League which transformed ethnic and sectarian differences into a politics of confrontation since the creation of Pakistan. Here we will try to study the combination of various forces that secured victory for the League and gave rise to such politics.

During British rule in India, Muslim separatism emerged as the result of the Urdu- Hindi discord. It intensified in the urbanized Muslim community of UP mainly because Urdu was associated with Muslim elite culture and enjoyed official patronage since they were fearing the loss of jobs.<sup>53</sup> It was this section, which formed the vanguard of the All India Muslim League (AIML), whose foremost goal was to acquire posts in the administration. Therefore, it pleaded the case of a 'Muslim salaried class'<sup>54</sup> which might account for the AIML's popularity in the Muslim minority provinces. In order to become the "sole spokesman of Muslim India", the League made a tactical retreat and raised the slogan of religion in 1940s as the *raison d'être* of a new state.<sup>55</sup>

Since the Muslim majority areas had a feudal social and economic structure, supported by the colonial mode of production, it lacked a middle class. Only feudals were asked to profile the Muslim League in these areas and big *zamindar* assembled under the flag of AIML as a part of their stratagem of self-preservation. For instance, in 1941, Sikander Hayat remarked that 'unless he walked warily and kept on the right side of Jinnah, he would be swept away by a wave of fanaticism and wherever he went, would be greeted by Muslims with black flags'.<sup>56</sup>

The AIML could appeal to either feudals or to the urban classes, but lacked the popular support of the rural population.<sup>57</sup> It succeeded in creating a flimsy union of urban educated groups of different ethnicities who were hunting for government jobs. Except for Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the entire Muslim League leadership had no popular support in a larger context.

### (III)

In Pakistan, the struggle for regional autonomy emerged due to the centralization of authority in the elite of a particular linguistic community. The creation of an elite class and its alignments and re-



alignments with other classes to form the governing class (in Marxist terminology), is a phenomenon common to the post-colony. The bulk of this elite or governing class owed its existence to the colonial powers which over-emphasized the state structure, in Alvi's interpretation, comprising strong civil and armed bureaucracy, and had weak political institutions mainly due to the de-politicization of the people. Feebly established political institutions thus assisted this strong state structure in the role of nation building.

The governing class established a relation of disharmony with smaller regions and resolutely followed policies of uneven development. The rise of sub-national consciousness, it may be argued, is linked to such structural violence. In this conceptual framework, we will try to read the dynamics of identity politics by analyzing the formation of the governing class and the processes of class alignment and realignment, and the resultant socio-political structure in the Siraiki region.

The process of de-politicization of the people of Pakistan, the formation of the governing class, and the emergence of regional politics, began with the failure of the League to relocate itself as a broad-based, multi-cultured national institution. We have already discussed the ethnic composition of the League, which considered the Muslim bourgeois of northern India as its policy makers.<sup>58</sup> This leadership did not aspire to engage in egalitarian political institutions, as:

This would involve a shift in power away from the Muhajir-Punjabi elite to the Bengalis. None of the leaders in command at the centre, including Liaquat, had a political base in East Pakistan. The elections would therefore, have altered the hierarchies of power within the national elite, with Bengalis emerging at the helm of the central government. The refusal to accept such a shift prevented the Muslim League from developing into a national representative force.<sup>59</sup>

Upon this failure, and hinging on the charismatic personality of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the League became completely dependent on the central bureaucracy to remain in power, but, in due course, lost its dynamism and authority at both federal and provincial levels by the end of 1954.<sup>60</sup>

From the very beginning, Jinnah paid particular attention to the reorganization and re-structuring of the civil services for efficient governance.<sup>61</sup> The first instance of bureaucratic control became visible with Ghulam Muhammad at the seat of Governor General whose rule merely formalized the control of the bureaucracy over the legislature.<sup>62</sup> Although political intervention of the civil services began in the early days of Pakistan, the army remained a hesitant player in power politics.<sup>63</sup> And yet, the military forces were closely allied to the process of state formation and facilitated civilian administration in resolving administrative problems.<sup>64</sup> What we witness today is a role reversal of sorts with the military becoming more political in character and the bureaucracy maintaining a professional posture. It may not be hasty to conclude that economic and the US interests sowed the seeds of politicization in the Pakistan Army.<sup>65</sup> This dependency and parasitic relation of the Army with the Pentagon led to the logical intervention of the latter in the internal political affairs of Pakistan in order to strengthen the US position within the ruling elites.

Political degeneration increased with the convergence of interests between "civil and armed bureaucrats" and the USA.<sup>66</sup> Umar Noman, in *Pakistan: A Political and Economic History Since 1947* (1990), observes:

By the time of Ayub's coup two critical issues had been settled. First, parliamentary democracy would not be allowed to function in Pakistan. Second, a strong central executive would dominate the provinces. Pakistani politics have never recovered from these twin setbacks.<sup>67</sup>

Hasan Askari, a Pakistani political scientist, in *The Military and Politics in Pakistan-1947-1997* (2000), has pointed to the political role of the military becoming the defining characteristic of politics with the diminution of civilian supremacy.<sup>68</sup> This affected the performance of military regimes and political institutions in two ways: first, the political institutions they fabricated provided little room for 'dialogue, bargaining, accommodation and participation'.<sup>69</sup> Second, they introduce the concept of "oneness" of Pakistan, quite irrelevant to democratic political philosophy.



The newly born state of Pakistan was not only divided geographically but comprised regional and cultural diversity. As mentioned earlier, the military and bureaucracy, which had a majority of Punjabi and Urdu speaking groups, became influential actors in the country's politics from the early days. The power structure provided little space for other regional elites, especially the Bengalis, who had a developed language and culture which had been sidelined and ignored in the demand for a separate Muslim state.

The military bureaucracy *junta*, the "governing class" in Marxist terminology, tried to enforce a monolithic identity on the polity. Meanwhile, regional elites worked the masses on the issue of provincial autonomy. To handle such a situation, religious catchphrases and historical interpretation of mediaeval Islam were employed to counter and defy these regional elites and from there, narrowly based religious groups which turned out to be the tool of the establishment, tried to oppose regional autonomy. The result of all these endeavours was the increasing vigour and stridency of ethno-nationalistic movements.

The first challenge to the central authority came from the Bengali language movement. Only a few months after the Partition of India, when it became clear that Urdu would be the *lingua franca* of the new country, the student community in East Bengal launched a movement for an equal status for Bengali language. The situation became so serious that Jinnah was provoked to visit East Bengal. He warned the students 'to beware of these fifth columnist' and made it clear that 'for official use in this province, the people of the province can choose any language they wish... There can, however, be only one *lingua franca*,... and that language should be Urdu and cannot be any other'. The speech was followed by a strong reaction among the Bengali students, who felt betrayed and disgraced. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at the time, a young university student leader, alongwith many other protesters, was arrested and put in prison.

The language issue was further complicated by the delay in Constitution-making. Between 1948-54, the Pakistan Constituent Assembly met only sixteen days in a year, with an average attendance of forty-six members. One of the main reasons for this



delay was the question of power sharing among provinces. The regional elites were ambitious to grab as much power as they could. The Punjabi elite, on a number of occasions, opposed proposals which challenged the Punjab's domination. For instance, in 1952 Khwaja Nazimuddin's constitutional proposals were rejected by a Punjabi Finance Minister, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, and another Punjabi, Mushtaq Ahmad Ghurmani, then Interior Minister, since these were against the interests of the Punjab.

In the 1950s, the East Bengalis were negotiating for representation in the power structure. The 1956 Constitution, despite its shortcomings, assured their equal representation in the parliament. They would have exerted more influence in the domains of power after 1959 elections, but General Ayub Khan's martial law sealed the possibility of such a political development. His understanding of the East Bengali people was not different from the ethnic hierarchy in West Pakistan, although he did not belong to any of these groups. In his autobiography, General Ayub writes:

East Bengalis probably belong to the very original Indian races...until the creation of Pakistan they had not known any real freedom or sovereignty...In addition they have been, and still are, under considerable Hindu cultural and linguistic influence. As such they have all the inhibitions of the downtrodden races and have not yet found it possible to adjust psychologically to the requirements of the newborn freedom.<sup>70</sup>

General Ayub established a presidential form of government through the 1962 Constitution. Article 131 empowered the central government to take any action which it thought appropriate in the "national interest". The powers given to the bureaucrats significantly marginalized the role of regional elites which further alienated them. Violent protests erupted throughout the country against the regime, as indicated by table 1.

**Table: 0.1 Riots in East and West Pakistan**

Year	West Pakistan	East Pakistan
1958	1 356	4 550
1959	913	3 232
1960	1 114	4 499
1961	1 681	4 777
1962	609	4 792
1963	758	5 182
1964	1 086	5 723
1965	995	5 626
1966	967	6 135

Source: Pakistan Statistical Yearbook (1967). Umer Noman *Pakistan: A Political and Economic History Since 1947* (GB:1990) p. 32.

The situation became so serious that by 1966, some East Bengali politicians spoke of amendments to the proposed constitutional framework which later came to be known as the Six Points. With some amendments, these points became the principle objectives of the Awami League's manifesto in the 1970 election. The important clauses of these proposals demanded that the federal government should control only defence and foreign affairs, and two separate currencies and militia were suggested for each wing of Pakistan.

Due to historical reasons, Pakistan inherited unevenly developed regions which was further complicated by General Ayub's market oriented development policies. Liberalization of the economy was ensured by relaxing bureaucratic controls which sharply increased industrial productions that rose to 72 per cent between 1958-63. When Ayub took over, there was a difference of 30 per cent in the per capita incomes of East Bengal and West Pakistan which increased to 45 per cent in 1965, and 61 per cent in 1969. The IMF, World Bank and other development institutions equally contributed to this uneven economic growth. For instance, the World Bank 'usually selected those projects which promised



the highest rate of return and they tended to be in West Pakistan'.<sup>71</sup>

In Sindh, G M Syed, a Sindhi nationalist leader, initiated a movement for a separate Sindhi state, *Sindhu Desh*. In 1954, when the provinces in the western wing were merged into One-Unit, it was opposed by Sindhi leaders. The Sindhi Adabi Sangat demanded that Sindhi be made one of the national languages. Five million Sindhi speaking people would be 'handicapped and put at a disadvantage in the field of education, trade and commerce, and public services as against Urdu-knowing fellow citizens' if Sindhi was not given the status of official language,<sup>72</sup> they claimed.

In 1959, the report on national education aroused the ire of Sindhi politicians and linguists because it stipulated the introduction of Urdu after primary education. On 9 November 1962, Sindhi ethno-nationalists celebrated a 'Sindhi Day' with the demand to restore their language to its previous status as medium of instruction at matric level, and a medium of examination at the graduate level. The situation compelled the President to assure them of accepting their demand, but, in this period the number of Sindhi medium schools decreased which was probably due the increase in the Urdu speaking population in Karachi. Sindhi-medium schools continue to be popular in Sindh amongst the local population but they are limited to the primary level.

General Ayub's programme of industrialization increased resentment in rural Sindh because his plan of industrialization focused on Karachi by ignoring the smaller towns of Sindh. It was left to Ayub's foreign minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a Sindhi landlord, who later formed the Pakistan People's Party and attempted to mobilize the rural and urban centres. In 1970, the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education and the University of Sindh made Sindhi compulsory for all students and candidates. It led to violent protests by the Urdu speaking population in the province, especially in Karachi. Riots broke out again in 1972 when the provincial government of the PPP proposed a bill for increasing the use of Sindhi. For promoting the cause of Muhajir, Altaf Hussain, an Urdu speaking leader, formed a party, Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), and began to assert a separate ethnic identity revolving around Urdu. Such an assertion led to further



disharmony within the province, which is up till now a significant factor in determining election results.

Local politicians in Balochistan, which was given the status of province as late as in the 1970s, also raised the issues of their own language and greater provincial autonomy. In various parts of the province, Balochi, Brahvi and Pashto are spoken alongwith Siraiki, Punjabi, Urdu and Persian. Since Balochi and Brahvi speaking population of the province call themselves Baloch and trace the same origin, the basis of a separate identity is not language but similar origin. In 1951, some Karachi-based Baloch intellectuals started *Oman*, a monthly periodical, under the auspices of Baloch Educational Society. It was followed by a literary movement for Baloch renaissance, the Lathkhana, primarily due to the efforts of Gul Khan Naseer, a famous Baloch poet, and two brothers, Azat Jamaldini and Abdullah Jamaldini. In 1958, Azat started a monthly magazine, *Balochi*, which could not be published after one year due to financial constrains. In the same period, some political developments politicized the linguistic and cultural identity of the region. Most significant among them was the arrest and release of Prince Abdul Karim of Qalat on charges of patronizing a secessionist movement. Soon after his release, he formed the Ustaman Gall (People's Party) to struggle for a 'Baloch Province on linguistic and cultural lines'. The party was later merged in the National Awami Party. In 1958, the Baloch tribes launched an armed struggle against the army, under Nauroz Khan, the chief of the Zehri tribe. Due to the geographical contiguity of Balochistan with the General Headquarters of the military, it could not achieve any success. Like the Awami League in East Bengal, the National Awami Party (NAP) pushed the cause of Baloch autonomy in Balochistan.

In the decade of the 1960s, the Baloch tribes, especially the Pararis under Sher Muhammad Marri, remained engaged in an armed conflict with the military government, Marri also backed local intellectuals in promoting the language. Consequently, *Ulus*, a monthly magazine began in 1962, followed by a weekly paper, *Nokeen Daur*. In the early 60s, Warna Wananda and Baloch Academy, two literary organizations, were formed to promote the cause of Balochi language

In the 1970s, the Baloch guerrilla warfare intensified due to dishonourable dismissal of the provincial government of the National Awami Party. Nearly four hundred and fifty army personnel lost their lives as against 125 Baloch tribesmen. In the 1980s and the 90s, the conflict lost its early vigour, while the question of greater provincial autonomy remained a hot issue in the politics of Pakistan.

Like other provinces, the ethno-nationalists in the North-West Frontier Province also expressed their bitterness against strong centralization. The Pakhtun had a centuries-old tradition of Pashto language, which was politicized by Khan Ghaffar Khan (1890-1988), a pro-Congress Pakhtun nationalist. In the 1930s, the Afghan state began to promote Pashto as a state language, especially in northern Afghanistan, where Persian was popular among the locals. This received an enthusiastic response among the Pakhtun leadership, who identified culturally with Afghanistan. Ghaffar Khan opened 'Azad' or 'Islamia' schools in the tribal areas of the province, where Pashto and Arabic were taught. In 1921, he began to publish a magazine, *Pakhtun*, which laid great emphasis on the distinct cultural and linguistic identity of the Pakhtun. The magazine severely criticized the British schooling system in the region which was introducing alien values among the locals, who were asked to use Pashto in their day-to-day affairs.

After 1947, Ghaffar Khan suggested a confederation with Pakistan of the 'six settled districts of the North-West Frontier Province that may wish to join the new state of their own will'. After merger into One-Unit, the Pakhtun expressed bitter sentiments against the centre and the Punjab province. The National Awami Party actively furthered the cause of Pakhtun throughout the decade of the 1960s, but in 1970s when it formed a coalition government with the Jamait Ulema-i-Islam, the Pakhtun cause became a secondary issue. In the 1980s, the NAP again raised the issue of Pakhtunistan, but in the 90s, after the Afghan war, the Pakhtun leadership gave up the idea of unified Pakhtun state probably due to civil war and internal economic instability in Afghanistan. The demand for a name to their province and for greater provincial autonomy is still an issue in regional politics.

The situation became worse when the constituency of the

central elites was challenged by the Siraiki nationalist movement, exposing one centre of power, the Punjab. Frustrated voices began to be raised in these areas against the discriminatory policies of successive governments. This led to the partly organized struggle for regional autonomy in the Siraiki speaking region of southern Punjab.

In the succeeding chapters, I will try to examine the construction of Siraiki identity and the dynamics of this movement with special reference to the impact of state policies on the emergence of ethnic politics and demand for regional autonomy. The aim is not to critique regional identity formation but to study it in historical perspective and recent developments.

I solely own all mistakes, errors and shortcomings in the book and hope this small step of writing on the politics of southern Punjab and the construction of ethnic identities in the Siraiki speaking region will help in further discussion and research on this part of the country.



## ENDNOTES

- 1 Anwar Syed, *Pakistan: Islam, Politics and National Solidarity* (Lahore: 1984).
- 2 Akbar S Ahmad, *Pakistan Society* (Karachi: 1986) p.4.
- 3 Hamza Alvi, "Authoritarianism and Legitimation of State Power in Pakistan", in Subrata Mitra (ed), *The Post Colonial State in South Asia* (London and New York: 1990). Hamza Alvi, "Politics of Ethnicity in India and Pakistan", in Alvi & Harriss (ed), *Sociology of Developing Societies: South Asia*, 1989. Hamza Alvi, "Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan", *Pakistan Progressive*, Vol. 9 (1), 1987.
- 4 Paul Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison* (New Delhi: 1991).
- 5 Tariq Rahman, *Language, Education and Culture* (Karachi: 1999).
- 6 Mumtaz Dar int: 08/03/2001.
- 7 The concept of "kin-ship" or "nepotism" and its role in the process of identity formation, or ethnicity is discussed in primordial theories. These theories entertain ethnicity, 'as a predominantly *biological* phenomenon having its roots in *culture* and *history*' (italics in original). These are based on evolutionism, and ethnicity is treated by genetic and geographical factors. Pierre Van den Berghe, while explaining ethnicity, centred his concept on a socio-biological approach of "inclusive fitness". This concept explains the effects of altruistic behaviour in reducing individual fitness (the genetic transmission to the next generation) and, at the same time, increasing one's kin group fitness by helping more of one's relatives to reproduce, thus transmitting albeit indirectly more of one's own genes. This favouring of kin over non-kin is known as "kin-selection" or "nepotism". See for an overview, Alan Barnard and Jonathon Spencer (ed), *Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology* (N.Y.: 1996) p. 190-91.
- 8 Mubarak Ali, *Almia-e-Tariekh* (Lahore: 1999) p. 181.
- 9 Ibid, p. 182-83.
- 10 Ibid, p. 272.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Mubarak Ali, *Mughal Darbar* (Lahore: 1995) p. 126,128.
- 13 Mubarak Ali, *Almia-e-Tariekh* (Lahore: 1999) p. 122-28.
- 14 Ibid, p. 273.
- 15 Mubarak Ali, "Hindustan ur Ruhaila". *Tariekh* (4) (Lahore: 2000) p. 185.
- 16 Hamza Alvi, *Jagirdari Ur Samraj* (Translated by Tahir Kamran) (Lahore: 2000) p. 51.
- 17 Ibid. p. 53.
- 18 S M Ikram. *A History of Muslim Civilization in India and Pakistan* (Lahore: 1993) p. 644.
- 19 Mumtaz Dar int: 9/03/2001.
- 20 Akbar S Ahmad compares these two schools of thought by focusing on the characters of Aurangzeb and Dara Shikoh.

Aurangzeb	Dara Shikoh
1. Orthodox, legalistic Islam.	Syncretic, eclectic Islam.
2. Emphasis on <i>ummah</i> or Muslim community.	Universalistic humanity.
3. Discouraged art (music, dancing, etc.).	Encouraged art.
3. Supported clergy/ <i>ulemma</i> .	Anti-clergy ('paradise is where there is no <i>mullah</i> ').

<p>4. Outward signs of orthodoxy: rejected silk cloth and gold vessel, the <i>Nawroz</i> –the Persian New Year–the solar year, etc.</p> <p>5. Patron of <i>Fatwai-i-Alamgeri</i>, most comprehensive digest of Muslim jurisprudence ever compiled.</p> <p>6. Favourite reading Quran, Al-Ghazzali.</p> <p>7. Wished Muslim society to revert to orthodox mould thus drawing boundaries.</p>	<p>Kept constant company with the <i>Sufis</i>, Hindu <i>yogi</i> and <i>sanyasi</i>: his ring bore legend "<i>Prabhu</i>", the Sanskrit for god. Patron/translator of <i>Upanishad/Bhagavadgita</i>, classic Hindu texts, into Persian.</p> <p>Favourite reading: mystics.</p> <p>Wished to expand boundaries of Muslim society by incorporating non-Muslims: equates Micheal with Vishnu, Adam with Brahman, etc.</p>
---	---

Source—Akbar S Ahmad, *Pakistan Society* (Karachi: 1986) p. 10.

- 21 Iftikhar H Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan* (Lahore: 1997) p. 41-42.
- 22 Ibid., p. 42.
- 22 Akbar S Ahmad, *Pakistan Society* (Karachi: 1986).
- 23 Mubarak Ali, "Hindustan ur Ruhaila". *Tariekh* (4) (Lahore: 2000) p. 179-85.
- 24 *Encyclopedia Encarta* (Microsoft 2001).
- 25 Inayatullah, *Politics of Ethnicity and Separatism in South Asia* (Centre For South Asian Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore: ?).
- 26 Nehru's speech, *Indian Parliamentary Debates*. Quoted from S M Burke and Salim Al-Din Quraishi, *The British Raj in India* (Karachi: 1995) p. 633. Sir John Seeley, the British historian, concluded that 'India can hardly be said to have been conquered at all by the foreigners. She has rather conquered herself'. (Ibid. p.634). The example of Siraiiki people can be quoted here, 'who supported the East India Company due to their resentment and hatred against the Sikh rule over their areas'. Mumtaz Dar int: 08/03/2001.
- 27 India was famous for her wealth and riches. Before European takeover, she was 'exporting to England cotton goods, silks, spices, sugar, indigo, lead, quicksilver and saltpeter. The balance of trade was heavily in favour of India, amounting to almost about 1.8 million pounds, which at the time constituted more than ten per cent of England's annual revenue'. See Dr Viqar Zaman, "Crippling Colonialism", *Dawn* (Lahore: 21 January 2001). According to Burke and Quraishi, Mughal India was 'one of the richest countries in the world, but in the immediately – following British period it became one of the poorest'. See Burke and Quraishi, *The British Raj in India* (Karachi: 1995) p. 648.
- 28 Hamza Alvi tossed the term, "colonial mode of production" in order to distinguish between the pre-colonial mode of production and the mode of production formulated and established during the colonial period. See for details Hamza Alvi, "India: Transition from Feudalism to Colonial Capitalism". Translated by Tahir Kamran, *Jagirdari Ur Samraj* (Lahore: 2000) p. 94-101.
- 29 Ibid, p. 50.
- 30 For example, the British imposed heavy protected duties and administrative measures to keep Indian textiles out of British markets e.g., "under pressure from British textile interests and despite ideological commitment to *laissez faire*, a 10 per cent import duty was imposed in Britain in 1685, which was doubled in 1690. A year later, law was passed which, 'prohibited the wear and use of Indian silks and calicoes, painted, stained or dyed in India, under the plenty of five pound for each offence on each wearer and of 20 pounds on the seller...the protective duty against Indian textiles was raised to 85 per cent in 1813. Moreover, in India the *dadni* merchants, who were independent moneylenders cum traders, were now pushed out by *goomasthas*, agents of the East India Company, who sort direct



control over the weavers. The weavers were obliged to work against their will at whatever prices were arbitrarily imposed on them. When the weavers resisted, a practice of physical torture was introduced. The control under which the weaver population was held was not only a matter of practice but it was legalized by regulations". See for details, Hamza Alvi, "Colonialism and the Rise of Capitalism", p. 7-14. And also see, Hamza Alvi, "Formation of Social Structure of South Asia under the Impact of Colonialism", p.2-8.

31 Table 0.3 Relative Shares of World Manufacturing Output (1750-1900)

	1750	1800	1830	1860	1880	1900
Europe (as a whole)	23.2	28.1	34.2	53.2	61.3	62.0
United Kingdom	1.9	4.3	9.5	19.9	22.9	18.5
Habsburg Empire	2.9	3.2	3.2	4.2	4.4	4.7
France	4.0	4.2	5.2	7.9	7.8	6.8
German States	2.9	3.5	3.5	4.9	8.5	13.2
Italian States	2.4	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.5
Russia	5.0	5.6	5.6	7.0	7.6	8.8
United States	0.1	0.8	2.4	7.2	14.7	23.6
Japan	3.8	3.5	2.8	2.6	2.4	2.4
Third World	73.0	67.7	60.5	36.6	20.9	11.0
China	32.8	33.3	29.8	19.7	12.5	6.2
India/ Pakistan	24.5	19.7	17.6	8.6	2.8	1.7

Table 0.4 Per-Capita Levels of Industrialization (1750-1900)

(Relative to UK in 1900= 100)

	1750	1800	1830	1860	1880	1900
Europe (as a whole)	8	8	11	16	24	35
United Kingdom	10	16	25	64	87	[100]
Habsburg Empire	7	7	8	11	15	23
France	9	9	12	20	28	39
German States	8	8	9	15	25	52
Italian States	8	8	8	10	12	17
Russia	6	6	7	8	10	15
United States	4	9	14	21	38	69
Japan	7	7	7	7	9	12
Third World	7	6	6	4	3	2
China	8	6	6	4	4	3
India/ Pakistan	7	6	6	3	2	1

Source (Tables-0.3 & 0.4): Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (Lahore: 1996) p. 190.



- 32 Hamza Alvi, "Hindustan: Feudalism Sa Nu-abadiati Capitalism tuk". Translated by Tahir Kamran, *Jagirdari Ur Samraj* (Lahore: 2000) p. 87-94.
- 33 Ibid, p. 92.
- 34 The examples of the separation of NWFP from the Punjab, Sindh from Mumbai on the demand of political parties can be quoted here. It is also claimed by Siraiki activists that the British government was planning to separate 'the Siraiki region' from rest of the Punjab, but could not do so due to the Second World War and later on due to the political crisis in India.
- 35 Iftikhar H Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan* (Lahore: 1997) p. 81.
- 36 Mubarak Ali, *Jagirdari* (Lahore: 1996) p. 119.
- 37 Various constitutional reforms were introduced to provide protection and stability to feudal lords, e.g., "in the Punjab 'The Alienation of the Land Act' was imposed, in 1900, which reduced the influence of moneylenders over landlords. In the words of Sir Michael O' Dwyer, the former English officer in the Punjab, 'The Land Alienation Act of 1900' is now regarded by hereditary landowners of all religions and castes as their Magna Carta". Quoted from Khalid bin Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan* (NY: 1980) p. 7. Similarly, 'The Law of Inheritance', allowed landlords to appoint their successor, which helped them to retain their land-holdings.
- 38 Darling, a British officer, while writing about the plight of people in the district of Muzaffargarh, observed: "Every five miles or so is the house of a tribal or religious leader, who maintains a band of retainers to enforce his influence on his poorer neighbours, and to conduct his feuds with his equals. The poor man pays blackmail for his cattle to these local chieftains and for his soul to his *pir*, who may or may not live in the neighbourhood, but visits his followers yearly to receive his dues". (Ibid. p. 7). 'The situation in Dera Ghazi Khan was equally grim. Baring a few exceptions, "the landlord's maw was insatiable" and as a result of the Land Alienation Act he had doubled his acres. The small peasants, after satisfying the demands of the landlord, had to pay his dues and bribes to the moneylenders, village *mullah*, and a whole host of revenue officials and village menials. Both in Muzaffargarh and Dera Ghazi Khan, with the exception of about 5 per cent who did not oppress their tenants, landlords were described as "all throat stranglers". In Mianwali most of the landlords were "tyrants". The landlords in the District of Jhang and in some parts of Multan "were most powerful than officers, they inspired each fears in their tenants that they could take from them what service they pleased, and that they eat up the lands of the smaller folk, and rarely let their tenants stay long on a well for fear that they will assert their right of occupancy". Ibid., p. 6.
- 39 Mubarak Ali, *Jagirdari* (Lahore: 1996) p. 117-121.
- 40 The class which fulfills the criteria for jobs in government, works or aspires to work in these vacancies, and looks for more job opportunities.
- 41 Iftikhar H Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan* (Lahore: 1997) p. 76.
- 42 Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: 2000) p. 37-38.
- 43 Iftikhar H Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan* (Lahore: 1997) p. 58-59.
- 44 Ibid, p. 59.
- 45 Ibid, p. 60.
- 46 Ibid, p. 60.
- 47 Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: 2000) p. 13.
- 48 Ibid, p. 49-50.
- 49 Ibid, p. 35.
- 50 Ibid, p. 53.
- 51 Warren Hastings, the governor of India (1774-1785) was in favour of indigenization as a mean of governance. According to Tariq Rahman, it was the part of political

strategy to conciliate the established regional elites of culture and learning. Wellesley wrote in a letter: 'the college (of vernacular education) must stand—or the Empire must fall'. The British officers, who represented the government for common people, used the indigenous languages to win the favour. The example of Col. David Lorimer, the political agent in Gilgit can be quoted as example. The Fort William College and the Asiatic Society of Bengal gave modern shape to vernaculars. See for details, Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: 2000) p. 26-28.

52 Ibid, p. 37.

53 For detail account, how Muslim linguists tried to purify Urdu by limiting its scope among the elite and educated class, see Mubarak Ali, *Tariekh kia kehti hai* (Lahore: 1998) p.23-33. The Muslims of UP were the descendants of the Mughal administrators who were governing India at the time of British conquest, therefore, Urdu was the *raison d'être*. Tariq Rahman writes: "As a symbol, it (Urdu) was invested with so much emotion that it was salient, even without conscious manipulation by the leaders of the Urdu elite. It was chosen or rather forced itself upon the consciousness of the Urdu elite of UP mainly for extra-rational reasons. The non-Urdu speaking Muslims of India however choose it primarily for instrumental ones. For them after Islam, it was the only identity marker that could transcend ethnic and local loyalties. Thus, by the time of partition, Urdu was an important part of Muslim separatism in South Asia". Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: 2000) p. 77-78.

54 Mubarak Ali, *Tariekh kia kehti hai* (Lahore: 1998) p. 37.

55 Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman* (Lahore: 1995) p. 5. Sharif al Mujahid writes about Jinnah's leadership phenomenon: 'Leaders called upon to lead nationalist coalitions covering a wide spectrum of political opinion are bound to be a little vague as to the full implication of their goals, if only to retain the allegiance of divergent schools in their derive to the supreme goal'. Sharif al Mujahid, *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah: Studies in Interpretations*. Quoted from Pandey Nayak (ed), *Pakistan Society and Politics* (Dehli:1984) p. 32. In 1947, he protested on the partition of Bengal and Punjab on communal basis as, 'He begged the Viceroy "not to destroy the unity of Bengal and the Punjab, which had national characteristics in common: common history, common ways of life; and where the Hindus have stronger feelings as Bengalis or Punjabis than they have as members of the Congress"'. See for details, Ayesha Jalal, p. 252.

56 Khalid bin Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan* (N.Y.: 1980) p. 11. See also, Ayesha Jalal, p. 144.

57 According to Franz Fanon, the anti-colonial movements that symbolizes constitutional struggle only represent elite classes while the movements which succeed by armed struggle represent common people. Mubarak Ali, *Tariekh kia kehti hai* (Lahore: 1998) p. 37. Alvi believes that the League's success was due to nationalist movement launched by the Indian National Congress.

58 Umer Noman, *Pakistan: A Political and Economic History Since 1947* (G.B.:1990) p. 9.

59 Ibid., p. 9-10.

60 Ibid., p. 10.

61 A post of secretary general was created to co-ordinate among the various ministries, but this step made bureaucratic control much stronger and bureaucrats later began to by-pass their own ministers. Jinnah, being the Quaid-i-Azam, the Governor General and the President of the Constituent Assembly became the source of all constitutional powers. Section 51 of the Government of India Act (1935), and



Section 92a, paved the way for the intervention of centre in the provinces. The ministries of Dr Khan Sahib in NWFP, and Ayub Khuro in Sindh were dismissed under this Clause which was later used by his predecessors. Jinnah was too sick to handle the day-to-day affairs in the country. Under the cover of the Governor General, civil bureaucrats exercised enormous powers on his behalf. During his premiership, Liaquat Ali Khan also relied on the bureaucratic setup and his secretary used to order on his behalf.

- 62 Every possible effort for reducing the power of Governor General was made unsuccessful. In 1954, the Constituent Assembly, tried to limit the powers of Governor General by enacting a law, 'which made it impossible for him to dismiss prime minister. It also repealed the PRODA legislation (1949), which was meant to investigate the charges of corruption against politicians. In real sense it had provided Civil Servants with considerable regulatory power over the conduct of political leaders. The response of the Civil Service was swift. The Governor General dissolved the Constituent Assembly'. Umer Noman, *Pakistan: A Political and Economic History Since 1947* (GB:1990) p. 12.
- 63 For instance, when General Ayub was promoted as C-in-C in January 1951, he advised his troops to 'keep out of politics. By saying this I do not mean to imply that you should not take an intelligent interest in the affairs of your country. In fact, as citizens of Pakistan you must do that. But, what you must avoid is taking any active part in party politics and propagation of any such views. As I said before, you are servants of Pakistan and as such, the servants of any party that the people put in power'. On another occasion, he declared: 'I always told my people that (Army's) major task is to give cover to the country behind which it could build a sound democratic system and lay the foundation of a stable future'. Hasan Askari, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-1997* (Lahore:2000) p.70-71. General Ayub also refused Ghulam Muhammad when the latter invited him to step in.
- 64 'The government sought the assistance of the Army for evacuation and production of refugees at the time of independence. Its personnel were also involved in providing humanitarian assistance to the incoming refugees. The civilian governments continued to rely on the military in the subsequent period for the maintenance of law and order and for coping with natural calamities, i.e., floods, cyclones, earthquake, etc., as well as for a number of other administrative problems, i.e., food shortages, smuggling, dacoity, narcotics trafficking, etc. The military also made a significant contribution to the developmental work in the form of anti-salinity drive, road construction and improvement of communication, especially in the northern areas, and improvement of water resources in Balochistan. These activities in the civilian domain helped to build the image of the military, and adversely affected the reputation of the civilian government. The military began to be viewed at the common man level as a resourceful organization capable of salvaging the situation when the civilian leaders were unable to manage it'. Hasan Askari, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-1997* (Lahore:2000) p. 271.
- 65 The nationalization of oil in Iran (what Alvi terms it Musadiq Episode) compelled the Americans to find out the front line state in South Asia. The military establishment in Pakistan, which was in desperate need of new weapons, military hardware, and high standard training facilities, began to establish its relations with America as the senior commanders were enjoying complete 'freedom and autonomy in dealing with their professional and services affairs', see Hasan Askari, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-1997* (Lahore:2000) p. 271. This close collaboration between Rawalpindi and Pentagon developed in isolation to the internal political affairs of the country. See for details, Alvi, "Pakistan America



- Fauji Ta'luqat". Translated by Tahir Kamran in *Tariekh* (4) (Lahore:January, 2000).
- 66 The Bengali politicians, who were to dominate the parliament, were struggling for weak military-bureaucracy and strong political institutions. The elections, therefore, were neither in favour of strong military-bureaucracy oligarchy nor American interests.
- 67 Umer Noman, *Pakistan: A Political and Economic History Since 1947* (GB:1990) p. 15.
- 68 See Hasan Askari, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-1997* (Lahore:2000) p. 25. According to Finer's categorization, the military political intervention in Pakistan can be classified in four levels, influence, blackmail, displacement and supplantment. 'These levels of intervention are attained by various methods, alone or in conjunctions with one another. According to him, influence is perfectly legitimate and constitutional method of convincing the rulers to accept their point of view. This is done through persuasion. When the military leader threatens to use some sanctions, i.e., threat of violence or non-cooperation, should their advice not be followed, influence changes into blackmail. Displacement of one civil government or supplantment of civil regimes is achieved by threats to revolt, refusal to defend the government against its foes and refusal to defend the government against civil disorder. The supplantment of civil government can also take place through military takeover with or without violence, commonly known as coup. The latter mode of intervention is very common in the new nations. The military has, therefore, become 'crucial institution and power block'. In many new nation coup succeed because the public is relatively narrow and is weakly organized, the public attachment to their political institutions is so fragile that they hardly question the legitimacy of the takeover'. Hasan Askari, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-1997* (Lahore:2000) p. 22. The post-Zia democracy, depicts the first three levels of intervention while the three coups by Ayub Khan, Ziaul Haq and Pervaiz Musharraf are similar to the third level of intervention.
- 69 Hasan Askari, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-1997* (Lahore:2000) p. 274.
- 70 Umer Noman, *Pakistan: A Political and Economic History Since 1947* (GB:1990) p. 30.
- 71 Ibid, p. 41.
- 72 For an overview of the Sindhi language movement see Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* ( Karachi: 2000) p. 103-34.

## Siraiki Wasseib

The Siraiki belt in southern Punjab situated on the upper fringe of Sindh, is considered to be one of the most ancient inhabited lands of Pakistan by many researchers working on the Indus Valley civilization.<sup>1</sup> The area is generally hot and dusty but fertile primarily due to the canal system devised during the British Raj. The area and population of this region is more than the rest of the Punjab (see table 1.1), but it is difficult to draw an exact and conclusive boundary to this region on the basis of its cultural and linguistic homogeneity. According to the definition advocated by Siraiki ethno-nationalists, it incorporates four divisions, i.e., Multan, Sargodha, Bahawalpur and Dera Ghazi Khan, including two districts, Jhang and Dera Ismael Khan.<sup>2</sup> The agrarian economy of this region has concentrated the ownership of land and water resources in a few hands and defines the participation of this region in national politics.

TABLE 1.1 POPULATION OF SIRAIKI REGION  
(In thousands)

Districts	1951	1961	1972	1981	1992 estimated	1998
Bahwalnagar	631	821	1074	1374	1833	2433
Bahawalpur	528	736	1071	1453	—	2433
Rahim Yar Khan	665	1016	1399	1841	—	3073
Dera Ghazi Khan	631	777	1142	1583	—	1632
Layyah	162	273	496	667	941	1122
Rajanpur	247	304	456	639	925	1104
Muzaffargarh	751	990	1565	2165	2192	2581
Multan	725	2122	3133	4080	—	3117
Khanewal	635	775	1068	1370	1811	2068
Lodhran	289	364	559	740	—	1173
Pakpattan	381	440	616	844	—	1287
Sahiwal	604	2011	2684	3612	—	—
Vehari	—	703	1027	1329	1772	2048

Sargodha	1163	1468	2101	2553	2400	2666
Bhakkar					928	1044
Khushab	268	360	543	641	—	906
Mianwali	550	747	1096	1377	—	—
Jhang	863	10651	1555	1971	2583	2834
Dera Ismael Khan	223	272	380.23	494.43	—	853

SOURCES: The table is constructed with the help of 1998 *District Census Reports* of Sargodha, Bahwalnagar, Bahawalpur, Sahiwal, Dera Ismael Khan, Jhang, Mianwali, Khushab, Pakpattan, Lodhran, Khanewal, Multan. The figures of 1992 are taken from *Pre Investment Reports* of Jhang, Sargodha, Bhakkar, Vehari, Khanewal, Muzaffargarh, Rajanpur, Layyah and Bahwalnagar.

# I

Different explanations have been given to describe the origin of word "Siraiki" and the Siraiki language. According to one source, it came from a Sindhi word "Sirro", which means "of the north".<sup>3</sup> Ihsan H Nadiem, former Director of Archaeology, Pakistan, in the *Portrait of Sindh* writes about the traditional division of Sindh into three parts, viz: *Lar*—which consists of southern Sindh; *Wicholo*—which is central Sindh, the area around Hyderabad; and *Uttar* or *Sirro*—which comprises the areas of northern Sindh. It includes Sehwan Sharif, Larkana, Khairpur and the tract which separate Sukkur from Cutch Gundava. Ihsan contends that the word "Siraiki" originated from this region.<sup>4</sup> Yuri V Gankovsky in the *Peoples of Pakistan* also termed the people of Sirro as "Siraiki".<sup>5</sup> This view corresponds with a noted Pakistani archeologist Hassan Dani's reading, which terms Siraiki a corruption of "Sauvira" or "Savistan" (now Sehwan Sharif) a province of Sindh during the Brahman dynasty.<sup>6</sup> At that time, there were three other provinces of Sindh, one of them being Multan.<sup>7</sup> Considering this explanation, the word "Siraiki" seems to have its origin in Sindh rather than in the presently defined Siraiki belt.

Mushtaqur Rahman, Professor of Cultural Geography at the Iowa State University, USA, gives a racial interpretation to this word. According to him, the races that migrated from the (present) Punjab to Sindh, mainly Jat, Rajput and Baloch, were called Siraiki by the Sindhis.<sup>8</sup> They, probably, settled down in Sirro, and their language came to be known as Siraiki. Ihsan, in the *Portrait of Sindh*, notes that the language of Jat, Baloch and Abbasi was called



Siraiki in the region of Sirro.<sup>9</sup> In his other work, *Thar*, Ihsan notes that some Baloch tribes living in Thar are called 'Sirai', as they speak Siraiki language.<sup>10</sup>

To understand how these races called Siraiki in Sindh were recognized in upper Punjab, the Jat and the Rajput may be taken as an example. Denzil Ibbetson (1848-1908), a noted British ethnographer and Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, in his *Punjab Castes* (1881), is of the opinion that it is almost impossible to differentiate between the Jat and Rajput in lower Punjab (present Siraiki belt), but there is no such a problem in upper Punjab. Both identities are so closely intermingled with each other that they appear to comprise the same entity in lower Punjab.<sup>11</sup> If it is so, then it means that the Rajput who migrated from upper Punjab to Sindh were also considered Siraiki.

Now take the example of the Jat. Their migration pattern shows that they came to lower Punjab from Sindh, and then migrated to upper Punjab. Those Jat immigrants who settled in upper Punjab began to call themselves 'Jet',<sup>12</sup> which was probably corrupted due to the jerky style of speaking in upper Punjab. The word "Jat" remained in currency in lower Punjab in the soft spoken (Jatki) dialect<sup>13</sup> of the local population. The word Jat means camel grazers, which was considered an insult by the Jet (especially those in the Rawalpindi Division<sup>14</sup>) who with the passage of time began to assert their separate identity. Hence the Jet and others constructed "Jat" as an inferior identity. There are, therefore, two different types of identity markers for the people of lower Punjab who were either recognized by their kinship (Jat, Baloch, etc.) in upper Punjab and as the Siraiki (people of north) in Sindh.

It is difficult to assess how the Sindhis may have viewed the Siraikis, whether as people with a definite language and culture or as an identityless stock who were constructed as "others". The Siraikis had some linguistic-cultural characteristics which made them distinguishable, but we have seen earlier that the people of upper Punjab identified immigrants from lower Punjab by their race and not by their linguistic and regional identity. Although 'Jatki', 'Balochki' were considered languages spoken in Multan and some other southern regions, these languages which are now supposed

to be the dialects of Siraiki, were originally attributed to the Jat and the Baloch respectively. Even here, race became the prime identity marker.

Why these people were either identified by race in upper Punjab and called people "of the north" in Sindh remains a moot question. Archeological research conducted by different teams points to the civilization that flourished in the centuries before Christ which is believed to have vanished partly due to the change in the course of the rivers and partly due to the invasions from Iran and Afghanistan. Multan appears to be the only region in the present Siraiki belt which shows a continuity and growth in local linguistic and cultural traditions. Many historical accounts reveal the antiquity, economic affluence, and cultural resiliency of Multan, which remained the capital of Sindh for sometime. Many historians agree that in the times of Alexander, "Mali-us-than" was the old name of Multan.<sup>15</sup> Siraiki ethno-nationalists believe that the word "Siraiki" means "language of the chiefs".<sup>16</sup> According to Sheikh Ikramul Haq, Siraiki was spoken in Multan, which was then the capital of Sindh, while Hamida Khuro and Yuri V Gankovsky call the people of upper Sindh "Siraikis". Gankovsky considers the races of southern Punjab came from the intermingling of the races in Sindh and upper Punjab, hence, he holds, they possess the linguistic and cultural qualities of both regions. Like Khuro, he also terms the language spoken in upper Sindh as Siraiki.<sup>17</sup> Some sources suggest that Siraiki was spoken by the Kalhora, the rulers of Sindh, who settled in Multan. That's why Siraiki linguists seldom treat their language as being closer to Sindhi as compared to Punjabi.<sup>18</sup> According to Sadiq Jeri, a Siraiki linguist, 'people in Sindh understand and even can speak Siraiki by changing the pronunciation of three or four words of the Sindhi language, but the Siraikis cannot do that as they have no idea about it, so we can call Siraiki the elder sister of Sindhi language'.<sup>19</sup>

Several other accounts reveal that the language spoken in Multan was Multani.<sup>20</sup> The architecture in Multan was known as "Multani" architecture, its silk was famous by the name of "Multani" silk. Although the architecture was copied not only in Sindh but also in other parts of the subcontinent,<sup>21</sup> and the peripheral zones, from



Bahawalpur to Sindh and Jhang, Sahiwal, Sargodha, appear to have divergent cultures. The word "Siraiki", therefore, may have nothing to do with the region presently known as southern Punjab, rather, it is related to parts of upper Sindh, as also noted by Dr Dani, who termed it a corruption of Sauvira or Sauviraki, a province between the region of present Bahawalpur and upper Sindh.<sup>22</sup> The people called Siraikis in Sindh could be immigrants from the region between Bahawalpur and upper Sindh.

We may conclude that Siraiki was a fragile linguistic and cultural identity which was not related to Multan or its people in terms of language or culture. It was coined by the Sindhis to identify immigrants and those living in upper Sindh since the word Siraiki was prevalent in Sindh, but was never accepted in lower Punjab. The people and language were identified by locally constructed identities. When Uch became the centre of the Sufis and the *ulia*, the locals began to assert their identity as "Uchi". Similarly, when Bahawalpur became a state, the locals began to call themselves Bahawalpuri and their language was termed "Riasti". The language spoken in Multan was known as "Multani".

The present sense of Siraiki as a cultural identity began to take root in the 1960s. With the designing of the canal system by the British rulers, the people from upper Punjab were offered incentives by the State of Bahawalpur to migrate to cultivate the lands.<sup>23</sup> These people who were predominantly Punjabi speaking are known today as Abadkar but they prefer to call themselves "Punjabi", probably due to the sense of alienation attached to this word. I will use the word "Abadkar" for the Punjabi speaking settlers so as to distinguish them from the Punjabi speaking people of upper Punjab. In order to encourage cultivation in the region, the British government and the Nawab of Bahawalpur encouraged these Abadkar by allotting them large land-holdings. Since the Abadkar were economically and educationally stronger to the illiterate and extremely poor local population, they never made an effort to assimilate in the local culture. Instead, they kept their link to their birthplaces, both ideologically and due to their blood relation in upper Punjab. Within a few decades, the Abadkar became an affluent and politically effective force in the Siraiki region.



After Partition, migrants from India began to arrive in this region in large numbers. Since the subcontinent had been divided along religious lines, the Muslim immigrants were called "Muhajir"—the Islamic word for people 'who leave a place to seek sanctuary or freedom from persecution or freedom of religion or any other (just) purpose'.<sup>24</sup> For this group of immigrants which was predominantly Urdu and Punjabi speaking, a system of compensation was evolved. Lands were allotted to them and, consciously or unconsciously, the settlers preferred to establish either independent businesses or cultivate their own land. If they ventured out at all, it was to get jobs in the state machinery. Soon, they became influential in the region and were not dependent upon the local population for their economic needs.

Since both these groups of settlers were alien to the region, they were obviously outclassed by the locals in number. It was only the "convergence of interest" that brought them close to one other. With a distinct sense of superiority they called the locals *dhagga* (crude), *munafiq* (duplicious), etc. and, in turn, the locals called them *panahger* (asylum-seekers). Among some Muhajir, local Siraiki speaking people were stamped as hypocritical (*munafiq*).<sup>25</sup> Local proverbs and jokes reflect this undercurrent of hostility, but the relationship between the locals and the two sets of settlers, the Urdu and Punjabi speaking minorities, were apparently not hostile due to the vertical relationship between the two. The local population had to depend on the goodwill of the settlers for economic reasons.

Till the 1960s, the settlers were so powerful that in any electoral exercise their vote became the decisive factor. Amongst feudal lords of this region who were undisputed authorities in their respective constituencies, no one could win his seat in consecutive elections for the provincial and national assemblies (except on few seats like that of the Daultana in Ludden, District Vehari).<sup>26</sup> Feudal lords were never required to convince their tenants to cast votes because they were forced to do so, but they had to work in the towns that were politically and economically influenced by the settlers.

By the 1960s, local intellectuals started questioning the political and economic control of the settlers over their region. They cast

their argument in terms of cultural authenticity, attempting to trace the roots of their language in antiquity (their efforts for a cultural reconstruction of Siraiki identity will be dealt with in Chapter 4). For the first time in the 1960s, the word "Siraiki" was employed by the linguists and literary figures of southern Punjab.

At present, the language, famous for its musicality and mildness, is primarily used in the districts of Multan, Muzaffargarh, Dera Ghazi Khan, Bahawalpur and Rahim Yar Khan, with some areas of Mianwali and Jhang in the Punjab, and also in Dera Ismael Khan district in Khyber. The same language is also in use in the districts of upper Sindh, like Jacobabad, Sukkur and Khairpur, besides the Merri-Bugthi areas and Kachhi district in Balochistan.<sup>27</sup> The users of this language are also scattered throughout India, where alternative names of "Multani" and "Thali" are used for it. Like their neighbours, Indian Multani speaking people are mainly Hanafite Muslims and their numbers are estimated to be 23 500 in the year 1990, 25 800 in 1995, and 28 200 in 2000.<sup>28</sup> The percentage of Siraiki speaking people in southern Punjab can be seen in table 1.2.

TABLE 1.2  
THE LANGUAGES SPOKEN IN SOUTHERN PUNJAB

Southern Punjab	Urdu	Punjabi	Sindhi	Pashto	Balochi	Siraiki	Others
Bahwalnagar	3.7	94.6	*	0.3	*	1.2	0.1
Bahawalpur	5.5	28.4	0.1	0.6	0.1	64.3	1.1
Rahim Yar Khan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Dera Ghazi Khan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Layyah	3.1	32.6	0.1	1.5	*	62.3	0.4
Rajanpur	3.2	3.3	0.1	0.5	17.0	75.8	0.1
Muzaffargarh	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Multan	15.86	21.64	0.07	0.62	0.10	60.67	1.04
Khanewal	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Lodhran	9.1	18.6	0.1	0.2	*	69.6	2.4
Pakpattan	3.7	95.9	*	0.3	*	*	*
Sahiwal	1.4	98.1	*	0.4	*	0.1	*
Vehari	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sargodha	5.8	93.3	*	0.7	*	0.1	0.1



Bhakkar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Khushab	1.5	96.8	0.1	0.7	*	0.6	0.3
Mianwali	3.5	74.2	0.1	10.0	*	12.0	0.2
Jhang	3.3	95.9	*	0.4	*	0.1	0.2
Dera Ismael Khan	3.26	0.91	0.06	22.02	0.05	72.47	1.23

**SOURCES:** 1998 District Census Reports of Dera Ismael Khan, Sargodha, Jhang, Khushab Mianwali, Sahiwal, Pakpattan, Lodhran, Multan, Rajanpur, Layyah, Bahawalpur, Bahwalnagar.

## II

The political boundaries of the present Siraiiki belt have changed under different rulers. Before the Arab invasion, the region was ruled by the Brahman dynasty which, according to the Arab author of *Majma-i-Waridat*, had reigned Sindh for two thousand years.<sup>29</sup> Siharas Rai, one of the important kings of this dynasty, divided his empire into four administrative units. In the extreme north was the province of Multan, bordered by Kashmir. Brahmapur, Kahrur, and Ashahar were the important cities of the province of Multan. In the last months of 641 AD, Hiun Tsang, a Chinese pilgrim, visited the 'Kingdom of Mu-lo-an-pu-lu' by 'leaving the right bank of the Indus'.<sup>30</sup> Chach, a Brahman, who seized power after the death of Sahasi Rai, ruled the kingdom of Sindh. When the Arabs captured Sindh, Multan became their important military outpost. For the next three centuries, there is no record of any war or confrontation in this region. The areas located above the district of Multan were controlled by Hindu rulers. Similarly, the northern Sahi dynasties were busy in confronting the Muslim rulers of Kandahar and Kabul.

It appears that the Muslim administrators of Multan never interfered in the religious matters of the locals, except during invasions when temples were pillaged. The Governor, who was from the family of Quriesh, used to reside in the cantonment located a few miles away from the city.

By the end of the tenth century, Multan was taken over by the Ismaili sect. Lodhi Pathan, who were controlling the areas between Peshawar and Multan and were engaged in a confrontation with Mahmood Ghaznavi, became strong allies of the Karmatian because it provided them opportunity to profess their doctrine in Multan and its vicinity. Violent means were also employed to destroy old



traditions and prevalent faiths. A historic Hindu temple was demolished and the mosque constructed by Muhammad-bin-Qasim was abandoned. However, the two-hundred-years-old rule of the Ismaili sect ended with the invasions of Muhammad Ghouri. Whether these were sectarian wars or fueled by the personal ambition of kings, the region had to face the drastic consequences with its economy almost wholly destroyed and the area nearly deserted.

Under Sheikh Yusuf Gardezi, Gardezi Syed of the Shia sect came here during the reign of Sultan Bairam Shah (AD 1118-52) and reinhabited the deserted area. The apparent peace of three centuries was followed by rapid intrusions from western and Central Asia. The stage was set by the Mongol under the command of Changiz Khan. Like other loosely held provinces, Multan also had nominal allegiance with the Sultans of Dehli.<sup>31</sup> Between 1210-27, under Nassiruddin Kubacha, and between 1445-1527, the Langha ruled over this region independently. Kubacha's rule extended over the region of Multan and Sindhu (probably Sindh), while the Langha established their control over Multan and its nearby areas.<sup>32</sup> The governors of Multan in this period appear to be instrumental in the revolts and conspiracies of the Derbar of Delhi.<sup>33</sup> For instance, in AD 1236, Malik Kabir Khan was among the mutineers who fought against Razia Sultana similarly, in AD 1321, Kishlu Khan vigilantly supported Ghiasuddin Tughlaq in the latter's campaign for the throne. We may also notice Syed Khizar Khan who, in 1414, captured Delhi and laid down the foundation of the Syed Dynasty which survived for thirty-eight years.

Some passages in the poems of Amir Khusrua give the impression that the Mongol impressed the Indian (Muslims) neither with their appearance nor with their manners. He writes:

There were more than a thousand infidels and warriors of other tribes, riding on camels, great commanders in battle, all with steel-like bodies clothed in cotton; with faces like fire, with caps of sheepskin, with their heads shorn. Their eyes were so narrow and piercing that they might have bored a hole in a brazen vessel. Their stink was more horrible than their colour. Their faces were set on their faces as they have no necks. Their cheeks resemble soft leather bottles, full of wrinkles and knots. Their noses extended from cheek to cheek, and their mouths from cheek-bone to cheek-bone. Their

nostrils resembled a rotten grave, and from them the hair descended as far as the lips. Their moustaches were of extravagant length. They had but scanty beards about their chins. Their chests of a colour half black, half white are so covered with lice that they looked like sesame growing on a bad soil. Their whole body indeed was covered with these insects, and their skin was rough and grainy as shagreen leather, fit only to be converted into shoes. They devoured dogs and pigs with their nasty teeth.<sup>34</sup>

However, the next three centuries saw racial and cultural amalgamation through intermarriages between these two regions. The Mongol began to settle in Iran, Afghanistan and the Indian subcontinent, which gradually removed the element of estrangement between the settlers and the locals.<sup>35</sup> The establishment of Mughal rule appears to be the last significant upshot of these intrusions. More often than not, Multan had to face the dire consequences of being the barrier against these western invasions which are recorded ten in number between the years 1221-1528 AD. The economy of the region was probably the worst effected, based on cultivation and centred around the river rain lands. Multan was also a significant commercial route, which remained an important factor in its survival.

It was during this period that ancestors of present tribes and *biradarian* began to arrive here in the form of groups and formed their colonies in various parts of this region. According to the *Gazetteer of the Multan District*, except the Langha (who are mainly Baloch), and their allied Baloch tribes, almost every tribe traces its arrival not before the fifteenth century.<sup>36</sup> Continuous invasions probably drove out the ancient inhabitants of this region to the western side, thus providing an opportunity to the tribes from Central Asia, Iran, Balochistan and Sindh to form their colonies in the present southern Punjab.<sup>37</sup> This process of immigration increased with the upheavals and bloody wars in Afghanistan and Iran. Many devout spiritual leaders came here and spread Islam in the region. After Gardezi Syed, a family of Qurieshi Syed settled at Kot Karor in the district of Layyah. Sheikh Bahauddin Zakariya, a famous saint buried in Multan, also belongs to this family. Of the same period are Shams Tabrezi (from Sabzawar), Qazi Qutbuddin (from Kashan), Khwaja Farid Ganjshakar and Saeed Jalal who provided a source of spiritual inspiration not only to the locals but also to



India. Their teachings of tolerance, love, and equality familiarized the locals with the essence of Islam, who probably found mental and spiritual satisfaction that had perhaps vanished due to the prolonged plundering and bloodshed seen in this region. Shah Rukn-i-Alam was buried in an emperor's tomb and, from this point onwards, the tradition of making shrines of pious men became a unique architectural tradition of Multan.<sup>38</sup>

During the next three centuries, peace and tranquility reigned over southern Punjab. In contemporary documents and coins, Multan was given the title of "Dar-ul-aman" (the seat of safety)<sup>39</sup>. Between 1548 to 1748, no major war broke out in this region, which attracted business from all over north-western India to Multan. In the times of Shah Jahan, according to the *Gazetteer of the Multan District*, the rate of immigration shows considerable increase probably due to the prosperity of the region. Although the cultivated area of southern Punjab was limited to river rain lands, and the provincial revenue, according to British records, 'do not indicate any very large development',<sup>40</sup> there must have been trade and commerce of some significance, which propelled immigrants to settle here. Since the Mughals were on good terms with the Persian kings, official protection was provided to the trade routes, fortifying Multan protection as the important route to Iran. The city gained importance when Multan was made the capital of a province that extended over south-western Punjab and included all of Sindh.

In the times of the later Mughals when anarchy reigned over India, this city remained comparatively peaceful. The reason for this appears to be the change of route by invading armies, who preferred to attack Dehli *via* Lahore rather than over the dry routes of Multan. According to the *Gazetteer of the Multan District*, the invasions by Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah Abdali did not create any serious damage, who passed through the region with only minor skirmishes. 'Especially when the trans-Indus tracts had been cut off by Nadir Shah, the Multan Province became by degrees an appendage of Lahore'.<sup>41</sup> With the weakening of central authority, the Hindu money-lending classes began to establish authoritative control over the local system of revenue inherited by the British Raj.<sup>42</sup>



In 1752, Multan came under the control of the Afghans of Kabul. For most of the time, this control was nominal and tenuous, but the local Pathan tribes continued to rule the region. When Sadozai, an immigrant Pathan tribe of Kabul, seized power a significant increase in the immigration of Pathan families from Afghanistan to this area is observed.<sup>43</sup> The Afghan tribes which are recognized as "Multani Pathan", extended their rule from Shujabad to the all of Multan under the command of Nawab Muzaffer Khan Sadozai and Nawab Sarfraz Khan Sadozai. However, the *tehsil* of Mailsi and the district of Lodhran were controlled by the Daudputra Abbasi Nawab of Bahawalpur, which were taken over by the Sikh in 1831. This independent kingdom of the Sadozai gave vast lands to the Pathan soldiers and town-people of Babar, Tarin, Khakwani, Bamozai and Badozai tribes.<sup>44</sup> The annual revenue of this government was five-and-a-half lakhs, as noted by British officials, and had a regular army of 2 000 soldiers with 20 guns. Its strength could be increased up to 12 000 soldiers.<sup>45</sup> Elphinstone, who passed through this region in December 1807, remarked about the administration:

Nothing could be worse than the government; all sorts of direct exactions were aggravated by the monopolies, rapacious and ungovernable troops, and every other kind of abuse.<sup>46</sup>

Elphinstone gives the impression that the ruling Pathan adopted Persian customs and traditions and were well conversant in the Persian language. They apparently left behind most characteristics of their birthplaces.<sup>47</sup>

In 1818, Mahraja Ranjit Singh captured the Multan fort after a tough resistance by Nawab Muzaffer Khan. The conquerors plundered Multan and Kabirwala, and the impact of atrocities committed by them was felt for a long time in the region.<sup>48</sup> A saying became quite common among the locals that 'misfortune comes from the north'.<sup>49</sup> Ranjit Singh's appointees proved to be incompetent in normalizing law and order, and in 1821 Diwan Sawan Mal was appointed as governor, who 'by a combination of strict justice with minute revenue management' conducted the affairs. About his judicial work the *Gazetteer* states:

In his judicial work he was strict and impartial. Edwardes, who saw through the spectacles of his friends, the Pathan refugees, attributed this largely to Sawan Mal's low origin, 'what in us', he writes, 'is an imperfection in Sawan Mal amounted to a vice. He could not tolerate a gentleman. A low bred man himself, he hated any one who had a grandfather. Rich merchants he loved and called around him, for they earned their money as he did himself; but inherited wealth he regarded as contraband, a thing to be seized and confiscated whenever found. Thus the same man who would lend money to a Jat to buy a plough or dig a well, would keep a Multani Pathan out of his estate and think he did God a service. Between the poor he did justice with great pains and impartiality; but a rich man, even if in the right, never got a verdict from Sawan Mal without paying for it'.<sup>50</sup>

Sawan Mal promoted the concept of nationalization of uncultivated lands, which probably prompted big landlords to cultivate their holdings.<sup>51</sup> Similarly, concessions, grants and loans were given to the farmers, which effectively increased the area of cultivation. Sawan Mal was succeeded by his son Mulraj. It was during his reign that some British officials were murdered in the area, the incident leading to the series of attacks on Multan city, and to the extension of the British Raj to Multan. In this campaign, the Daudputra Nawab of Bahawalpur and the Pathan of Multan provided assistance to the British army. After the British annexation of "Sikh Punjab", when Multan and its nearby areas were made part of the province, almost half of the Siraiki region remained detached from the rest of the Punjab as the sovereign princely State of Bahawalpur. Founded in 1727, Bahawalpur remained independent till 1947, when it was annexed to the newly born State of Pakistan.

### III

Siraiki that had by now evolved into a language, seems to have evolved with the interaction between the linguistically different tribes (e.g., Syed, Jat, Pathan, and others) and a series of immigration by groups of people from other regions (Muhajir, Abadkar), who came to the Siraiki region over a period of time.<sup>52</sup> These immigrants affected and enriched the local culture and established a multiple system of identity (*biradari*, sect, and ethnicity) and became the source of cultural differences among the locals. A brief discussion



of the arrival and sub-branches of various immigrants can be found in Appendix-II. Here we will try to see the process of assimilation or fragmentation of these peoples, and their role in the construction of the present cultural complexity of the region, especially with reference to the Syed and the Qurieshi.

To date, the Syed and Qurieshi are highly venerated tribes by the local population. Different explanations have been given to explicate the reasons for this. According to Denzil Ibbetson, the strong caste system of Hinduism developed the tendency of paying respect to high-caste Brahman, so even when the locals converted to Islam they replaced the Syed and Qurieshi as an equivalent to the Brahman.<sup>53</sup> Contrary to Ibbetson's readings, different studies have questioned the existence of the caste system in the region which now constitutes Pakistan.<sup>54</sup> According to some writers, there was no strong division of caste, whereby it became easier to spread Islam in this region. The caste system at one time was more about hereditary professions like *mochi* (cobbler), *naee* (barber), *kumhar* (potter), *telli* (oil-seller). The system survived and flourished in the prosperous Ganges Valley and its nearby areas, losing its intensity with the passage of time. As the areas which constitute the Siraiiki belt and the rest of Pakistan were less developed, the kinship or *biradari* system prospered at the expense of the caste system.<sup>55</sup> The author of *Tariekh-e-Rahim Yar Khan* who endorses these studies, relates that when the Brahman dynasty was established in this region, about fifteen hundred Brahman came here from other parts of India to lay down the foundation of the caste system.<sup>56</sup> If this was so, then Ibbetson's explanation appears to be plausible, but if this was not the case, and the caste system never flourished here, then the timing of the immigration of these tribes may facilitate in understanding the reverence and approbation enjoyed by some tribes like the Syed and the Qurieshi who began to appear in this region, according to the documents compiled by the British official, in the fifteenth century.<sup>57</sup> Although we have some accounts that reveal the control of the Qurieshi family over the province of Multan, which lasted after the arrival of Karmatian, no other family, according to the *Gazetteer*, traces its immigration to this region before the fifteenth century.<sup>58</sup> The Mongol invasions had entered their last

phase, and the region was experiencing complete devastation and despondency due to the continuous wars and upheavals of three centuries. The locals probably saw these learned Syed and Qurieshi as the harbinger of peace and tranquility. Some ancestors of these families played an important role in preaching Islam which may be termed the most important reason for the respect they command to this day.

The immigration of the Qurieshi and Syed was primarily due to the harsh rule of the Abbasides in Iraq and in other regions. Surviving through hardship and the fact of their being the decedents of the nephews of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), their proselytising was probably more acceptable to the locals. It was perhaps for that reason Tahir Taunsvi, a Siraiiki linguist and the author of many books, holds the view that tradition of *marsia*, or dirge, was introduced in this region<sup>59</sup> which continues to this day.<sup>60</sup>

These Arabic and Persian speaking peoples like Qurieshi and Syed also introduced new words into the Siraiiki language, which bears a strong influence of these two languages. Words like *kerwa* (abolution, pot) *lota* in Urdu, *busel* (onion) in Siraiiki is *wasel*, *foom* (or garlic) in Siraiiki is *thom kameez*, are derived from the Arabic language. Similarly, the Siraiiki language also shares a wide range of vocabulary with Persian, i.e., *dool*, *aftaba* is *ostada* in Siraiiki, *balae* is *maliee* in Siraiiki, *hadil desta* is *hamam desta* in Siraiiki, *gulgula* is *germala* in Siraiiki.<sup>61</sup>

The shrines of sufi mystics, like Sheikh Bahauddin Zakariya (AD 1169-1266), Shah Rukn-i-Alam, Musa Pak Shahid, Shah Dana Shahid, Shah Shams Tabrez and others, became the hub of activity for the locals, mostly the Barelvi sect, whereas the Deobandi and Ahle-Hadees condemned such activities as shrine worship. The annual *urs* or commemoration, draws large crowds where the *sajjada nashin*, custodian of the shrines, address the people and tell them about the teachings of the saints. Especially recounted on these occasions are apocryphal stories about these saints which the followers normally hear with great interest and spiritual satisfaction.

The organizers of the *urs*, the local *pir* and custodian of the shrines, sometimes translate this power to excel in political and



social affairs. For instance, 'the followers of Yousuf Raza Gillani (in the city of Multan), believe that their cows will stop milking if they will switch over their loyalties to his opponents'.<sup>62</sup> Similarly, many people believe that any one who passes through a gate known as *Baheshti Dervaza* in the shrine of Baba Farid Ganjshakar, will enter straight away into paradise. Consequently, millions of people come to visit the place in order to confirm their places in the Promised Land, and the custodian of this shrine mints millions of rupees as *nazrana*.<sup>63</sup>

According to another tradition, the extremely hot climate of this region is due to the curse of Shah Shams to whom the locals denied fire for frying fish. He prayed for the sun to come near the earth at an arms length. Since then, they believe this area is exposed to extreme cosmic energies.<sup>64</sup> When Arabs stormed this region, they found the worshipping of the "god of fire" as a most common practice among the local population.<sup>65</sup> It is a popular superstition that Shah Shams reappeared as the soul of that god of fire to resolve the difficulties of the locals and to confer the bounties of nature.<sup>66</sup> Hence, the change of religion failed to change the prevalent customs and mentality of the locals.

#### IV

Over time, due to a series of migrations and settlements from other areas the Siraiiki belt developed a pluralist cultural identity, especially linguistically. Although different races mixed with each other and can no longer be identified so easily, the cultural and linguistic dissimilarity within the region is quite obvious. For instance, in districts like Jhang, Sargodha, and Sahiwal that are much closer to upper Punjab, linguistic differences may be observed in table 1.2. Similar is the case of areas adjoining upper Sindh where linguistic similarities may be found with contiguous region.

A major part of the Siraiiki region comprises a semi desert terrain where the local farmers have to labour hard for a productive yield. Even so, people are generally averse to either selling or leaving their land. Like in most agrarian cultures, the land is called *Maun* (mother), and is therefore considered sacred, something that cannot be sold.<sup>67</sup> It is one of the basic reasons that migration from the Siraiiki speaking region to other places is not recorded in great

numbers, as compared to the mass-migration from other regions into the Siraiiki belt.

While the economy of this region is based on agriculture, industry is established in upper Punjab (for details see Chapter 2), due to which major parts of the Siraiiki belt are underdeveloped. It lacks adequate health and education facilities, with the result that many people believe in supernatural objects like *jin* and the evil eye. 'The snake-bitten survives, but one who is affected by the evil eye cannot', is the most common proverb. *The District Census Report of Multan* states:

.... there is a widespread custom that the boy holding his wife enters the bedchamber but not before the sacrifice of a goat at their door. He holds the girl in his right arm and takes her to the bedchamber. He has a knife in his hand to save him from evil influences on the first night. Two days after the marriage the girl returns to her parents on, what is called, *Satwara*..... birth of a child is celebrated even before the child is born. Pregnancy is received with an Aura of mystery around it. A pregnant woman is kept as far as possible away from all the negative and supernatural influences. In the 9<sup>th</sup> month *Kanji* is celebrated. The parents of the woman send bridal clothes and green fruits for the expectant mother. When the pregnant woman is in labour various attempts are made to keep evil influences away from her. Pepper and chilies are burnt at her door. The birth of the baby is announced and celebrated according to the sex of new born. If it is a male baby great festivities begin soon after his birth. About five days after the birth, baby's head is shaved. The event is celebrated with get-together, whether the parents can afford or cannot afford, the occasion is rounded off with the slaughter of the sacrificial lamb.<sup>68</sup>

Due to the low level of development of the area, the people remain poor, and harsh living conditions make them rely on supernatural powers.<sup>69</sup> Accordingly, people use amulets, mascots, and talismen for psychological comfort and relief. Trading of lucky charms and amulets is a common practice of local soothsayers, the *pir* and any imposter who can command the faith of the poor.<sup>70</sup>

It may not seem surprising then that sectarian feelings run much deeper as compared to an ethnic sense of identity. Generally, people of one sect dislike going to the mosques of another sect.<sup>71</sup> Even sects within Sunni, like Barelvi, Deobandi and Ahle-Hadees—do not refrain from calling each other "unbelievers".<sup>72</sup> Sometimes,



preachers of one sect offer money to those of another sect to change their faith. For instance, in the city of Mailsi (District Vehari), Ahle-Hadees have made a huge mosque to attract the people of other faiths. Anyone offering prayers according to the faith of the keepers is rewarded with 10 Rupees for regular prayer, and for *Jumma* prayers this money is doubled. Local people of the area believe that these preachers are getting generous aid from Saudi Arabia.

The Bareilvi show great affection for the saints, and at the time of the annual *urs*, followers, or *mureed*, of these pious men proffer *charahway* and *nazranna* on the *mazar*.<sup>73</sup> The ritual of *mannat* is also widespread at the shrines of Sheikh Bahauddin Zakariya, Shah Rukn-i-Alam, Musa Pak Shahid, Shah Dana Shahid, and Shah Shams Tabrez. These annually held *urs* not only provide spiritual and psychic satisfaction to the locals but also offer material gains for the organizers and shopkeepers.

Early marriage is another prevalent custom among the Siraiki speaking population, which is usually arranged on a reciprocal basis (*watta satta*) between two families. Although there is no restriction of dowry and *haq-maher*,<sup>74</sup> sometimes children are engaged to be married at birth. Cousine-marriage is not only acceptable but a much-desired proposition. Sometimes, the acceptance of a proposal is given in writing before a daughter is born. This written agreement is known as *boli* in the local language. The Muhajir and Abadkar, and the young generation of the Siraiki speaking people, tend to avoid these reciprocal marriages. The less developed tribes and groups, whether influential or not, generally wish to marry their children within the *biradari*, or clan, to retain family property or to maintain their separate identity.

Various dynamics of culture, language, and history separate the Siraiki region from upper Punjab, but the construction of a separate cultural identity by the local intelligentsia and political activists is still a contested site. On one hand, activists arguing for a sub-national status for Siraiki base their identity politics on language while, on the other, they contradict this claim by terming every person living within the region of Siraikistan, despite his race, colour, religion and language, as Siraiki.<sup>75</sup> This definition defines Siraiki individuality on the basis of region and not language. It may be a compulsion of

Siraiki proto-elites to accommodate the Punjabi speaking Abadkar and Urdu speaking Muhajir in this conceptual framework of Siraikistan since these two groups form the bulk of a socially and economically affluent class in the region. Besides this, some parts which are incorporated in the proposed Siraiki province have more cultural and linguistic affiliation with upper Punjab than with the southern region. For instance, the people of Sargodha, Sahiwal, Pakpattan, and Bahwalnagar like to call themselves Punjabi speaking rather than Siraiki.<sup>76</sup> This begs the most important question because if Siraiki ethno-nationalism is based on linguistic differences, then the activists need to extend their claim over some parts of Sindh and Balochistan where Siraiki speaking people are in a majority. The rationale provided by Taj M Langha, the President of Pakistan Siraiki Party, is:

We do not want to annoy our already destitute, oppressed, and discontented brothers (in Balochistan and Sindh). The Punjabis are oppressive, that's why we want the bifurcation of the Punjab only.<sup>77</sup>

The apparent motive of the Siraiki elite is to get rid of the hegemony of the Punjab, rather than to join the culturally and linguistically homogeneous Siraiki speaking areas. It is not a primordial but an instrumental desire for power that overrides Siraiki ethno-nationalism and other struggles for regional autonomy in the Siraiki region, e.g., the Bahawalpur Province Movement. Cultural symbols are employed only to create cohesive and compact alliances among the people of southern Punjab against northern Punjab, but one thing is sure, Siraiki language is distinct from Punjabi and on this alone, the government has recognized Siraiki as a separate language by tabulating it different from Punjabi in the official census reports. In a somewhat essentialist manner, even the nature and characteristics of the Siraiki people have been distinguished by these reports.<sup>78</sup> The Siraiki speaking people, therefore, form a different identity not to be confused or subsumed under the larger Punjabi identity. In the succeeding chapters, we will look at the sub-national movements striving for regional autonomy in the Siraiki region.



## ENDNOTES

- 1 See Christine De Geer, and Garfield Newman, et. al. "Ancient India", *Odyssey Through The Ages* (Canada:1992). Also see Gregory L Possehl, *The Indus Civilization: A Contemporary Perspective*. Jonathan Mark Kenoyer, *Ancient Cities of the Indus Valley Civilization* (New York: 1998).
- 2 M Afzel Masood Khan, *Manshur-o-Programme: Pakistan Siraiiki Party* (Multan: 1991) p. 8.
- 3 Ihsan H Nadiem, *Portrait of Sindh* (Lahore: 2002) p. 100.
- 4 See for details, *Ibid.*, p. 23-74.
- 5 Yuri V Gankovsky, *Peoples of Pakistan*. Translated by Mirza Ishfaq Beg, *Pakistan ki qumiatain* (Lahore: 2000) p. 136.
- 6 Hassan Dani, "Sindhu-Sauvira: A Glimse into the Early History of Sind" in Hamida Khuro (ed), *Sind Through the Centuries* (Karachi: 1981) p. 36.
- 7 *Gazetteer of the Multan District (1923-24)* (Re-Printed-Lahore: 2001) p. 23.
- 8 Mushtaqur Rahman, *Land and Life in Sindh, Pakistan* (Lahore: 1993) p. 67, 73.
- 9 Ihsan H Nadiem, *Portrait of Sindh* (Lahore: 2002) p. 100.
- 10 Ihsan H Nadiem, *Thar* (Lahore: 2001) p. 98.
- 11 Denzil Ibbetson, *Punjab Castes* (1881). Translated by Yasir Jawad, *Punjab ki Zatain* (Lahore: 1998) p. 209, 233.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 198.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 210, 216.
- 14 *Ibid.*, p. 220.
- 15 M Hanif Raza, *Multan, Past and Present* (Islamabad: 1988) p. 29.
- 16 M Sadiq Jeri int: 08/03/2001. Sheikh Ikramul Haq, *Arz-e-Multan* (Multan: 1972) p. 357.
- 17 Yuri V Gankovsky, *Peoples of Pakistan*. Translated by Mirza Ishfaq Beg, *Pakistan ki qumiatain* (Lahore: 2000) p. 118, 136.
- 18 M Sadiq Jeri int: 08/03/2001.
- 19 *Ibid.*
- 20 *Gazetteer of the Multan District (1923-24)* (Re-Printed-Lahore: 2001).
- 21 See Ahmad Nabi Khan, *Multan: History and Architecture* (Islamabad: 1983).
- 22 The boundaries of Sindh and present Siraiiki region changed many times. See Mushtaqur Rahman, *Land and Life in Sindh, Pakistan* (Lahore: 1993) p. 16-21. Also see, M H Panhwar, *Chronological Dictionary of Sind (From Geological Times to 1539 AD)* (Jamshoro: 1983). For Savistan see, Syed Abu Zafar Nadvi, *Tariikh-e-Sindh* (Lahore: 1997), G Lee IStrange, *Jugrafiya-e-khilafat-e-Mashriqi*. Translated by M Jamelur Rahman) (Lahore: 1987) p. 503-31. Also see, Maulvi M Shafi, *Sanaded-e-Sindh* (Lahore: 1970) p. 11-24.
- 23 Mumtaz Dar int: 9/03/2001.
- 24 *Islamic Glossary*. Website: <http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/reference/glossary/term.HIJRAH.html>. Visited at 9:00 PM, on 3 December 2003.
- 25 Abdul Ghani, a Muhajir in the city of Mailsi, told to the author a proverb often used for the locals, 'people who live near the river Ravi are brave and gallant, those who live near the banks of Chanab are romantic and those who are living near the river Satluj are *munafiq*' (phony or duplicitous).
- 26 Abad Ahmad Khan int: 09/03/2001.
- 27 Christopher Shackle, "Siraiiki: A Language Movement in Pakistan". *Modern Asian Studies*, ii,3 (Great Britain: 1977) p. 388.
- 28 *Prayer Profile: The Multani of India*. See website [http://www.ksafe.com/profiles/p\\_code5/1485.html](http://www.ksafe.com/profiles/p_code5/1485.html). Visited at 4: 45 PM, on 2 December 2003.

- 29 *Gazetteer of the Multan District (1923-24)* (Re-Printed-Lahore: 2001) p. 23.
- 30 Ibid., p. 24.
- 31 Ibid., p. 31.
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Ibid., p. 31-32.
- 35 Ibid., p. 32.
- 36 Ibid., p. 33.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 Ibid., p. 34.
- 39 Ibid., p. 41.
- 40 Ibid.
- 41 Ibid., p. 42.
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 Ibid., p. 46.
- 44 Ibid.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 Ibid.
- 47 Ibid., p. 46-47.
- 48 Ibid., p. 49.
- 49 Ibid.
- 50 Ibid., p. 49-50.
- 51 Ibid., p. 54.
- 52 Sheikh Ikramul Haq, *Arz-e-Multan* (Multan: 1972) p. 353-54.
- 53 Denzil Ibbetson, *Punjab Castes* (1881). Translated by Yasir Jawad, *Punjab ki Zatain* (Lahore: 1998) p. 504.
- 54 Hamza Alvi, "Politics of Ethnicity in India and Pakistan". in Alvi & Harriss (ed), *Sociology of Developing Societies: South Asia*. 1989.
- 55 Ibid.,
- 56 Saeed A Saeed, *Tariekh-o-Ta'ruf: Zila Rahim Yar Khan* (Lahore: 1981).
- 57 *Gazetteer of the Multan District (1923-24)* (Re-Printed-Lahore: 2001) p. 33-34.
- 58 Ibid., p.
- 59 Saeed A Saeed, *Tariekh-o-Ta'ruf: Zila Rahim Yar Khan* (Lahore: 1981).
- 60 M Sadiq Jeri int: 08/03/2001. Hassan N Gardezi, *Siraiki Language and Its Poetics: An Introduction*. See website [http://www.punjabilok.com/misc/literature/siraiki\\_language\\_and\\_Poetics.htm](http://www.punjabilok.com/misc/literature/siraiki_language_and_Poetics.htm). Visited at 4: 30 PM, 2 December 2003.
- 61 Sheikh Ikramul Haq, *Arz-e-Multan* (Multan: 1972) p. 360.
- 62 Naveed Islam Khan int: 10/03/2001.
- 63 Azmat Khan int: 10/03/2001.
- 64 M Sadiq Jeri int: 08/03/2001.
- 65 A *munder* situated in the centre of the city of Multan was the hub of such activities where people from far-flung areas used to visit for prayers and *nazrana*. Arab army took control of that *munder*, and whenever they heard about any plan of revolt, they (Arabs) threatened to destroy it. For the next two centuries Arab controlled this area with the same strategy. *Gazetteer of the Multan District (1923-24)* (Re-Printed-Lahore: 2001) p. 25.
- 66 M Sadiq Jeri int: 08/03/2001. Also see, Sheikh Ikramul Haq, *Arz-e-Multan* (Multan: 1972).
- 67 Abad Ahmad Khan int: 09/03/2001.
- 68 1998 *District Census Report of Multan* (Islamabad: 2000).
- 69 1998 *District Census Report of Layyah* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 12-13.



- 70 *1998 District Census Report of Jhang* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 13.
- 71 Abdul Ghani int: 08/03/2001. *1998 District Census Report of Lodhran* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 7.
- 72 Azmat Khan int: 10/03/2001.
- 73 *1998 District Census Report of Lodhran* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 7.
- 74 *Ibid.*, p. 8.
- 75 M Afzel Masood Khan, *Manshur-o-programme Pakistan Siraiiki Party* (Multan: 1993) p. 3.
- 76 See table 1.2.
- 77 Taj M Langha int: 04/03/2001.
- 78 See 1998 District Census Reports of Multan, Bahawalpur and Layyah.

# Siraiki Particularism

In the previous chapter we have discussed the social matrix of the Siraiki region and how different groups (local, Abadkar and Muhajir) have constructed the dichotomy of self and other. In this chapter we will attempt to analyze the economic structure of the region which is the major source of discontent among the people. When the British devised the canal system for this region, people from upper Punjab were preferred over the local population and were given generous incentives to settle here and cultivate the lands. This not only produced a sense of deprivation among the locals but also depreciated their relationship with the immigrants, both Muhajir and Abadkar, which was manned by hostility. This feeling was reciprocated by the economically dominant migrant population who looked down upon their underprivileged hosts. For analytical purposes, we will call the settler communities, Abadkar and Muhajir, as the immigrant working class (IWC) and the local population as the Siraiki working class (SWC).

### Seeds of the Bahawalpur Movement

It has been claimed by the Nawabs of Bahawalpur State that their State joined Pakistan without any hesitation.<sup>1</sup> This has been contested by Chaudhri Muhammad Ali in *The Emergence of Pakistan*, where he discloses the hesitation of the Nawab of Bahawalpur to merge his State into the newly-born Dominion of Pakistan.<sup>2</sup> With a population of less than two million and 83 per cent majority of Muslims, Bahawalpur was considered among the few rich states of the subcontinent. When the partition took place, the Nawab of Bahawalpur and the State's Chief Minister, Mushtaq Ahmad Ghurmani, were hesitant to join Pakistan and desired to 'maintain a quasi-independent existence',<sup>3</sup> and 'a strong negotiating position'.<sup>4</sup> On 15 August 1947, the Nawab titled himself "Jalalat-



ul-Malik A'la Hazrat Amir of Bahawalpur", a move to show his independent status. Meanwhile, he sent representatives to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly to participate in deliberations and to strive for a 'satisfactory constitutional arrangement between the state and Pakistan'.<sup>5</sup> The events brought about the immigration and evacuation of Sikh and Hindu, circumstances that forced the Nawab to accede to Pakistan, and the gradual introduction of reforms brought the State under the federal government.

The agreement of accession, which was mutually signed by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Governor General of Pakistan, and the Nawab of Bahawalpur on 5 October 1947, was based on Clause Six of the Government of Indian Act 1935. Its eighth paragraph guaranteed the continuation of the Nawab's authority in the State.<sup>6</sup> This came later with the second agreement signed by Khwaja Nazimuddin, the Governor General of Pakistan, and the Nawab of Bahawalpur on 6 September 1949, which gave Bahawalpur the status of a separate administrative unit under the federal government. According to paragraph number two of this agreement, claimed by Chaudhry Ferzand Ali, immigrant and first speaker of Bahawalpur Assembly after 1947, 'His Highness was entitled as the constitutional head, while the powers to control the administration were passed to the Prime Minister of Pakistan and his cabinet'.<sup>7</sup>

From the 1950s onward, some sections of the population started protesting against the Nawab's rule and demanded responsible government. On 30 April 1951, an agreement was reached between the Nawab and the Government of Pakistan for holding elections in the State. In 1952, elections were held on the basis of adult franchise and, like other provincial assemblies, the assembly of Bahawalpur came into existence, consisting of 49 members.<sup>8</sup> Chaudhry Ferzand Ali was chosen as the Speaker and Syed Mahmood Hassan was elected as first Chief Minister of Bahawalpur. It is claimed that the constitutional drafts of 1952 and 1954 gave these states a provincial status.<sup>9</sup> Mukhdoom Noor Muhammad, who was elected MNA from the region for the first time in 1970 after defeating Mahmood Hassan, claimed that in the same period, the central government published a Gazette notification where Bahawalpur was termed a province.<sup>10</sup> These developments disillusioned the local political leaders about

the provincial status who later struggled for the restoration of Bahawalpur province. This movement will be discussed in Chapter 4, here we will examine the imagined or actual grievances which resulted in the rise of the ethno-nationalist movement.

Like other provincial assemblies, the assembly of Bahawalpur also rejected the scheme of One-Unit and consequently dissolved in 1954. It was the Nawab who took the decision of merging into One-Unit. While One-Unit countered Bengali domination in the legislature, it also brought small and culturally diverse provinces under the centralized control of the Punjab. Bahawalpur State faced the same fate which, according to local political leaders, bore serious consequences in the long run. These grievances may have been based on misconception, but the study of the perceived injustices and accusations may facilitate an understanding of the sense of deprivation that resulted in the rise of a series of sub-nationalist movements and the incompetency on the part of successive governments to clear their position and build a level of trust in national government.

Figures given by the *Pakistan Times*<sup>11</sup> indicate that between 1955-63, the average annual income of Bahawalpur was nearly 112 million Rupees while 963 millions were spent on it. It was comparatively less amount spent on other regions which were given more funds than their incomes. The revenues of NWFP and Khairpur divisions were 377.7 and 121 millions and their expenditure amounting to 1154 and 243 million Rupees respectively. Similarly, the total incomes of Sindh, Quetta and Qalat were 1118, 109 and 42 million Rupees respectively, while their expenses were 2331, 236 and 137 millions respectively (see Table 2.1). When the State was merged into One-Unit, it had 100 million Rupees which were then given to the provincial government of West Pakistan.

Figures provided by Allama Rahmatullah Arshad,<sup>12</sup> MNA from Bahawalpur in 1960s, show that till the 1970s, the annual income of Bahawalpur was about 200-220 million Rupees, but only 30 million were spent on its development. Whereas the revenue of Balochistan was about 5.60 million Rupees and expenditures aggregating 90.00 millions. Similarly, the revenue of NWFP was 70.00 million and its expenditures were amounting to 350 million. Up till 1970, the annual



development budget of Bahawalpur remained between 8.00 -20.00 million.<sup>13</sup> The situation was severely criticized by Rahmatullah Arshad and Syed Ahmed Nawaz Shah (MNAs from Bahawalpur), thus the development budget was increased to 40.50 million Rupees.<sup>14</sup>

It was also claimed that such cuts affected the social sector in the former State of Bahawalpur, for instance, the proposals of setting up the Abbasiya University, and agricultural, medical, engineering and commerce colleges, all were dropped after One-Unit.

Education at the Matric level was free in Bahawalpur State before its amalgamation into One-Unit, but later students were asked to pay fees at school level<sup>15</sup> and fees increased at colleges. Every year, 47 boys were given scholarships by the State for advanced technical education, but due to unknown reasons, the government discontinued this facility.<sup>16</sup> A reasonable number of seats were allocated to students from Bahawalpur in various agricultural, medical, and animal husbandry colleges in the country but while this quota was retained for students from Karachi, Hyderabad, Quetta, Qalat and other areas, it was abolished for the Bahawalpuri students.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, relief fund for Muhajir, established by the Nawab, was abolished, likewise the scheme of Masjid schools.<sup>18</sup>

Before merging into One-Unit, Bahawalpur enjoyed a degree of provincial autonomy with its own assembly for legislation. Administrative functions were performed by a council of ministers, the High Court, and the Secretariat. The Public Service Commission was also working in the State for transparent recruitments. The Nawab, also known as Amir of Bahawalpur, was the representative of the central government and the constitutional head of all these departments, and institutions, like the governors in other provinces. After One-Unit, all these institutions were wrapped up, which created many administrative problems for the local employees,<sup>19</sup> many of whom had to either go to other regions or relinquish their jobs. During the period of One-Unit, not a single lawyer was inducted as magistrate from Bahawalpur.

For the provincial and federal posts, a quota system was introduced to protect the rights of smaller units in West Pakistan,

and Bahawalpur was included in the Punjab Cadre. For direct appointments, Bahawalpur was made a sub-zone along with Muzaffargarh, Dera Ghazi Khan, Campbelpur, Jehlum, Mianwali and Jhang, inspite of the fact that the West Pakistan integration Service Cadre Committee had proposed a six per cent quota in jobs for the region.<sup>20</sup> It was claimed that due to this arrangement, the representation of Bahawalpur became almost negligible as shown by table 2.2. The posts of second and third grades were filled on district or divisional basis, but the people of Bahawalpur were not given this right since in most of the departments posts were filled on regional basis and Bahawalpur was considered to be a part of the Punjab.<sup>21</sup>

Whether the figures are real or imagined, the list of grievances published in the propaganda material and in the newspapers shows the discontent among the working classes. This might, in fact, have been the reason behind the predominant participation of Muhajir and Abadkar in the Bahawalpur Province Movement (BPM). The course of the movement will be further discussed in Chapter 4.

To date job opportunities and promotions to government posts remain the problem of southern Punjab. A Grade 19 officer of the Health Department, presently working in the Siraiiki region, on request of anonymity, clearly blamed the bureaucratic hurdles in the promotions of officers of the government to higher ranks. The officer cited many examples of people from this region who were not given their due promotions by the establishment in Lahore. The same person tagged nepotism as the sole criterion in the distribution of funds for development. Another officer of the same department expressed a similar opinion. According to him, almost every government department has established its headquarters in Lahore, consequently, the poor people of southern Punjab have to go to Lahore to address their petty problems, even for getting the furniture for their office, or for the transfer from one ward of a hospital to another ward of the same hospital. Mahmood Hayat Khan, former MPA and advisor to the Chief Minister Punjab, linked this problem of job opportunities and underdevelopment to the feudal structure of southern Punjab:



...the feudal lords must be held responsible first than bureaucracy and military rulers, as they are not letting the schools and colleges to open in this southern belt. For instance in my area, a parliamentarian did not let any programme of education to be completed, we got our first intermediate college in 1970s, when that feudal lord was defeated in the elections and it took another 20 years to get the status of graduate college. They (northern Punjabis) have high literacy rate, that's why they have greater share in and stern control over the bureaucracy. In every town or village of northern Punjab you will easily find at least one bureaucrat or military officer. Here in our region (southern Punjab), you seldom find any high ranking official, our representation is so less that you may count the officials from southern Punjab on fingers.<sup>22</sup>

Mahmood also noted that the 'resentment and discontent is on the rise with the passage of time', which is perhaps due to the increasing problems faced by cultivators.

### **Cultivators and Industrialists**

The economy of southern Punjab is largely agrarian, its major cash crops being cotton, wheat, and sugarcane. The decade of the 1960s saw a hopeful Green Revolution throughout third world countries, according to which the economies of underdeveloped countries producing raw material were firmly tied to the industrialized metropolitan capitals. Rapid industrialization in the early years of Ayub's regime was followed by a boom in agricultural development. High yielding varieties (HYV) of seeds and fertilizers were given to the farmers on soft loans. Seed-fertilizer-water package helped in agricultural development significantly but it led to the mechanization of the agrarian economy. In 1959, the number of tractors were nearly 2 000, which increased to 19 000 in 1968.<sup>23</sup> This adversely affected the small farmers and peasants.

The research work done by Hamza Alvi,<sup>24</sup> the Pakistani sociologist, and Dr Karamat Ali, Professor of Economics, Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan, has enumerated the profits made by big land-holders, and the miserable circumstances of the peasantry, largely due to the introduction of advanced technology. Statistics collected by Dr Karamat Ali divulge that such developments bode ill for the peasants of the Siraiiki belt, as shown in 2.3 table. Commenting on the situation Cocher writes:

Only big landlords have the political power and luxury of modern technology, quite necessary for the proper utilization of capital. Due to lack of resources, tenants became less competitive, even purchased servants of big landlords.<sup>25</sup>

In 1960, about 40 per cent of the land was cultivated by tenant farmers. This percentage dropped to only 26 per cent in sharp contrast to the increase in owner farms and shared cultivated farms, which rose to 18 per cent and 42 to 26 per cent and 52 per cent respectively in 1980. This change signifies that the poor tenants either became landless due to less requirement for the manual labour or began to depend upon their feudal lords, a phenomenon that shaped the politics of the future. In the last regime of Z A Bhutto, the control of big land-holders became an agent or instrument of governance in the Siraiki region. Consequently, When General Zia came to power, his *Mujlis-e-Shura* was structured by these feudal lords.

While the introduction of agricultural technology increased the rate of production in southern Punjab as can be observed in table 2.3. Tables 2.4 and 2.5, underlining the predominance of the Siraiki districts in the productions of wheat, cotton and rice, and the precious revenue gained by these cash crops, but the area was industrially less developed as compared to northern Punjab (see tables 2.6, 2.7). Between 1920-30, only five industrial units were registered in the district of Multan, whereas four were registered in Faisalabad, as compared to eleven in the Lahore district. In the decade of 1930s, not a single unit was registered in Multan as compared to one in Faisalabad, and six units in the Lahore district. Between 1941-50, ten units were established, out of which six were set up before 1947 (i.e. only four units were registered after partition). In the same period, ten new units were registered in Faisalabad, of which nine were set up after 1947. Lahore district, however, attracted more investment, which can be judged from the registration of 29 industrial units. Not only Multan but the discrimination facing the entire southern Punjab as compared to northern Punjab may be noted in table 2.6.

According to the statistics of 1984, the Siraiki region, excluding Dera Ismael Khan, had only 22.88 per cent of total industry whereas



the census report of 1981 reveals its population as being around 20.00 million. The population of Lahore district was, meanwhile, only 3.55 million but encompassed 25.59 per cent of the total industry in the Punjab with 53.67 per cent industry set up in three districts, Lahore, Gujranwala and Faisalabad.

So, despite of agrarian advancement, the Siraiki region did not benefit much since only 22.88 per cent of the total industry was established in the region till 1984. By contrast, northern Punjab contains the remaining industrial units, especially in its three districts, Faisalabad, Gujranwala, and Lahore that have about 53.67 per cent of the total proportion.<sup>26</sup> The cultivators of the Siraiki region also had to depend upon northern Punjab for selling their goods and produce.

Thirty-three per cent of silver fibre is produced in Bahawalpur<sup>27</sup> but, like many parts of the Siraiki speaking area, the revenue generated by it is not spent locally. After partition, some effort was made to industrialize the region. For instance, in Rahim Yar Khan city, three industrial units were established. One of them, Abbasi Textile Mill, was sold out; Lever Brother's factory of Dalda ghee was shifted to some other place, while a fertilizer factory is still operative at Machi Goth (Sadiqabad).<sup>28</sup> No heavy industry was set up in the other two districts, Bahwalnagar and Bahawalpur, and according to some political observers, the industrial units sanctioned for Bahawalpur division were moved to other places. Abdul Waheed, a Cabinet Minister in Ayub Khan's government, sold his textile mill license for Bahawalpur to a Chinioti Sheikh family who set up a spinning unit on Samasatta Road.<sup>29</sup>

In 1962, a small Bahawalpur Industrial Estate (BIE) was established by the federal government, and after a period of six years, its 47 units started functioning with export quality products, especially towels, which were exported to the USA and Moscow, generating great profit and revenue. In the late 1970s, a ghee unit was also set up in the private sector. The floods in 1988 halted all these developments when most of the units in the BIE stopped functioning, and several of the mill owners fled abroad when they were declared defaulters.

At present, 12 small-scale industrial units are functioning in

the BIE. The Punjab Small Industries Cooperation is trying to resolve the issue of defaults and sick industrial units with the help of the Bahawalpur Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI).

An industrial estate was established in Bahwalnagar district, but due to the lack of interest of private investors it was not developed. Although a textile mill is functioning in the private sector, its production is limited to the spinning of yarn. In Chishtian, a few ginning factories and a sugar mill are functional and provide job opportunities to the locals.

The BCCI declares that it is interested in industrializing the three districts of the former state of Bahawalpur, but the government's lack of interest hampers its efforts.<sup>30</sup> To attract outside investors, the BCCI has been demanding a tax-free zone and zero duty areas on lease for a period of at least ten years. These demands have gone unheeded, and private investment in the region remains below the target. Most of the investors prefer other areas where they are provided the land on cheap rates. The BCCI has also requested to banks to reduce their mark-up and for the government to merge all taxes to decrease the burden on the private investor. Their other demands are concerned with the interference of the bureaucracy in the sanction of loans and the setting up of industry, and the establishment of a technical institution to provide skilled labour to the local textile industry.

Some local industrialists suggest the establishment of heavy and medium industry adjacent to the Export Processing Zone (EPZ). One such zone is established near Rahim Yar Khan but despite official approval, no EPZ exists in Bahawalpur.<sup>31</sup> On the BCCI's suggestion, the government surveyed an industrial estate on 500-acre land at Mauza Jugiat Peer adjacent to Lal Sonhanra near Bahawalpur-Hasilpur Road. To date, no step has been taken to implement this plan.<sup>32</sup>

Similar is the case with the Export Promotion Bureau (EPB). The Ministry of Commerce and Industry had approved its offices in Bahawalpur and Rahim Yar Khan but nothing exists so far and the exporters have to travel to Multan to resolve minor cases.

Since 1999, ginneries have to face great difficulty due to the cotton crisis. In 2000-01, cotton factories of the three districts paid



6 billion Rupees as sales tax.<sup>33</sup> In 2001, they faced a crisis situation because the Trading Cooperation of Pakistan (TCP) did not purchase the cotton despite the government's advice. Between 2001-02, one million bales remained unsold in the ginning factories, while 500 000 were being held by the growers due to low rates.<sup>34</sup> Dr Munir Ahmed Khan, a scientist at the Cotton Research Station, Multan, remarked that in the last five or six years, owners of textile mills have been employing various underhanded methods to increase profits. They actively support rumours and speculations of importing cotton just before the arrival of locally produced cotton in the market, so that the cultivators and ginnerers cannot then insist on reasonable rates. He disclosed that the State media is also involved in these speculations. Most of the industrialists purchase the cash crop after the season, which further reduces their price in the market.<sup>35</sup>

Akram Mirani, Professor at Government College, Layyah, in *Siraiki Daes*, blames the military and the bureaucrats for not industrialising this region, despite its agrarian advancement and geographical proximity to the port city, Karachi, as compared to upper Punjab.<sup>36</sup> Afzel Masood Khan in the *Manshur-o-programme Pakistan Siraiki Party*, claims that the project of the steel mill was initially designed for Multan but later shifted to Karachi for unknown reasons.<sup>37</sup> Mahmood Hayat blames Punjabi industrialists alongwith the Siraiki feudal lords, for dispiriting the establishment and discouraging industrialisation in the Siraiki region. He points to several development plans for southern Punjab that were stalled due to the intervention of local landlords.<sup>38</sup> Azmat Khan, a resident of Mianwali and a staunch supporter of Siraiki ethno-nationalism, endorses Mahmood's point of view:

If industrialisation takes place, Siraiki feudal lords and industrial elites of northern Punjab will lose control over this area. Punjabi bureaucrats are also strengthening their interests by a consciously planned policy of uneven investment and industrialization. If our cultivators do not get their due share it will be an injustice to the agrarian society of southern Punjab. They normally get far less share than they deserve; some of them cannot even recover their costs.<sup>39</sup>

### **Emergence of Siraiki and Immigrant Working Classes**

Due to the reasons discussed above, big landlords and agriculturists

are either selling their land or giving it on lease. This appears to be a new development that might change the power balance in the region. Small land-holders may then become politically and economically independent of the feudal lords. As discussed earlier, the Muhajir and Abadkar population tend to establish their own business, cultivate their own lands, or try to get white-collar jobs. Meanwhile, Siraiki speaking people display less social mobility and prefer to serve their masters whether they are Siraiki, Muhajir or Abadkar. This new trend of selling the lands or giving it on lease is certainly clearing the way for Siraiki speaking *mazara*, who still consider agriculture to be their only livelihood. A local cultivator comments that profits are drying up for big land-holders. Whether these changes in land ownership will add vigour to the Siraiki ethno-nationalist movement is not easy to say. Although the Siraiki speaking peasantry is emerging, the immigrant working class (IWC) is also struggling to change its means of livelihood. It is now eager to get jobs in the government or to set up independent business. Another resident of Multan expressed his concerns over the dismal condition of local cultivators, fearing the possible growth of ethno-national politics in this region. Cotton exporters mostly belong to northern Punjab, who do not purchase the crop at competitive rates according to the international market, despite the fact that cotton is one of the major cash crops of the country. The cultivators of southern Punjab are, therefore, shifting to other crops such as sunflower and sugarcane, which are of no use to textile mills. Textile mill owners are likely to be compelled by circumstance to import cotton at much higher rates, but the most important aspect of this tussle is the continuously increasing discontent between the SWC and IWC who have been frustrated in their aspirations for a better life in the past decade. They may take recourse to the politics of regionalism which would be difficult to stop once it has taken off and which is likely to involve the traders and educated youth because the former are dependent on goods produced by cultivators for their transaction, and the educated youth is desperate for better job opportunities.<sup>40</sup>

The most important aspect of this socio-economic development is the convergence of interest between the IWC and SWC. Mahmood Hayat Khan, former MPA and advisor to the Chief



Minister Punjab, says that the sense of dispossession is ascending with the passage of time, and all the groups in the region feel it with the same intensity although they still construct counter-posed identities like Abadkar (Punjabi), Muhajir, and Siraiiki (or local). Such an identity construction is not based on economic relations, rather the local intellectuals produce literature which directly or indirectly contributes to the markings of separate identities. The next chapter deals with the historical development of local literature which has swelled the drive for a separate linguistic and cultural identity in the Siraiiki speaking region of southern Punjab.

**TABLE 2.1 COMPARISIAN OF INCOME AND EXPENDITURE OF  
BAHAWALPUR WITH OTHER REGIONS**  
(Rupees in Million)

Year	Sindh Province		NWFP Province		Bahawalpur	
	Income	Expendi- tures	Income	Expendi- tures	Income	Expendi- tures
1955-56	86.90	90.80	48.70	85.40	70.00	59.6
1956-57	88.40	215.30	20.00	111.50	79.60	65.9
1957-58	95.40	216.60	39.00	108.00	119.10	114.6
1958-59	157.20	238.20	48.10	123.70	140.00	133.9
1959-60	147.90	269.30	47.50	121.40	139.80	134.1
1960-61	144.70	264.80	38.10	110.10	117.90	104.9
1961-62	136.10	302.60	37.40	140.90	110.70	105.4
1962-63	132.60	353.80	42.10	153.20	114.90	107.1
1963-64	148.60	419.30	56.50	199.40	118.20	117.5
Total	1137.80	2370.70	377.40	1153.60	1010.20	943.00

Source: *Pakistan Times* (Lahore: 6 February 1970) p. 8.

**TABLE 2.2 REPERESNTATION OF BAHAWALPURI OFFICERS IN  
ADMISTRATION AFTER THE MERGER INTO ONE-UNIT**

Sr. No.	Designation	Total (No.)	Bahawal-puri (No.)
1	High Court Judge	34	-
2	Chief, Additional Chief, Joint & Deputy Secretaries	86	1
3	Commissioners	13	-
4	Additional Commissioners	13	1
5	Controller Supridents & Manager Printing	17	-
6	Deputy Commissioners/ Political Agents	66	1
7	Session Judge	63	3
8	IG, AIG, DIG	15	-
9	Director & Deputy Directors Education	24	-
10	Inspector & Lady Inspector Schools	34	1
11	Regional & Deputy Directors Agriculture	16	-
12	Regional & Deputy Directors Live Stock	29	-
13	Director & Deputy Directors Industries	33	-
14	Director & Additional Directors Excise	11	-
15	Registrar & Deputy Registrar Co-Operatives	19	1
16	Controller Divisional Forest Officers	16	-
17	Director Information	7	-
18	Directors Local Audit Fund	6	-
19	Directors Joint & Deputy Directors Labour Welfare	12	-
20	Chief Engineers Canals	8	-
21	Director Chief & Deputy Chief Engineers-Buildings	6	-
22	Director Chief & Deputy Chief Engineers Highways	9	-
23	Director Additional & Deputy Director Foods	9	-

**Source:** *Kaynat (Goli Number)* (Bahawalpur: 3 July 1972) p. 57.



TABLE 2.3 SIZE AND PATTREN OF CULTIVATION IN PUNJAB

	1960		1960		1980		1980	
	Area	%age	Area	%age	Area	%age	Area	%age
	(Acres)	(%)	(Acres)	(%)	(Acres)	(%)	(Acres)	(%)
Shared cultivation	1,563,000	42	1,514,000	41	2,226,787	55	24,533,378	52
Owner cultivation	674,000	18	7,832,000	21	789,162	20	12,395,879	26
Tenant cultivation	1,520,000	40	14,065,000	38	1,053,506	26	10,165,428	22

Source: Akram Mirani, *Siraiki Daes* (Lahore: 1987) p.104

TABLE 2.4 COMPARISION OF PRODUCTIONS WITH VARIOUS DISTRICTS OF THE PUNJAB

Wheat (in metric tone)				Cotton (thousand bales)					Rice(metric tone)			
Distt.	1974	1977	1979	1983	1974	1977	1979	1983	1974	1977	1979	1983
Multan	649	739	791	900	660	398	407	832	11	26	31	21
Rahim Yar Khan	217	281	264	415	181	263	336	561	17	22	29	30
Bahawalpur	151	226	204	232	121	114	176	291	8	14	22	17
Faisalabad	426	450	521	485	68	37	38	42	35	35	40	31
Gujranwala	306	387	390	444	11	6	7	4	287	303	342	308
Lahore	70	87	90	113	4	2	3	1	34	30	42	45

Source: Bureau of Statistics Government of the Punjab. Quoted from Akram Mirani, *Siraiki Daes*, (Lahore: 1987), p.100.

TABLE 2.5 EXPORTS OF COTTON AND RICE  
(Rupees in millions)

Name of commodities	1976-77	1980-81	1981-82	1982-83
Cotton	316	5222	2971	3985
Rice	2478	5602	4128	3683

Source: Bureau of Statistics Government of the Punjab. Quoted from Akram Mirani, *Siraiki Daes*, (Lahore: 1987), p. 100.

TABLE 2.6 COMPARISION OF INDUSTRIAL UNITS

Decade/Years	District Multan	District Faisalabad	District Lahore
1920-30	5	4	11
1931-40	0	1	6
1941-50	10	10	29
1951-60	24	74	111
1961-70	48	63	72
1971-80	103	204	232
1981-84	85	73	171

Source: Directory of registered factories Bureau of Statistics Punjab. Quoted from Akram Mirani, *Siraiki Daes* (Lahore: 1987) p. 94.

TABLE 2.7 COMPARISION OF INDUSTRIAL UNITS

	%age of total industry		Population 1981	Units with 1-499 workers	Units with 500-999 workers	Units with 1,000 or more workers
	1982	1984				
Siraiki Belt	20.67	22.88	19,307,000	702	16	16
Distt. Lahore	27.21	25.59	3,545,000	804	6	11
Distt. Faisalabad	14.74	14.52	3,562,000	458	5	9
Distt. Gujranwala	14.64	13.56	2,676,000	432	2	1
Total (excluding Siraiki Belt)	56.59	53.67	9,783,000			

Source: Directory of registered industry 1986 Bureau of Statistics Punjab. Quoted from Akram Mirani, *Siraiki Daes* (Lahore: 1987) p. 96.



TABLE 2.8 Basic Facilities in Some Districts of the Siraiiki Region  
(1984)

	Dera Ismael Khan	Rajanpur	Muzaffar- garh	Layyah	Bahawal- pur	Bahwal- nagar	Rahim Yar Khan	Multan	Vehari	Sahiwal	Bhakkar	Mian- wali	Jhang
Population	944000	63900	1498000	667000	1453000	1374000	1841000	2,710,000	1329000	2125000	666000	712000	1978000
Area (Km)	15178	9010	8250	6290	24830	8877	11880	6498	4364	2925	1853	5840	4153
Roads (Km)	471	344.43	613	368	832	638	813	879	539	578	493	474	790
Health (Beds)	333	144	353	72	1089	456	1175	1759	317	760	93	337	606
Government servants	9480	4242	12932	5514	16410	12888	13783	27385	8290	16387	5026	9184	13550
Primary schools	1154	719	1361	629	1366	1716	2069	2447	1113	1660	724	919	2104
Middle schools	94	91	105	50	123	141	188	227	80	137	44	97	161
High schools	46	22	48	25	69	71	88	134	44	74	28	46	71
Colleges	4	4	6	2	9	9	8	13	5	8	2	5	10
Hospitals	4	3	5	1	6	5	7	22	3	8	2	4	8
Dispensaries	26	9	31	19	52	52	59	83	53	39	19	21	56
Rural health centers	4	5	5	2	6	20	7	8	4	5	4	4	11
Basic health centers.	22	8	39	12	33	107	39	73	31	46	—	—	—

Source: Bureau of Statistics Government of the Punjab, Lahore. Quoted from Akram Mirani, *Siraiiki Daes* (Lahore: 1987) p. 107.

## ENDNOTES

- 1 Qari Munas Baloch int: 21/06/2001.
- 2 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (Re-Printed, Lahore: 1996). p. 235-36.
- 3 Ibid., p. 235.
- 4 Ibid., p. 236.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 Chaudhry Ferzand Ali, "India Act 1935 ney Bahawalpur ur Punjab key ghaer kuderty bhandhen taor diya", *Kaynat (Goli Number)* (Bahawalpur: 3 July 1972) p. 10.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Ibid. Qari Munas Baloch int: 21/06/2001.
- 9 Mukhdoom Noor Muhammad Qurieshi, "Awami ahsa'saat key samney kuwat key bund nahi bhandey ja saktey", *Kaynat (Goli Number)* (Bahawalpur: 3 July 1972) p. 13.
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 *Pakistan Times* (Lahore: 6 February 1970) p. 8.
- 12 Allama Rahmatullah Arshad, "Bahawalpur mahromiyoun ka sah'ra", *Kaynat (Goli Number)* (Bahawalpur: 3 July 1972) p. 17-18.
- 13 See for details, "Bahawalpur ka suba kaun ur kis liya", *Kaynat (Goli Number)* (Bahawalpur: 3 July 1972) p. 54-56.
- 14 Allama Rahmatullah Arshad, "Bahawalpur mahromiyoun ka sah'ra", *Kaynat (Goli Number)* (Bahawalpur: 3 July 1972) p. 17.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Ibid., p. 18.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Mahmood Hayat Khan int: 26/06/2001.
- 23 *Report of the Farm Mechanisation Committee* (Ministry of Agriculture and Works, Government of Pakistan: 1970), in Umer Noman, *Pakistan: A Political and Economic History Since 1947* (GB: 1990) p. 30.
- 24 Hamza Alvi, "The Rural Elite and Agricultural Development in Pakistan", in Robert D Stevens, Hamza Alvi and Peter Bertocci (eds), *Rural Development in Bangladesh and Pakistan* (The University of Hawaii Press: 1976), p. 317-53.
- 25 Akram Mirani, *Siraiki Daes* (Lahore: 1987) p. 103.
- 26 Ibid., p. 94, 96.
- 27 Majeed Gill, "Heavy industries lacking in Bahawalpur", *Dawn* (Lahore: 27 October 2002) p. 13.
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 Munir Ahmad Khan int: 23/03/2002.



- 36 Akram Mirani, *Siraiki Daes* (Lahore: 1987) p. 95.  
37 M Afzel Masood Khan, *Manshur-o-programme Pakistan Siraiki Party* (Multan: 1993) p. 17.  
38 Mahmood Hayat Khan int: 26/06/2001.  
39 Azmat Khan int: 25/06/2001.  
40 Naveed Islam Khan int: 25/06/2001.

## Towards Cultural Identity

The struggle for regional autonomy in the Siraiki speaking areas of south Punjab was initially an administrative demand for greater autonomy and economic rights for the region. Only later did it assume the status of a political movement around separatist identity. The prime objective was to contest the economic hegemony of northern Punjab. The movement is, therefore, different from the Pakhtun, Baloch, Sindhi and Muhajir ethno-nationalist struggles.

It was in the 1960s that Siraiki political activists and intelligentsia initiated the construction of a different identity on the basis of Siraiki language. Like the Celtic revival in Ireland, social, cultural, linguistic, and literary assertions came first, which were then used by political activists to congeal a separatist identity.<sup>1</sup> To develop Siraiki, conscious steps were taken to standardize the language and efforts were made to enrich the existing literature. In this chapter, an attempt is made to study the steps taken by Siraiki linguists, individual writers, and literary organizations, all of whom gave a diction to the Siraiki identity.

### (I)

Before the Muslim conquest of Multan, the local language which is now called Siraiki was probably written in a variant of the *Brahmi* script. Later, Arabic *naskh* was adopted for it, which was then replaced by the Persian *nastaleeq*, after the eighteenth century.<sup>2</sup>

The literature was mostly in verse and was initially mystical and religious, with secular and political prose-writing beginning in the twentieth century. A distinguished feature of the Siraiki literature is the tradition of the *marsia*, commonly written in the form of *Doha*, which consist of four metric lines of similar rhythm. Hassan H Gardezi thinks that this tradition of *marsia nigari* began in the thirteenth century when immigrants from Arabia and Central Asia



inhabited this region. 'Particularly the Syed among them started the practice of holding assemblies commemorating the martyrdom of Hussain. The *marsia* in these assemblies was recited in the sad notes of a Siraiki composition known as *maaru*'.<sup>3</sup> Perhaps for this reason, Tahir Taunsvi, a famous Siraiki literati, claims that the first *marsia* in the subcontinent was written in the Siraiki language.<sup>4</sup> The style of the *marsia* changed over the centuries, especially from the nineteenth century onwards. Now verse is made in prose, which makes it sound like a continuous account of the event. These Shi'ite elegies were very different from those of upper Punjab.

Apart from the *marsia*, a large part of Siraiki literature consists of mystical poetry. Rubina Tareen in her work *Multan ki adbi-vatehzibi zindagi main sufia keram ka hessa*, gives some details about Sufi poetry in the Siraiki language.<sup>5</sup> She quotes some verses from the poetry of Bahauddin Zakariya and Shah Rukn-i-Alam that are close to the Siraiki language. These verses were probably written in the Multani language, which was later standardized as Siraiki.

The weakening of the Mughal Empire in the seventeenth century led to the burgeoning of literature in the vernacular in many parts of the subcontinent. Siraiki (then Multani or Riyasti), which had according to Gardezi, survived through the oral tradition, began to appear in script form.<sup>6</sup> Ali Haider (Multan) and Lutf Ali (Bahawalpur) were among the first few literary figures of this language. Ali Haider Multani's (b.1690) poetry in Multani (or Siraiki) language consisted of *she herfi*, which is mainly influenced by philosophy and mysticism. Many poets like Sachal Sarmast of Khairpur (d. 1826), wrote mystical poetry in the same period in a language that is similar to Siraiki, although Siraiki and Punjabi intelligentsia dispute the origins of the language used by Sufis like Shah Hussain (d. 1593), Sultan Bahu (d.1691) or Bullehe Shah (d.1758). Christopher Shackleton, Professor of Modern Languages of South Asia at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, points out that the 'exact definition of the original language of these works is anyway impossible, given the unreliability of their transmission in the earlier period'.<sup>7</sup>

The controversy owns its existence to the works by British colonial scholars posted in this region who considered Siraiki to be

a dialect of the Punjabi. William Carey (1761-1834), working at Serampore, termed this language "Wuch" in 1813. He also compiled a book of grammar which was probably the first of its kind in the *kirakki* script.<sup>8</sup> Richard Burton (1849), another British scholar, compiled a grammar by the name of *Siraiki*. He was probably the first man to have used the word "Siraiki" for the language spoken in the southern parts of Punjab, which he considered to be a dialect of the Punjabi.<sup>9</sup> Andrew Jukes (1847-1931) and Trevor Bomford, both missionaries, used the word "Western Punjabi" for it. George Grieson also used this word "Lahnda" (Western Punjabi) in his linguistic survey.<sup>10</sup> According to Christopher Shackle, 'Lahnda' is a term unacceptable to many Pakistani Punjabis as it is denoting an artificial division of what they regard as common language of all of the Punjab, but is equally repugnant to enthusiasts of Siraiki as implying a sub-ordinate status for it as a 'mere dialect' of Punjabi'.<sup>11</sup>

Exactly when this sense of a distinct language evolved among the literary circles in southern Punjab is hard to determine. Some records suggest that in 1893, Qazi Fakhruddin Razi, attempted for the first time to invent a new and distinguished symbol system to express the distinctive sounds of the Siraiki language.<sup>12</sup> Others have tried to invent and modify orthographic symbols for the language but these efforts remained either unnoticed or unrealized.

Khwaja Farid (1845-1901), the spiritual leader of the rulers of Bahawalpur State and head of the dynasty of *Chishti pir*, enriched the Riyasti language which was later recognized as the standard form of the Siraiki language. Christopher Shackle, while commenting on the unique feature of *marsia*-writing in Siraiki language, writes:

Residing at Chachran on the banks of the Indus, he was well known to his contemporaries for his profound theological and legal knowledge, but he is chiefly remembered for his divan of mystical hymns (*kafi*), which marks the virtual conclusion, and also the culmination, of the long tradition of mystical writing in the local language of the Indus valley by Sufi poets. Written for the most part in a pure and quite distinctive Siraiki, and often imbued with specifically local elements, particularly in references to and description of, the scenery and activities of the people of his beloved *rohi*, the Cholistan desert, these poems and their author have attracted a popularity and a veneration in the Siraiki-speaking area which is



closely paralleled only by the position of Shah Abdul Latif in Sindh and that of Varis Shah, author of the famous *Hir* (1766), in the Central Punjab. In spite of his comparatively recent date, the classic status of Khwaja Farid is undisputed, and is indeed thrown into sharper relief by the lack of successors of remotely comparable stature. Here, then, is an artistic and spiritual focus whose symbolic potential has naturally been gratefully recognized by the Siraiiki movement.<sup>13</sup>

It was as late as the 1930s when the local writers began to quarry the past for submerged identities in Multan and Bahawalpur, an attempt which was quite similar to the movement in the North-West Frontier Province, where the local intelligentsia attempted to enrich Pakhtun identity. This new trend may have been inspired by documents compiled and published by the British administration in this period. The British had translated a major portion of oriental literature like poetry, prose, ancient sources of history, and so on. The *Imperial Gazetteers* published by them provided comprehensive information about the history, population, language, races and tribes, economy, culture, pattern of migration, etc. In this period, Aulad Ali Khan wrote *Muraq'e Mooltani*, which profiles distinguished local personalities alongwith a short history of the city of Multan. The book included minor details derived from the *Gazetteers* and other official publications about noted local figures, culture, and industry.<sup>14</sup> In Bahawalpur, Azizur Rahman, librarian to the Amir of Bahawalpur, and his brother Hafizur Rahman, did some work on the history of the Abbasi Nawabs of Bahawalpur. Hafiz also translated the Quran in Riyasti, which was later considered a dialect of Siraiiki. Although the Bible had already been translated into Siraiiki by a Christian missionary in 1819, it was written in Devnagiri script<sup>15</sup> and its language was possibly that of Sirro (upper Sindh).

Azizur Rahman, alongwith some of his literary-minded friends, tried to standardize the language by convening 'a committee, which recommended the adoption of a rationally planned set of additional letters to mark the implosives and other consonants, to enable the reasonably phonetic writing of Siraiiki into the Urdu script'.<sup>16</sup> He adopted this style in *Diwan-e-Farid*, which was published in 1944. Patronized by the Nawabs, it was an Urdu translation of Khwaja Farid's poetry accompanied by a commentary to which Allama

Talut wrote a detailed biographical introduction. This small literary group of Bahawalpur also published a journal, *Al-Aziz*, which was the first of its kind in the local language. *Al-Aziz* provided useful information about literary activities and publications, but these writings lack any critical evaluation and literary value and were possibly undertaken to gain the Nawab's favour rather than to insist on a separatist identity. Hafizur Rahman's *Tamaden-e-Bahawalpur ki duo mukhtaser tesverain* can be quoted as an example in which the local language was termed a dialect of the Punjabi.<sup>17</sup> Since Urdu was the official language of the State, all these works published in Urdu. The local language was neither the medium of instruction in schools nor used by those in power.<sup>18</sup> Mumtaz Dar, General Secretary (Punjab) Pakistan Siraiki Party, argues that had the Nawab patronized the language, there would have been greater awareness of a separate identity.<sup>19</sup> Although some followers of Ubaidullah Sindhi did try to devise grammatical rules for the local language by publishing *Riayasti maadri zuban ka qa'ida* in 1943 from Bahawalpur, such efforts did not go very far due to lack of official patronage.<sup>20</sup>

In 1950, *Punjnad*, a Siraiki journal was published from Karachi but it could survive only for a shortwhile. In 1953, Akhter Vahid, the General Secretary of the Multani Research Academy, attempted to standardize the language and published a booklet of Multani grammar, *Multani zuban da qa'ida*. Till the end of the 1950s, the word "Siraiki" remained alien to this region. Multani and Riyasti were the terms used for the languages spoken in Multan and Bahawalpur respectively. The literature produced in Multan mainly revolved around mystical poetry or language and culture.

In the 1960s, some writers and intellectuals from southern Punjab convened a meeting and decided to discard home-sprung names like *Multani*, *Muzaffargarhi*, *Uchi*, *Riasti*, *Derewali*, *Hindko*, *Jaghadali*, *Thalchari*, *Lahnda*, *Jatki*, and *Balochki* often used for the local languages and replace them with a single word "Siraiki".<sup>21</sup> Multani and Riyasti were recognized as the standard forms of Siraiki. As discussed earlier, Siraiki was used for a dialect of Sindhi language, spoken in upper Sindh. Different people claim the credit for proposing this name, most important among



them being Dr Mehr Abdul Haq, a well known Siraiki literary figure, and Mushtaq Hussain Gadi, a retired school headmaster.<sup>22</sup> It was Dr Mehr who researched the Multani language in the 1960s, calling it "Siraiki" because he thought it could apply to a much wider region.<sup>23</sup> Dr Mehr wrote many books in Siraiki and also translated the Quran and *Qasida Burda Sharif* in the local language.

In 1961, Riaz Hashmi, a Siraiki speaking Urdu poet and a lawyer from Muzaffargarh, organized a festival by the name of *Jashn-e-Farid* or *Yum-e-Farid*, for the first time. This biannual festival attracted a considerable number of writers and performers. Music concerts and *musha'ira* were the most popular events, which enticed large audiences, even from other provinces.<sup>24</sup> Hashmi also founded a cultural organization, Bazm-e-Saqafat, which aimed at preserving the local culture and to 'bring it before a wider public'.<sup>25</sup> The organization not only produced significant literature in Siraiki but also laid special emphasis on the translation of the poetry of Khwaja Farid in Bengali, English, and Urdu.<sup>26</sup> All these efforts were inspired by Riaz Hashmi, so when he became the judge of the Lahore High Court and shifted residence to that city, the organization lost its momentum. Despite its shortcomings, his efforts provided the blueprint for other cultural organizations to emulate.

Another significant development was the official support for Siraiki. When the Siraiki Movement was rearing its head in the early 1960s, the Punjabi intelligentsia blamed Qudratullah Shahab, one of the most influential bureaucrats of that time, for patronizing it and directing it against the "Punjabi identity".<sup>27</sup> In the First and Second Adabi Conferences,<sup>28</sup> a reasonable number of high profiled state officials either sent their wishes or took an active part in the proceedings. In the 1980s, an Assistant Commissioner of Bahawalpur inaugurated the office of Jhok Publishers near Siraiki Chowk in Bahawalpur, which devoted itself to professing the cause of Siraiki identity. The same place is also operating as the office of the local Siraiki party.

In 1964, Brigadier Nazir Ali Shah, an ex-official of the Bahawalpur State, formed an organization, the Siraiki Adabi Majlis, in Bahawalpur. The organization devoted itself to highlighting Siraiki history, culture, and language, with special emphasis on Bahawalpur.

This split in identity politics and Bahawalpuri self-assertion apparently had no links with Multan.<sup>29</sup> It was perhaps the sense of deprivation which emerged after Bahawalpur was merged into One-Unit. The organization produced dozens of publications in Siraiki, including a journal, *Siraiki*, first published in 1965. Like other groups, this one also laid emphasis on poetry, and most of the published works are in verse but these publications proved to be the source for prose writing in the language. Riayasti political consciousness became more prominent in these literary works. Local literary figures, some of which used the term "Bahawalpuri" after their names, condemned these political developments. Brigadier Nazir Ali, in his book *Sadiqnama*, compared the condition of Bahawalpur before and after the merger. He noted the anger of local people and the political denunciation of One-Unit scheme.<sup>30</sup>

In Multan the Siraiki Academy, was formed by A K Baloch. The Academy, which initially worked under Hasanul Haidiri, structured its activities around the language movement, thus paving the way for other small literary and cultural organizations.<sup>31</sup> When Khan Rizwani, a journalist by profession, took over the charge of Secretary to the Academy, the activities became more result-oriented. A K Baloch also published a bulletin of the Academy which later became an independent Siraiki journal, *Akhter*, containing analytical articles, poems, and short stories, but it could not survive after the departure of the Baloch to Quetta. Noor Ahmed Faridi (Baloch's father), tried to fill the gap by publishing a monthly literary magazine called *Siraiki Adab*, which was classified along the same lines with the addition of religious articles in Urdu. Noor commercialized it to some extent, but it is hard to ascertain its circulation figures. All such organizations, as Shackle noted, were a kind of pressure tactics to establish Siraiki as an historical and culturally rich language.<sup>32</sup> By the late 1960s, although considerable linguistic activism was going on in the southern belt, it centred around individual personalities, and collapsed when they lost an interest in the movement.

In the 1970s, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's shrewd policies contained all separatist identity politics in the country. He crushed the Baloch nationalist movement by military action, and enacted a law imposing



seven years rigorous imprisonment if anyone demanded a status of state for the provinces. Partly due to this, but mainly due to the badly organized Siraiki movement, it could not be fully mobilised, and limited itself to literary and cultural activities. Taj M Langha, President of Pakistan Siraiki Party (PSP), blamed Z A Bhutto, 'Although he was our friend; he betrayed us by devising stern policies against regional movements'.<sup>33</sup> Some literary figures felt that literary and cultural organizations working independently lacked any co-ordination. In order to overcome this, efforts were intensified to form close collaboration among Siraiki literary organizations which came together in the form of the Adabi Sangat. The Sangat aimed at highlighting the antiquity of the language and the rich cultural heritage of the region, marking out its separate political identity in the past.

At around the same time, the Siraiki Academy in Multan formed the Siraiki Student's Federation to reinvigorate the movement. It was seen by political analysts as language issue but even though this federation still exists in the colleges of southern Punjab, it appears to be paralyzed in any political sense. Its members are more involved in beating up bus drivers and striking against college authorities rather than in any positive politics. Even during national elections, the federation of students did not campaign for any candidate of the Siraiki political parties.

In the 1970s, some literary men of Multan established the Siraiki Adabi Board along the lines of the Sindhi Adabi Board (SAB). The SAB was financially supported by the provincial government, and it played a vital role in the development of the Sindhi language alongwith publishing many classical works in the vernacular since its inception in 1941. Initially, Dr Mehr Abdul Haq was secretary to the Siraiki Adabi Board, who later became its incharge. This Board, alongwith Siraiki Academy and Siraiki Adabi Majlis, contributed significantly to Siraiki literature.<sup>34</sup> By that time, the Siraiki Academy had initiated a new programme of giving awards to those who rendered extraordinary services to the language. The first annual Siraiki Award was given to Inayat Hussain Bhatti who directed the first feature film in Siraiki, *Dhian Nimanian*. Bhatti, who played the central role and shot the film in Lahore, was severely criticized

for heavily northern Punjabi accent of some actors. The picture attracted a large audience. Shackle committed, the 'award seems to be justified due to its record breaking popularity'.<sup>35</sup>

The most significant development, which left a deep impact and gave valuable impetus to the Siraiki movement was the first All-Pakistan Siraiki Literary Conference, held between 14-16 March 1975. The idea of this conference was tossed in January 1975 as a retort to the reports that Punjabi was to be introduced as the medium of instruction at primary level in the entire province.<sup>36</sup> Siraiki intelligentsia and ethno-nationalists organized this Conference to highlight their separate language and identity.

We will discuss its far-reaching political impact on the movement in the next chapter, here we will focus on those literary activities which consolidated and intensified the efforts of Siraiki intelligentsia in fashioning the Siraiki ethno-nationalistic identity. When twenty-three Siraiki *Adabi* (literary) organizations<sup>37</sup> came together in the Pakistan Foundation with Riaz Anwer as the General Secretary, these different bodies called themselves *Siraiki Majlis-e-Amila*, which was made responsible for all the arrangements and proceedings of the Conference. The papers read at the Conference were meant to emphasize the distinct linguistic and cultural identity of this region.<sup>38</sup>

Two language-planning committees suggested some changes in the script of the language. One was instituted by the Siraiki Sangat of Karachi, and the other by the Siraiki Conference, held in Multan in March 1975. There was complete harmony between the two committees about employing *naskh*. However, the Multan committee recommended the use of circles under or over a number of letters, while the Karachi committee suggested dots for circles.<sup>39</sup> At present, many publications apply dots for the implosives and other sounds unique to the language.

The committee (*Masa'il committee*), drafted many resolutions<sup>40</sup> that were the precursors of ethno-nationalist demands:

1. Siraiki should be the medium of instruction at primary level alongwith Urdu, and an optional subject in the universities.
2. Separate departments for Siraiki language in the



universities of Lahore, Multan, Bahawalpur, Dera Ismael Khan, and Jamshoro should be established. All colleges in the Siraiiki region should publish one portion of their college magazines in the Siraiiki language, along with Urdu and English.

3. Non-Siraiiki staff at Bahawalpur and Multan radio stations and their undue reliance upon relays from Lahore radio, which was mainly in the Punjabi should be stopped or curtailed. At least 70 per cent programmes should be in Siraiiki.
4. Siraiiki literary organizations should advertise their publications. The establishment of an Art Councils in Bahawalpur and Multan, comprising only Siraiiki speaking scholars and literary figures, should be considered. The absence of Siraiiki literary figures in the Pakistan Writers Guild, and the abundance of non-Siraiiki speaking staff in the Pakistan National Centre (Bahawalpur) was condemned.
5. Official publications should include translation into Siraiiki for establishing a direct and efficient means of communication between the Siraiiki speaking people and the government.
6. The parliamentarians elected from southern Punjab should address the parliament in Siraiiki.
7. Official assistance should be provided for spreading the teachings of Khwaja Farid, Bahauddin Zakariya, and others.

Christopher Shackle, who participated in the proceedings, observed:

The organizers of the Conference were careful to stress its exclusively literary and cultural character, and to disassociate themselves from the views presented there by a provincial opposition leader, invited as a guest speaker, who spoke forcefully in favour of the immediate recognition of Siraiiki claims and the establishment of a separate Siraiiki Suba. But to grant the Conference's demands, particularly in the educational sphere, would indeed necessitate important political decisions involving the award of some degree of local autonomy.<sup>41</sup>

According to Shackle, the principal aim of the Conference was to reinforce the participants' sense of solidarity and common progress and the Conference proved to be successful in evoking and consolidating a Siraiki consciousness.<sup>42</sup>

During the Multan Conference, it was announced that the next conference would be held in Bahawalpur, where participants would be allowed to express their views freely without any political pressure.<sup>43</sup> After the lapse of thirteen years, in 1988, the Second All-Pakistan Siraiki Adabi Conference was held in Multan, in sharp contrast to the first one. The earlier Conference had been more political in character, whereas the second one proved to be more literary. Although the participants stressed upon making Siraiki the medium of instruction at primary and university level, and also highlighted the economic problems faced by the Siraikis, no anti-Punjabi sentiments were aired in this Conference.<sup>44</sup>

In the 1970s, the Siraiki intelligentsia was struggling for the recognition of a separate identity. This aim combined the goals of the Siraiki literati and political leadership, hence the outcome was a successful First All-Pakistan Siraiki Adabi Conference. Later, when the Siraiki language was recognized by the State, literature and politics became two very different concerns. The best evidence of this was the Second All-Pakistan Siraiki Adabi Conference in which no prominent Siraiki ethno-nationalist bothered to take part. This gap between Siraiki literary activities and politics was also resented by Taj M Langha:

It is too disappointing to see that some of our scholars and literary figures are not working along with the Siraiki National Movement but striving for dissolute, off track, and unprincipled destinations.<sup>45</sup>

On the same forum, Mr Langha appealed to Siraiki scholars to write about the history of the Siraiki movement along with the literary history of Siraiki. From early 1970s onward, some attempts were made to stress upon the distinctive identity through literature. Sheikh Ikramul Haq in his *Arz-e-Multan*, not only emphasized the distinctive culture and language of the region but also incorporated many myths and arguments to support his case. According to him, Orsis (a character in the Egyptian mythology in about 23 000 BC) came to



the region and taught people about the cultivation of cotton. In the same work, he claims that the Urdu language derived its basic grammar and vocabulary from Siraiiki.<sup>46</sup> Akram Mirani, in his Urdu work, *Greater Thar*, researched the economic exploitation of the locals in the region of Thar and Bahawalpur. The author pleaded his case, much better than in *Siraiiki Daes*, which except for some useful tables belonged to the game propaganda literature.<sup>47</sup> Javeed Ahsan in his book *Siraiiki Sa'qafet*, tried to give an idea of "Siraiiki culture" and its difference from upper Punjab.<sup>48</sup>

Some scholars tried to highlight the antiquity of the language and claimed that Siraiiki 'was the language of the sun worshipping Asury people who ruled Multan 3 000 years ago; or that it was the language of village Sarwa in Rahim Yar Khan district'.<sup>49</sup> In India, some activists claimed that the language which is written in Devnagiri script, was spoken during the times of Chandragupta, and 'was one of the classic languages of the yore in the same league as Sanskrit and Pali'.<sup>50</sup> Sheikh Ikramul Haq argues that Sanskrit had to experience a complete metamorphosis due to a great number of intrusions by foreigners whose remodelled form adapted itself in the shape of Siraiiki.<sup>51</sup> Dilshad Kalanchvi wrote an article in 2001-02, in which he claimed that Siraiiki language originated when Adam came to this region.<sup>52</sup> One can question the authenticity of these works, but it is difficult to deny the efforts made to carve a distinctive identity for this region.

In spite of the apolitical posture adopted by most of the literati, Siraiiki literary activities played a crucial part in developing the concept of Siraiiki identity. Literary organizations like Siraiiki Library,<sup>53</sup> Ecathmy Siraiiki Adab,<sup>54</sup> Mumtaz Academy Bhutta,<sup>55</sup> and Siraiiki Publications,<sup>56</sup> produced literature which may be termed valuable addition to the existing stock. In addition, a number of weekly and monthly publications also attempted to raise cultural and political awareness.<sup>57</sup> Most of these journals could not survive for a long period, mainly due to financial constraints.

Some activities for the survival and promotion of Siraiiki language are also taking place in India, mostly by the immigrants from Pakistan who still speak the language. The Federation of Migrant Groups, founded by poet, J C Batra, has organized the

Siraiki *mushaira* a couple of times. A journal in the language was published under the advisory committee comprising Batra and Atam Prakash Nandvani. Taj M Langha, alongwith a delegation, also participated in these cultural and literary activities. Azmat Khan, a delegate with Langha, disclosed that some of the participants expressed anti-partition sentiments from both sides but these were exaggerated in the Pakistani Press. According to him, the Indians did not give due protocol to Langha, which annoyed him and darkened the possibility of any future collaboration. Such activities encouraged many anti-Siraiki circles to blame the "foreign hand" behind the language movement.<sup>58</sup> However, the disorganized, isolated, and somewhat confused activities do not justify such a claim.

Under the firm control of the federal government, the academic institutions in the region are indirectly contributing to the cultural construction of a Siraiki identity. Currently, Islamia University, Bahawalpur is offering degree classes at post-graduate level in Siraiki, but the department is facing great hardships due to lack of interest among the students. A Siraiki Centre has also been established in the same university. Although curriculum suggested for the course stressed the unity of the country, literature that may challenge the authority of the State is strictly prohibited in the library of the Siraiki Centre (Bahawalpur).<sup>59</sup> A Siraiki Research Centre is also established at Bahauddin Zakariya University (BZU), Multan. Established under the headship of Dr Anwar Ahmad Khan, the Centre aims to research the language, history, and culture of the region. Other departments of the University, for example, History, Economics, have produced some works on the history, culture and economy of the region by relying on factual evidence rather than on myth or imagination, thus compiling a comparatively more credible study of the region. Works done by Dr Mughal, Dr Rubina, and Dr Karamat may be quoted here as examples.

The recognition of Siraiki as an independent language by the government in the 1980s was a triumph for Siraiki political advocates and the intelligentsia. The language is spoken in the geographically contiguous regions, which helped in creating a sense of unity. Such a pattern of distinguishing "mutually intelligible", languages for



political purposes and identity formation may be observed in the case of Urdu and Hindi languages. Similarly, the mutually intelligible dialects of the Scandinavian countries are being tagged as mature, distinctive, and discrete languages only to strengthen national identities.

Many Siraiki linguists are also trying to invent new terms to expand the vocabulary but there is no concurrence in their usage, and not even a single glossary that is commonly accepted has been compiled until now.<sup>60</sup> For scholarly works, writers tend to fall back upon that original stockpile which is only partially analogous to the Punjabi.<sup>61</sup> By and large, all recently coined words utilize homegrown Sanskrit morphemes. Such words and terminologies are not used by the general public, and most of the Siraiki intellectuals do not bother to exercise most of them in their own popular writing.<sup>62</sup>

Similarly, an attempt has been made to standardize the script of Kandhari, a dialect of Siraiki that is spoken by Afghan Hindus. A Roman script for the language is devised along with alphabets, numbers, pronouns, common verbs, adjectives, tenses and verb conjugation.<sup>63</sup>

Such efforts show individual ambition rather than collective effort. Sadiq Jeri, a Siraiki linguist, believes that most Siraiki intellectuals are working for personal gain, that is why despite every effort, they fail to deliver on every forum made for language planning.<sup>64</sup>

TABLE 3.1 NEWLY INTRODUCED SIRAIKI TERMS

WORD COMMONLY USED	SIRAIKI COINAGE	ENGLISH
<i>Ilm</i>	<i>Bhum</i>	Knowledge
<i>Alim</i>	<i>Bhum val</i>	Intellectual, erudite person
<i>Lisaniyat</i>	<i>Boli bhum</i>	Linguistics
<i>Qutub shimali</i>	<i>Ubheejar Dharti dhur</i>	North pole
<i>Qutub janubi</i>	<i>Lamuchar Dherti dhur</i>	South pole
<i>Rasmul khat</i>	<i>Likhat reet</i>	Script
TV	<i>Moorat vaja</i>	Television
Radio	<i>Sur vaja</i>	Radio
Atom bomb	<i>Suth gola</i>	Nuclear bomb
Grammar	<i>Akhar mool</i>	Grammar
Dast khat	<i>Akhar huth</i>	Signature

Source: Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: 2000) p.177

## (II)

The Siraiki Lok Sanjh (Siraiki People's Co-operative Society), which came into existence on 7 November 1985 in Rajanpur at Bangla Korai, is an important cultural organization whose stated objectives were:

- (a) To promote the cause of the Siraiki language and culture;
- (b) To create consciousness of rights and promote social education among the Siraiki people;
- (c) To make the Siraiki area a powerful unit of the federation of Pakistan.<sup>65</sup>

The Sanjh instituted its branches in various towns of the Siraiki speaking region, based in Lahore and Islamabad. To make people aware of their separate identity and their political rights, festivals and fairs were organized. According to Tariq Rahman, the Sanjh has an anti-feudal, left-leaning proclivity due to which it is charged of being the front organization of a socialist party.<sup>66</sup> An identical pattern may be observed in Paleejo's Awami Party in Sindh, known for its anti-feudal politics, whose leaders claim that if a Siraiki province is formed the local feudal lords would lord over the proposed province.<sup>67</sup> According to Mazher Arif, the founding General Secretary of the Sanjh:

We want to end exploitation but are not the front organization of any political party. We do have contacts with the PNP and ANP since they both accepted ethno-nationalism. There was a meeting with the PNP in 1986 with Ghaus Baksh Bazenjo, and our own president Fida Hussain Gadi. The PNP agreed with our stand that Siraiki formed a separate nationality. They made a unit called the PNP Siraiki for southern Punjab. The ANP also made their Siraiki unit in 1987 and Pleejo was part of it. All this makes us close to these two left leaning parties but we are in no sense their font organization.<sup>68</sup>

The Lok Sanjh includes many middle and lower middle class intellectuals. Fida Hussain Gadi, a retired schoolmaster, remained its head till 1988. The Sanjh has also been allied with other leftist organizations and participated in the Progressive Writers Conference (1986), which recognized Siraiki as one of the regional languages of Pakistan.<sup>69</sup> The anxieties of the Sanjh are carbon copy of concerns propagated by the other Siraiki parties. For instance:



Siraiki region should be acknowledged as a nationality, official documents should be written in Siraiki, and the Siraiki areas should vote on ethnicity. The Sanjh leaders awareness of underdevelopment and cultural deprivation, the demands for using Siraiki as the medium of instruction at the primary level, and improving educational facilities and job opportunities, are no different from other Siraiki intellectuals.<sup>70</sup>

There are a number of affiliated organizations of the Sanjh: the Shagird Sanjh (Students Association), established in 1986; the Siraiki Lok Tamasha (Siraiki People's Theatre), which staged its first play in Multan in 1987 and has branches in Kot Addu, Dera Ismael Khan and other places; and the Siraiki Trimit Sanjh (Siraiki Women's Association) formed in 1989. These organizations distance themselves from political parties but their cultural activities do carry political implications. Collaborative organizations like student groups used to play a role in the election to students unions at the universities against right-wing Islamic student parties.<sup>71</sup> Many of the students of local colleges interviewed for this study say that these student unions completely failed to mobilize people on any linguistic or political basis.

Student wings of main political parties, like the Muslim Student Federation of the Pakistan Muslim League and People's Student Federation of the Pakistan Peoples Party, and Jamiat of Jamat-i-Islami, enjoy comparatively more respect than the student wings of the Siraiki political parties. The unpopularity of Siraiki students' organizations has had grave consequences for ethno-nationalists because no base could be formed amongst the volatile youth, the future of this region.

The attempts to accept Siraiki as a distinctive cultural identity is becoming more political with the passage of time, especially due to the increasing economic disparity between the northern and the southern parts of Punjab. Although intellectual backing and co-ordination is still required for the politicization of the movement, the increasing discontent in the Siraiki working class is a dominating feature of local literature. The immigrant working class is still not ready to accept the label of "Siraikism" for their region and is struggling for another, more accommodative label. The next chapter deals with the political aspects of the Siraiki movement.

## ENDNOTES

- 1 Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: 2000) p. 180.
- 2 Ibid., p. 176.
- 3 Hassan N Gardezi, *Siraiki Language and Its Poetics: An Introduction*. See website [http://www.punjabilok.com/misc/literature/siraiki\\_language\\_and\\_%20Poetics.htm](http://www.punjabilok.com/misc/literature/siraiki_language_and_%20Poetics.htm). Visited at 4: 30 PM, 2 December 2003.
- 4 M Sadiq Jeri int: 08/03/2001.
- 5 Rubina Tareen, *Multan ki adbi-va-tehzibi zindagi main sufia karam ka hessa* (Multan: 1989).
- 6 Hassan N Gardezi, *Siraiki Language and Its Poetics: An Introduction*. See website [http://www.punjabilok.com/misc/literature/siraiki\\_language\\_and\\_%20Poetics.htm](http://www.punjabilok.com/misc/literature/siraiki_language_and_%20Poetics.htm). Visited at 4: 30 PM, on 2 December 2003.
- 7 Christopher Shackle, "Siraiki: A Language Movement in Pakistan". *Modern Asian Studies*, ii, 3 (Great Britain: 1977) p. 390.
- 8 Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: 2000) p. 173.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 Christopher Shackle, "Siraiki: A Language Movement in Pakistan". *Modern Asian Studies*, ii, 3 (Great Britain: 1977) p. 388.
- 12 Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: 2000) p. 176.
- 13 Christopher Shackle, "Siraiki: A Language Movement in Pakistan". *Modern Asian Studies*, ii, 3 (Great Britain: 1977) p. 390-91.
- 14 Aulad Ali Khan, *Muraq'e Mooltani* (Re-printed, Lahore: 1995).
- 15 See <http://www.worldscriptures.org/pages/siraiki.html>. Visited at 4: 30 PM, on 2 December 2003.
- 16 Christopher Shackle, "Siraiki: A Language Movement in Pakistan". *Modern Asian Studies*, ii, 3 (Great Britain: 1977) p. 391.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Mumtaz Dar int: 08/04/2001.
- 20 Christopher Shackle, "Siraiki: A Language Movement in Pakistan". *Modern Asian Studies*, ii, 3 (Great Britain: 1977) p. 391.
- 21 Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: 2000) p. 173.
- 22 M Sadiq Jeri int: 08/03/2001.
- 23 Mehr Abdul Haq int: 26/12/1996, quoted from Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: 2000) p. 174.
- 24 Christopher Shackle, "Siraiki: A Language Movement in Pakistan". *Modern Asian Studies*, ii, 3 (Great Britain: 1977) p. 391-93.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Ibid. Some of its prominent publications include *prêt mahar*, *nagma-e-sehra*, *Siraiki lok geet* (Dr Mehr Abdul Haq), *Siraiki sha'eri* (Kafi Jampur), *Kher Shah da kelaam* (Dr Tahir Taunsvi), *tulawerda* (Muhammad Aslem Rasoolpuri), *Tariekhe Multan Langha dur main* (from AD 1437-1543) (Umer Kamal).
- 27 Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: 2000) p. 180.
- 28 The First All-Pakistan Siraiki Adabi Conference was held in Multan in 1975, while the Second All-Pakistan Adabi Conference was also hosted by same city in 1988.
- 29 Christopher Shackle, "Siraiki: A Language Movement in Pakistan". *Modern Asian Studies*, ii, 3 (Great Britain: 1977) p. 395.
- 30 See Syed Nazir Ali Shah, *Sadiqnama* (1971, Re-Printed with additions, Multan:



- 1997) p. 113-119.
- 31 Christopher Shackle, "Siraiki: A Language Movement in Pakistan". *Modern Asian Studies*, ii, 3 (Great Britain: 1977) p. 394.
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 Taj M Langha int: 04/03/2001.
- 34 The important publications of this body are *Nur-a-Jamal* (Mehr Abdul Haq), *Siraiki ur es ke humsaya ilaqae zubunaun* (Mehr Abdul Haq), *Siraiki zaban da q'eeda q'nun* (Mehr Abdul Haq), *Siraiki diaun ma'zeed lisani tahkeequan* (Mehr Abdul Haq), *Payam-e-Farid* (Mehr Abdul Haq), *Cherag Awan di Heer* (Dr Tahir Taunsvi), etc.
- 35 Christopher Shackle, "Siraiki: A Language Movement in Pakistan". *Modern Asian Studies*, ii, 3 (Great Britain: 1977) p. 397-98.
- 36 Ibid., p. 398.
- 37 These organizations were Farid Siraiki Academy, Siraiki Adabi Board Multan, Siraiki Majlis Multan, Siraiki Academy Multan, Siraiki Adabi Sanget Multan, Bazm-e-Mashagal Siraiki Adab Zahir Pir, Bazm-e-Janbaz Uccch Sharif, Bazm-e-Mujahid Khanpur, Arbab-e-Qalem D G Khan, Sattar Academy Rahim Yar Khan, Merkez-e-Siraiki zaban te Adab Bahawalpur, Bazm-e-Jazeb Chuni Godth, Bazm-e-Faiz Liaquatpur, Siraiki Cultural Society Bahawalpur, Siraiki Adabi Majlis Bahawalpur, Siraiki Sanghat Sadiqabad, Siraiki Adabi Sanghet Tunsu, Bazm-e-Farid Chacheran, Bazm-e-Farid Rahim Yar Khan, Khwaja Khuda Buksh Academy Khairpur, Bazm-e-Naqvi Ahmedpur Sharqia, Pakistan Siraiki Anjuman Bahawalpur, and Bazm-e-Sayil Dera Gazi Khan. It was a Pan-Siraiki gathering in which 132 representatives across the belt participated in the proceedings. *Musha'era* and music concert attracted much audience than any other event of the Conference. About one hundred and twenty eight poets and ten singers, many from southern Punjab, participated.
- 38 The papers read in the Conference were *Siraiki Adab main kuwateen ka hissa* by Begham Shaheen Qurieshi, *Siraiki ka awami adab* by Prof A B Bashir, *Jadeed Siraiki Sha'eri* by Dr Tahir Taunsvi, *Siraiki drama* by Allama Ateeq Fiqri, *Siraiki ta'lime ida'ruan main* by Prof Umair Qurieshi, *Siraiki saqafet zurbul mesil ki rooshuni main* by Refia Qamer, *Siraiki rasmul khet* by Wahid Baksh Khan Wahid, *Siraiki afsannah* by Aslem Rasulpuri, *Siraiki zaban flahet-o-blaget ki zaban haa* by Rafiq Khawer Jeskani, *Siraiki lok geet* by Tahir Gani Khan, *Dera Ismaeel main Siraiki* by Zafer Mirza, *Siraiki kafi ur gazel* by Rasheed Usmani, *Siraiki bhujhartain* by Sufi Ahmed Jan Faridi, *Punjabi ur Siraiki ka lisani rawabet* by Dr Mehr Abdul Haq. See for details Umer Kamal Khan, *Paheli kul Pakistan Siraiki Adabi Conference* (Multan: 1975) p. 1.
- 39 Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: 2000) p. 176.
- 40 See for details Umer Kamal Khan, *Paheli kul Pakistan Siraiki Adabi Conference* (Multan: 1975) p. 7-9.
- 41 Christopher Shackle, "Siraiki: A Language Movement in Pakistan", *Modern Asian Studies*, ii, 3 (Great Britain: 1977) p. 400.
- 42 Ibid., p. 399.
- 43 Umer Kamal Khan, *Paheli kul Pakistan Siraiki Adabi Conference* (Multan: 1975) p. 42.
- 44 Habeeb Faik, "Kul Pakistan Siraiki Adabi Conference", *Siraiki Adab* (5), (May, 1988), p. 33-36.
- 45 Lecture by Taj M Langha, "Siraiki Adab qumi tehriek da bagher perwan na'e charh sukda". *Siraiki Awaz* (9) (Khanpur:1-9 October, 1995) p. 16.
- 46 Sheikh Ikramul Haq, *Arz-e-Multan* (Multan: 1972) p. 327, 383-90.

- 47 Akram Mirani, *Siraiki Dae* (Lahore: 1987).
- 48 Javed Ahsan Khan, *Siraiki Sa'qafet* (Multan: 1995).
- 49 Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: 2000) p. 174.
- 50 "Multani poets relive memories of struggle", *Indian Express* (Bombay : 27 January 1998). See website [http://www.indianexpress.com/ie/daily/19980127\\_02651164.html](http://www.indianexpress.com/ie/daily/19980127_02651164.html). Visited at 4: 30 PM, 2 December 2003.
- 51 See for details Sheikh Ikramul Haq, *Arz-e-Multan* (Multan: 1972) p. 353-54.
- 52 This information was provided to the author by some students at the Central Library, Bahawalpur.
- 53 Important publications of this organization included many books written by Dilshad Kalanchvi like *Siraiki g'eda*, *Siraiki-Urdu lughet*, *Urdu-Siraiki lughet*, *Sh'eri da uzan*, *Masnavi del'a bahar*, *kun faqer Farid*.
- 54 Some of its publications are *Uchi dherti jhuka asmaan* and *dhekun kenia dian walian* by Dilshad Kalanchvi.
- 55 Its important publications are *Kaskol vich sumander* and *undhara di ra't* both written by Mumtaz Haider Dahir.
- 56 Its important publications are *Siraiki adabi ta'riekh*, *suchaun da dau'vera* both written by Sajad Haider Pervaiz, *Siraiki insha'ya*, by Aslem Matella.
- 57 For instance *Sachar* (Karachi), *Sunghet* (Lahore), *Sinha* and *Sanjh* (Taunsa), *Sochaun* (Rasulpur), *Wasseib* and *Sinhrha* (Ahmadpur Sherqia), *Perchol* (Mianwali), *RohiRung* (Khanpur), *Siraiki Adab* (Multan), *Siraiki Awaaz* (Khanpur), *Akhter* (Multan), *Sumal* (Ahmadpur Sherqia and Bahawalpur) For details see, Tahir Taunsvi, "Siraiki dian anjumena ta idara". *Siraiki Adab* (5), (May, 1988), p. 6-8.
- 58 Azmat Khan int: 25/06/2001.
- 59 When I went to the Islamia University, Bahawalpur, during this research and requested for books on Siraiki ethno-nationalism, one Professor remarked, 'they will kill us if we keep such stuff in our libraries'.
- 60 Sadiq Jeri int: 8/03/2001.
- 61 Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: 2000) p. 176.
- 62 Ibid.
- 63 *Kandhari: The Language*. Website: <http://www.afghanhindu.info/language.htm>. Visited at 5: 10 PM, on 2 December 2003.
- 64 Sadiq Jeri int: 8/03/2001.
- 65 Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: 2000) p. 184.
- 66 Ibid., 185.
- 67 Ibid.
- 68 Ibid.
- 69 Ibid.
- 70 Ibid.
- 71 Ibid.





# Quest For Political Autonomy

The struggle for political autonomy and demand for a separate province began with the emergence of the Bahawalpur Province Movement (BPM), which surfaced in the late 1960s and petered out in the early 1970s. This movement later gave impetus to a series of literary and cultural activities that configured themselves around the Siraiki identity. Earlier, we have studied the claims and grievances which set the stage for the separatist colour that this movement attained. In this chapter an attempt is being made to study the course of this struggle and to analyze the factors which led to Siraiki ethno-nationalist parties and their factions.

### (I)

The Bahawalpur Province Movement (BPM) began to take shape when General Yahya Khan's regime took the decision of dissolving One-Unit. The movement demanded the creation of a separate province in the former State of Bahawalpur by including three districts: Bahawalpur, Bahwalnagar and Rahim Yar Khan, which covered an area of 17 508 square miles and had a population of 2 574 066, according to the census reports of 1961.<sup>1</sup> Since its foundation, Daud Putra Abbasi ruled the State, sometimes independently and at other times with the help of the British. This collaboration with the British was aimed at countering the external challenges posed by the Sikh. Historical and literary accounts prove that the local population never favoured this association, even as it was in the interest of peace in the region. In his verse, Khwaja Farid gives the impression of distaste towards the State of Bahawalpur under the reign of regency. After enjoying a status of an independent state for about two hundred years, it was the first princely State which acceded to Pakistan in 1947 fraught with controversy. When the plan of One-Unit was implemented in 1954, Nawab Sadiq Ali Khan, the ruler of the



State, agreed to merge it with the union of three culturally diverse provinces named "West Pakistan".

From the beginning, the Punjabi and Muhajir formed the bulk of civil and armed bureaucrats, consequently, ethno-nationalists perceived the Punjab as the main force in the power structure. The political leaders of Bahawalpur also joined the other provinces in their struggle against One-Unit. In 1957, when it was planned to break up the western province into its constituents, twelve parliamentarians from Bahawalpur unanimously declared that the State would become a separate administrative unit,<sup>2</sup> but due to the imposition of martial law, West Pakistan remained intact in an ethnically diversified alliance. It was not until 1969 that General Yahya Khan, who had succeeded General Ayub Khan after violent protests, planned to break One-Unit and restore the status of provinces.

Throughout Ayub's regime, Bahawalpuri parliamentarians expressed their grievances at every social or political forum. Local parliamentarians in the provincial assembly of West Pakistan, blamed the government for not taking note of the injustices done to the region.<sup>3</sup> In July 1964, Allama Arshad criticized the government for ignoring the rights of Bahawalpur, and blamed the authorities for treating the 'locals as third-rate citizens'.<sup>4</sup> He warned that the people were losing their patience, and if the government did not change her attitude, the local political leaders would move towards the fragmentation of One-Unit and the restoration of Bahawalpur Province.<sup>5</sup>

On 12 July 1969, another MPA, Mukhdoom Gilani, issued a press release in which he favoured the demand of a separate province. Towards the end of February 1969, Prince Saeedur Rasheed Abbasi appealed to the politicians, scholars, *ulema*, and students to adopt a non-violent way to convince the government to grant provincial status to Bahawalpur after the break up of One-Unit.<sup>6</sup> The voice of the Nawab added strength to the demand.

On 21 May 1969, a sub-committee under Justice Fazel Akbar arrived in Bahawalpur to find the drawbacks and repercussions of One-Unit. Political leaders<sup>7</sup> argued in favour of a separate province, but Mukhdoom Syed Hassan Mahmood, one of the local Muslim

League leaders, supported the idea of including Bahawalpur in the Punjab.<sup>8</sup> It was not the first time that he had expressed such views. In June 1958, when political deliberations were taking place at Nathia Gali, Mukhdoom Mahmood, then the minister of the Republican Party, also opposed the proposal of a separate province.<sup>9</sup> Parliamentarians from Bahawalpur strongly criticized his attitude by issuing press statements.

When General Attiquur Rahman, the Governor of West Pakistan, and later his successor Air Marshall Noor Khan, visited the region, local leaders again favoured the case of Bahawalpur Province and criticized One-Unit.<sup>10</sup> On 28 September 1969, Chaudhry Ferzand Ali, former Speaker of the Bahawalpur Assembly, said in an interview that if Bahawalpur was included in any other province it would be a 'second Radcliff Award'.<sup>11</sup> Meanwhile, political activists started making a case for a separate province by publishing propaganda material. Sardar Najumuddin Laghari published a pamphlet, *Bahawalpur ka muqadma*, in which Bahawalpur was claimed as a separate administrative unit. Before this, in March 1969, Seth Ubaidur Rahman, one of the key characters in this movement, also wrote a pamphlet, *Bahawalpur kae tees lakh insan'uan ki awaz*, in order to provide rational grounds to the argument. Around the same time, Khan Abdul Qayum, a Muslim Leaguer and former Chief Minister of NWFP, in an interview given to the APP, favoured the demand of a separate province.

The decision of amalgamating Bahawalpur with the Punjab was as everyone feared. A few days before the decision, two forums were constituted in Bahawalpur. One of them called the All-Parties Action Committee (APAC), which was created on 22 November 1969 in Azad Manzil, Allama Arshad's residence in Bahawalpur. In its first meeting, representatives of the Council League, Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), Convention League, National Awami Party, Jamait-Ulema-i-Islam, and Peoples Party Bar Association, expressed their support for the BPM and a ten-point resolution in favour of the cause was accepted unanimously. Chaudhry Ferzand Ali, a Muhajir and Muslim Leaguer, was made the convener of the APAC. Another forum, Tehrik-e-tahaffuz-a-hakuk-a-Bahawalpur was formed in the same week. Ma'dud Qurieshi was elected as its



first president, while Shahid Sadiqee became the general secretary of this Tehrik. A number of groups for defending the rights of the people of Bahawalpur and the restoration of its status as a separate administrative unit emerged, which included: Anjuman-e-tahafuz-e-hakok-e-Bahawalpur, Tehrik-e-tahafuz-e-hakok-e-Bahawalpur, Student's Mutahidda Mahaz. The most important among these organizations was the Bahawalpur Mutahidda Mahaz (Bahawalpur United Front-BMM), which began from February 1970 onwards to organise large public meetings and processions in favour of the separate identity of Bahawalpur. With Chaudhry Ferzand Ali elected as its convener, these activities alarmed the authorities, which gave the orders of arresting the political leaders of BMM on 30 March 1970 in an attempt to control the situation. Prominent leaders like Mian Nizamuddin Haider, Chaudhry Ferzand Ali, Seth Ubaidur Rahman, Sardar Mahmood Khan and many activists were arrested.

The women of the area also took out separate processions. Tahira Masood,<sup>12</sup> the daughter of an important local political leader Nizamuddin Haider, led these processions which added some intensity and momentum to the movement. For 22 continuous days, these women protested against the merger of their region with the Punjab.

Another significant development, which infused some vigour into the BMM, was the inclusion of Punjabi speaking Abadkar and Urdu speaking Muhajir. The Nawab of Bahawalpur, especially from 1920s onwards, persuaded and induced the Punjabi speaking cultivators from upper Punjab to cultivate the lands in the Bahawalpur State. After partition, Urdu speaking immigrants were encouraged to settle in the region and develop the barren lands. Due to state patronage, the population of immigrants increased significantly as compared to the locals. According to *The Civil & Military Gazette*, Abadkar formed 42 per cent, whereas Siraiiki speaking were reduced to 37 per cent and Muhajir made up 21 per cent of the total population in 1952.<sup>13</sup> These immigrants to whom we earlier gave the name of the immigrant working class (IWC), had lodged themselves in the economic machinery of the State. The One-Unit scheme not only limited job opportunities for them but many of them lost their employment, and some were transferred

to other areas. They also lost political control in the region, and it was in their interest to back the movement for a separate province. In the late 1950s, the political leadership of the IWC raised its voice in favour of Bahawalpur province. The declaration of 17 September 1957, which demanded the break down of One-Unit and "restoration of Bahawalpur Province", was supported by many Muhajir and Abadkar Bahawalpuri parliamentarians.<sup>14</sup>

This local-immigrant alliance was not limited to Bahawalpur, other areas displayed the same leanings. Tabish Alveri and Sardar Illyas Khan steered the Muhajir community in Bahawalpur and Bahwalnagar respectively. In Rahim Yar Khan, Chaudhry Nazir Ahmed, President of Anjuman-e-Abadkaran (Rahim Yar Khan), lead Punjabi speaking Abadkar. It was, in fact, this multi linguistic composition which prevented the movement from using linguistic and cultural symbols for achieving political goals and limited the struggle to administrative demands.

The rest of the Siraiki region remained alien to this struggle. In the early 60s, the separatist identity formation of the Siraiki was in its preliminary stages but found no political expression. The BPM's leadership was hardly like to invoke the ethnic consciousness of Pan-Siraikism among the local population of the region, especially in the presence of feudal leaders and the Abadkar-Muhajir factor, who were then in a position to counter such a radical step due to their control over the power structure of the region. Besides, the internal organization of the BPM drew great strength from the immigrants who were active participants in the movement.

By raising the slogans of a separate province only for administrative purposes, the BMM succeeded in getting the support of other political parties which showed their sense of solidarity by staging protest rallies and issuing press statements. These parties included Pakistan Jamhuri Party, Tehrik-e-Istaklal, Muslim League Council, Muslim League Convention, Qayum League. Leaders like Z A Bhutto and Sheikh Mujib also issued sympathetic statements,<sup>15</sup> and Bhutto, in his address to the Bahawalpur Bar Council in January 1970, promised to resolve the issue of a separate province according to the aspirations of the local population.<sup>16</sup> After the elections, he



called a meeting to consider the probability of the separate province, but Taj M Langha opposed the proposal, and demanded the creation of a province on linguistic lines.<sup>17</sup> Later, the government abandoned further consideration of the proposal.

Interestingly, religious parties like Jamait-e-Islami, Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam and Jamait Ulema-e-Pakistan favoured the demand for a separate province due to the Islamic posture of the BPM. It was perhaps the only struggle for regional autonomy in the country which found the support of religious forces. Mukhdoom Noor Muhammad, who was elected as MNA in the 1971 elections from the Front, wrote:

One-Unit not only paralyzed our political and economic set up but also engulfed our social and religious purity. Before the merger of Bahawalpur into One-Unit, there were neither unveiled women nor co-education. Following the traditions of Islam, there was a holiday on every Friday...the holy month of Ramadan was held in great esteem. There was a ban on selling wine and the preaching of Christianity was prohibited within the boundaries of the State, there was not even a single Church or missionary school...All the criminal and civil cases were decided according to Shariah.... but after the merger of Bahawalpur, all these religious characteristics vanished.<sup>18</sup>

Prince Saeedur Rasheed, who was elected on the ticket of BMM, observed the same evils and pointed out:

We are striving to revive our old traditions.<sup>19</sup>

Similarly, Jamal Koreja (also MNA), in his essay, *Suba Bahawalpur ko Islami tehzeeb ka gah'wara bunaya jae ga*, wrote:

The restoration of the provincial status and the enforcement of Shariah is the sole aim of our life. We cannot compromise over these principles. One can see the love of the people of Bahawalpur for their religion by the fact that they did not pay any attention to the slogan of *roti, kapra aur makan*.<sup>20</sup>

Such statements issued by the BMM leadership helped in attracting the religious band within its circle.

The callous approach of the government added more fuel to the fire. On 24 April 1970, the police opened fire on a procession of the BMM, killing two people and injuring several others. Mukhlisur Rahman, the Bengali Assistant Commissioner of Liaquatpur, was entrusted with the task of investigation. Despite popular demands, no judge of any superior court was appointed for the inquiry, although a few days earlier a street vendor had been killed and a judge from the Lahore High Court was made incharge of that official inquiry. The BMM leaders boycotted the proceedings in protest. The same suit was followed by other political parties like Muslim League Convention, Muslim League Council, Qayum League, Jamait Ulama-e-Islam. Appointment of a judge and the transfer of officers involved in the firing were demanded. When the official witnesses were recording their statements before the enquiry commission, no public representative or lawyer was allowed to participate in the proceedings and press reporters were not permitted to cover the litigation.<sup>21</sup> As expected, the report never surfaced. Such an approach by the officials automatically cleared the activists, and the government was labeled insensitive and partial to the issue. A perfect stage was set for the BMM to plead a case strongly in the charged atmosphere of the December 1970's election.

Z A Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party won 81 seats out of 138 in the National Assembly from West Pakistan and, 113 out of 181 seats in the Provincial Assembly. It did not win even a single seat for any House from the former State of Bahawalpur. Out of eight seats of the National Assembly in Bahawalpur division, the BMM won four. The members elected included Mian Nizamuddin Haider, Prince Saeedur Rasheed Abbasi, Mukhdoom Noor, Mian Jamal Koreja. Syed M Rafiq, an elected MNA of the Qayum League from Rahim Yar Khan, also announced his support for the separate province.<sup>22</sup> These five members got over 3 30 000 votes from the area, and their opponents secured 1 44 000 votes.<sup>23</sup> The Mahaz also succeeded in winning the support of 18 members of the provincial legislature.<sup>24</sup>

These elected representatives issued statements and declarations in favour of a separate province and limited their activities to paying lip service to the cause. Chaudhry Ferzand Ali,



convener of the Mahaz and an MNA, wrote to General Yahya Khan and Z A Bhutto, but stopped at that. The main reason behind the loss of vigour by the Mahaz seems to be the crisis generated by East Pakistan, when a conflict of opinion developed in the Mahaz and Saeedur Rasheed Abbasi abandoned the demand of a separate province declaring that a 'new province was no longer a priority issue'<sup>25</sup> due to the defeat of Pakistan's army in the war of 1971. Many leaders of the Movement argued that the continuation of this struggle would threaten the integrity of Pakistan which was passing through a crucial period in its history. Later, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, the Governor of Punjab, declared that the Mahaz leaders had reached an agreement with his party and they would no longer insist on their demands.<sup>26</sup> Qari Allah Buksh Munas Baloch, General Secretary of the Tanzemi-a-Bahalia Bahawalpur Suba, held the same point of view. According to him, the leaders of the Mahaz did not pay any attention to their "sacred cause" and spent their energies in accumulating wealth. He blamed Seth Ubaidur Rahman and Tabish Alveri, 'who were poor before growing to be parliamentarians, and now they have residences in the posh localities of Bahawalpur. What they have is at the cost of Bahawalpur province'.<sup>27</sup>

These policy shifts de-energized and disintegrated the BPM and, by 1972, the movement totally lost its early vigour. After losing reasonable strength in Bahawalpur, especially due to the IWC and Saeedur Rasheed Abbasi, the Siraiki speaking leaders of the BPM, Riaz Hashmi and Seth Ubaidur Rahman, changed their demands by including the area of Bahawalpur Division, Dera Ghazi Khan Division, Multan Division, Sargodha Division, and the districts of Jhang and Dera Ismael Khan in the proposed boundaries of a new province. Seth Ubaid said that this new tilt was part of the struggle for a "Pan-Siraiki renaissance". Both leaders also claimed that the BPM's demand was the first step in their plan to pursue the integration and autonomy of the Siraiki region, if the government agreed with their demand for a separate Bahawalpur province.<sup>28</sup> These claims do not match the spirit of the Bahawalpur Province Movement as it was based on administrative injustice and religiously oriented discontent rather than on ethnic and linguistic homogeneity. Such trends emerged when the Bahawalpur Mutahidda Mahaz

fizzled out completely. In fact, no significant voice was raised in favour of Bahawalpur province from the rest of the Siraiki speaking region, which shows their disengagement and apathetic attitude towards the movement, a truth that is resented by Seth Ubaidur Rahman.<sup>29</sup>

This new trend of using linguistic and ethnic slogans did not strengthen the objectives of the BPM because it estranged the IWC and the religious parties, alongwith those who were supporting the *sui causa* of the movement. In addition, the people who were suspicious of the superior position of Multan as capital of the proposed Siraiki province, alongwith those who were against the creation of province based on linguistic identity, kept aloof from these new developments. These people launched a separate party, the Bahawalpur Suba Mahaz, which is still active in Khanpur (District Rahim Yar Khan), under Aslem Koreja. Another party with the same objective and supra-ethnic position is 'Tanzimi-a-bahalia Suba Bahawalpur', whose convener, Mukhdoom M Hassan Shah Bukhari, was elected nazim in the recently held District Assembly elections, with Qari Allah Buksh Munas Baloch as its general secretary.

Majid Kanju and Seth Ubaid give the impression that the majority of political activists in Bahawalpur favoured a Siraiki province, side-stepping the issue of whether Multan or Bahawalpur would be the stronghold for the future political leaders.<sup>30</sup> Keeping in view the heterogeneous nature of the local population in Bahawalpur, Munas Baloch refuted these claims to dominance, adding that the larger issue was the establishment of a separate administrative unit based on linguistic homogeneity.<sup>31</sup> In Bahawalpur, the struggle for regional autonomy laid emphasis on economic and administrative grievances, while in Multan it drew upon Siraiki being a distinctive culture.<sup>32</sup>

## (II)

To base politics upon linguistic, cultural or ethnic homogeneity, it was important for the leaders to accentuate and underscore this separate identity and generate consciousness based on exclusivity. For this, a cultural elite or a literary movement is a pre-requisite because although scholarly or literary works do not always mean to achieve political ends or are inspired by political motives, they do



have political implications. The sense of Pan-Siraikism can primarily be attributed to the literary and intellectual activities in the early 1970s. A Siraiki Literary Conference was held in Multan between 14-16 March 1975. Apparently, it was an attempt to share literary views and experiences of Siraiki scholars and intellectuals. The organizers also requested the participants to avoid expressing ethno-nationalistic sentiments,<sup>33</sup> but Siraiki and Sindhi ethno-nationalists were invited to express their views. Even in the management committee of the Conference, nationalists like Seth Ubaid were presiding. During the proceedings, political issues began to be discussed and Siraiki grievances found an outlet for further political articulation. Seth Ubaid described the event as the logical outcome of the failure of the BPM. He argued that the Siraiki Movement began due to the BPM, which was aimed at creating a separate Siraiki province<sup>34</sup> where Siraiki was mentioned as a local language and Siraiki Adabi Majlis supported the movement, yet no hint of ethnicity was visible. In fact, leaders like Saeedur Rasheed, Mukhdoom Noor Muhammad, Mian Nizamuddin Haider, and Chaudhry Ferzand Ali categorically denounced the use of ethnic slogans in the movement.<sup>35</sup>

In the Conference, Haji Saifullah, opposition leader in the Punjab provincial assembly, demanded the creation of a Siraiki province. He blamed the people of northern Punjab for disregarding and exploiting the Siraiki region.<sup>36</sup> Umer Kamal Khan, Secretary General of the Conference, tried to wash over the impression of ethno-nationalism by labeling these anxieties and petitions as Haji Saifullah's personal views,<sup>37</sup> but the Siraiki ethno nationalists later attributed the impetus of the movement to this conference.<sup>38</sup> In this literary conference, a resolution was passed condemning the allotment of lands in Cholistan to non-Siraiki people, underscoring the economic discontent prevailing amongst the locals. It stressed upon their share in government jobs on quota system.<sup>39</sup> In fact, it was this literary conference that, for the first time, politicized the "Siraiki cause".

It gave rise to a number of Siraiki ethno-nationalist parties and forums which were divided, short-lived, and less popular than the national political parties. Although the Conference went quite

far in creating and developing a political consciousness, no group or party could be formed at the time. This came later, in 1978, when the Siraiki Lawyers Forum was formed to struggle for the political rights of a separate province. In its first meeting held in Lahore, Taj M Langha was elected the first president, and it is claimed by the activists of this forum that the decentralization of the Lahore High Court (LHC) took place due to their struggle, with the formation of the LHC Multan Bench, and the LHC Bahawalpur Bench becoming regularized.<sup>40</sup>

In the late 70s, Siraiki Qaumi Mahaz emerged on the scene under the chairmanship of Muhammad Hayat Bhutta. No significant effort came from this party apart from some public meetings and a few press statements.<sup>41</sup> In 1979, Mian Sajid Pervaiz made his party by the name of Siraiki Conference but when he joined the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), and when it was crushed, the Siraiki party disappeared along with it.

In 1983, Taj M Langha, who was then President of the Siraiki Lawyers Forum, General Secretary of the Pakistan Awami Jamhuri Party, and caretaker president of the Pakistan Awami Jamhuri Ittehad, said in a press conference held in Multan High Court Bar, that the creation of a separate Siraiki province had become imperative. In that press conference, a Charter of Demands was also distributed, in which grievances and their redressal were incorporated. On 5 March 1984, another conference was arranged, this time in Lahore. Prominent leaders<sup>42</sup> of the Siraiki Lawyers Forum addressed the conference and announced the creation of the Siraiki Suba Mahaz (SSM). The leaders of the Mahaz approached Riaz Hashmi, who was then leading a faction of the Bahalia Bahawalpur Suba (BBS), and an agreement was reached between the two parties which led to the merger of BBS into SSM. On 8 April 1984 in Multan, office barriers of the Mahaz were chosen, and Qari Nurul Haq Qurieshi was elected its first convener. Seth Ubaid was initially asked to lead the Mahaz but he declined the offer. Efforts were made to bring small organizations working at the local level under its wings. Consequently, Jam Taj M Berda's Rajanpur-based Siraiki Qaumi Tehrik merged into the Mahaz.

In 1986-87, when martial law was withdrawn and Muhammad



Khan Junejo was installed as a civilian prime minister, the ethno-nationalist movements gained in momentum.<sup>43</sup> The Pakistan National Party (PNP) and the Awami National Party (ANP) formed Siraiki units, with the PNP Siraiki unit being headed by Wilayet Gardezi, and the Siraiki Qaumi Wahdat Committee of the ANP put in the charge of Abdul Majid Kanju. Another party which emerged at the same time was the Siraiki Qaumi Movement (SQM), based on the model of the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM). The SQM had three centres, Karachi, Khanpur Katora and Ahmadpur Sharqia.<sup>44</sup> It was prolific in terms of publishing incendiary pamphlets on the infringement of Siraiki rights. This party did not place its candidates in the local elections but supported other political parties probably in order to remain in mainstream politics.

Before the general elections of November 1988, "Comrade" Manzur Ahmad Bohar made another Siraiki political group called the Socialist Siraikistan National Front. Following earlier practice, Siraiki political parties did not field their own candidates in the national elections but supported Benazir Bhutto. After forming the government, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) completely forgot the issues raised by Siraiki political activists. Consequently, Taj M Langha separated his political group (SSM) from the PPP, and formed a separate political party by the name of Pakistan Siraiki Party (PSP).<sup>45</sup> In the elections held in October 1990, Siraiki political parties performed badly, partly due to the absence of cohesiveness amongst various groups. A political band calling itself the Siraiki National Alliance (SNA), opposed the PSP. The Siraiki Qaumi Movement, Lok Sanjh, and other smaller Siraiki political groups also cheered the alliance against the PSP.<sup>46</sup> Such split in their own ranks, kept the nationalist Siraiki political parties from performing well in the elections.

On 29 January 1993, a faction of the Siraiki Suba Mahaz, which worked in Bahawalpur under the leadership of Seth Ubaid, changed its name to Siraiki National Party (SNP). Abdul Majeed Kanju, a member of the Mahaz since 1992, was made its president, while Seth Ubaid remained its chief organizer. In 1998, Seth Ubaid disassociated himself from Siraiki politics altogether.

To this day, activist groups keep coming together and coming

apart with no significant change. From time to time, efforts have been made to popularize the movement by using regional political or economic crises. For instance, the activists blame the federal government for not providing water for agricultural purposes, protesting against the water accords signed between the units of the federation. Similarly, in the last days of Nawaz Sharif's second tenure, Siraiki *zamindar* were facing great difficulty due to the low cotton price in the market. Siraiki activists succeeded in arranging public protest rallies which were marked by hunger strikes and even an ostensible suicide attempt, but these rallies aimed to voice economic frustration rather than to demand greater autonomy.

In the late 90s, ethno-nationalists in Pakistan formed an alliance called the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM), which held its first meeting between 1-2 November 1998 at Islamabad Hotel, in the capital. In the declarations adopted on 2 November 1998, the following demands were made:

1. Pakistan is a multinational country comprising five nations, namely Punjabi, Sindhi, Baloch, Pushtun and Siraiki with their five homelands that have existed over five thousand years.
2. All federating units including Siraikistan should be autonomous and sovereign and referred to as states in the terms and spirit of the 1940 resolution.
3. These states should be the fountainheads of all power including finance, and the federation should be vested with only those powers which the states confer on it by mutual agreement and consent.
4. The Pushtun federal unit shall be known as Pakhtoonkhaw and the Siraiki federal unit as Siraikistan.
5. Pushto, Siraiki, Balochi, Sindhi and Punjabi languages should be declared national languages and the cultures of the federating nations should be given an equal opportunity to develop and prosper.
6. Each federating unit should have proper and adequate representation in the defense forces roughly commensurate with its population.
7. The principal of parity and equal representation should be made applicable to the people of all the federating nations in the federal bodies, services and other institutions with full force in the new order.
8. Matters requiring settlement among the above nations



(including Baloch and Pushtun), should be amicably settled by mutual negotiations under the principles of justice, fair play, and historical background in the interest of the concerned oppressed nations.<sup>47</sup>

The demands made by this forum were not very different from Sheikh Mujib's Six Points. The main advantage gained by the Siraiki political leaders from this, was the formal recognition of their distinct identity by other sub-national political movements. For this, the Siraiki leaders had to compromise on the Siraiki speaking areas in Sindh and in Balochistan. The boundaries of "Siraikistan" were confined to the areas located in the Punjab, with the purpose of avoiding confrontation with other provinces. It appears to be a smart judgment which brought the Siraiki political identity at par with other ethnic identities.

In the November 2002 elections, Siraiki political parties and their factions demonstrated a pathetic performance. The PSP failed to make any impression despite its coalition with the National Alliance of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi. Taj Muhammad Langha, the chief of the Pakistan Siraiki Part (PSP), contested from NA-149 (Multan II), NA-154 and NA-155 (Lodhran-I&II), and NA-183 (Bahawalpur-I), two of which were from the platform of the National Alliance and two from his own party. In Multan-II, he got 107 votes, in Lodhran-I, he could poll 118 votes, in Lodhran-II, he scored 2 322, and in Bahawalpur-I, he could get 988 votes. His security was confiscated from all these constituencies.<sup>48</sup> Later, a PSP spokesman clarified that the Party chief had retired from Bahawalpur-I before the elections. Advocate Malik Mumtaz Hussain, head of the Siraiki Suba Movement, also contested the election in Multan-II. His tally was 348, which made him happy as 'he bagged more votes than Mr Langha'.<sup>49</sup> This poor performance is not limited to Siraiki political parties but includes almost every sub-nationalist party in the other provinces. These political parties formed a joint platform, called "Ponam" (Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement) and blamed the government for holding engineered elections. Mahmood Khan Achakzai, chief of Ponam, said that the 'interference of the army in civilian affairs was the main problem faced by the country'.<sup>50</sup> In the same forum, Sardar Akhtar Mengal, President Balochistan

National Party, said that his party did not believe in Pakistan's democracy, laws, and the Constitution since they do not ensure the rights of our people.<sup>51</sup> Mr Langha, who earlier backed the Musharraf's government for its policies, protested against rigging in the elections. Rigging may have played a small part in the elections but the incompetent and unpopular leadership is a more obvious factor that may have influenced the polling results.

The two movements for regional autonomy in the Siraiki region, the Bahawalpur Province Movement (BPM) and the Siraiki Movement, present contrasting features for comparison. The BPM shows the same tendencies towards the IWC and the ideology of Pakistan that may be expected of any religious and right-wing political party. They believe 'Pakistan was liberated in the name of Islam' with the only solution of all problems of the country lies in the enforcement of *Sharia*.<sup>52</sup> The activists of BPM severely criticize the ethno-nationalistic movements in the other parts of the country. Munas Baloch remarked:

They want another disintegration of Pakistan. The creation of provinces on linguistic lines will definitely weaken our nationhood and will lead to another dismemberment.<sup>53</sup>

The Siraiki ethno-nationalists were, by contrast, critics of the official ideology of Pakistan. They define Siraiki as a person who is permanently settled within the boundaries of "Siraikistan", with no distinction made on the basis of language, religion, or race. But, they also stressed that after 1947, the lands in the Siraiki region were allotted to non-Siraiki people, and:

According to the Charter of UNO, these lands can only be allotted to either ancient inhabitants or natives of the area...and Pakistan Siraiki Party will cancel all such allotments which are bogus and illegal and will allot these lands only to the natives...Pakistan Siraiki Party considers all those allotments illegal that were made to the people coming from outside the Siraiki region.<sup>54</sup>

The insistence of the activists on Siraiki language and the determination to enforce it as the medium of instruction in the regional schools were issues about which Abadkar and Muhajir of the region are quite sensitive.



The present standing of the Siraiki ethno-nationalistic parties reveals that no struggle for autonomy in the Siraiki region can be planned without the active participation of the Muhajir-Abadkar population, who form the bulk of the influential working class in this area. The immigrant working class has isolated itself from all sub-national politics, thereby strengthening its chauvinistic tendencies. This has also tilted the balance against the more open-minded and inclusive elements present in the BPM.

The dilemmas which the two movements are facing are the crisis of leadership, cohesiveness, and the lack of the intelligentsia. Absence of the support for the IWC and the dependency of the SWC on the former for economic and political reasons has eroded their nurtured hopes of political success.

Baloch and Dar both attribute their present tragedy to these facts. Baloch claims that there is still a lot of sympathy for a separate Bahawalpur province,<sup>55</sup> but election results do not substantiate it. Mumtaz Dar holds that the local people are ignorant of the sub-national politics. According to him, the settlers have serious reservations about the proposed Siraiki province, and one should not expect any growth in this movement, in the near future.<sup>56</sup>

## ENDNOTES

- 1 Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: 2000) p. 181.
- 2 Qari Munas Baloch int: 21/06/2001. Also Chaudhry Ferzand Ali, "India Act 1935 ney Bahawalpur ur Punjab key ghaer kuderty bhandhen taor diya", *Kaynat (Goli Number)* (Bahawalpur: 3 July 1972) p. 10.
- 3 On 27 June 1962, Allama Arshad, one of the elected representatives, demanded to form a commission to find out the dismal and pitiable condition of the locals. On 17 December 1962, he requested to the House for giving sometime to discuss the problems of Bahawalpur, and to debate the government's policy of neglecting the region. See for details *Kaynat (Goli Number)* (Bahawalpur: 3 July 1972).
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Prominent leaders were Mian Nizamuddin Haider, Syed Ahmad Nawaz Shah, Allama Arshad, Seth Ubaidur Rahman, Syed Ahmed Nawaz Shah, Raja Mukhtar Ali, Khuwaja Saifullah.
- 8 See for details *Kaynat (Goli Number)* (Bahawalpur: 3 July 1972).
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Important leaders who met with the Generals were Allama Arshad, Seth Ubaidur Rahman, and Mukhdoom Sultan Ahmed Shah. When Air Marshall Noor Khan, then governor of West Pakistan, visited Bahawalpur in the last week of October 1969, 20 parliamentarians of West Pakistan and Bahawalpur Assembly presented a muster roll. Allama Arshad presented a separate muster roll of ten pages in which injustices done to the region were incorporated. Leaders like Seth Ubaidur Rahman, Nizamuddin Haider, Syed Mahmood Akbar Shah and Syed Asad Hussain Shah met with the governor.
- 11 See for details *Kaynat (Goli Number)* (Bahawalpur: 3 July 1972).
- 12 Presently, she is settled in Lahore.
- 13 *The Civil & Military Gazette* (Karachi: 1 February 1951) p. 2.
- 14 Prominent among them were Chaudhry Ferzand Ali, Chaudhry M Afzel Bajwa, Haji Sher Muhammad. In 1969, letters were sent to the President of Pakistan and the Governor of West Pakistan, many signatories were Muhajir and Abadkar, for example, Chaudhry Rahmatullah (former MPA), Chaudhry Jamaluddin (former MPA), Chaudhry M Basir Cheema (former Deputy Speaker of Bahawalpur Assembly).
- 15 See for details *Kaynat (Goli Number)* (Bahawalpur: 3 July 1972).
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 *Siraiki Suba* (Shuba-e-Nashr-o-Ishaet, Siraiki Suba Mahaz, Multan) p. 10.
- 18 See for details *Kaynat (Goli Number)* (Bahawalpur: 3 July 1972).
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: 2000) p. 182.
- 26 Ibid., p. 182-83.
- 27 Qari Munas Baloch int: 21/06/2001.
- 28 Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: 2000) p. 183.



- 29 Umer Kamal Khan, *Paheli kul Pakistan Siraiki Adabi Conference* (Multan: 1975) p. 30.
- 30 Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: 2000) p. 183.
- 31 Qari Munas Baloch int: 21/06/2001.
- 32 Ibid. Also Mumtaz Dar int: 08/04/2001.
- 33 Umer Kamal Khan, *Paheli kul Pakistan Siraiki Adabi Conference* (Multan: 1975) p. 15-16.
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 *Kaynat (Goli Number)* (Bahawalpur: 3 July 1972) p. 9-10, 13, 16.
- 36 Umer Kamal Khan, *Paheli kul Pakistan Siraiki Adabi Conference* (Multan: 1975) p. 15.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 M Afzel Masood Khan, *Manshur-o-programme Pakistan Siraiki Party* (Multan: 1993) p. 2.
- 39 Umer Kamal Khan, *Paheli kul Pakistan Siraiki Adabi Conference* (Multan: 1975) p. 20-21.
- 40 M Afzel Masood Khan, *Manshur-o-programme Pakistan Siraiki Party* (Multan: 1993) p. 3.
- 41 Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: 2000) p. 186.
- 42 These leaders were Qari Nurul Haq Qurieshi, Asadullah Khan Langha, Shafi M Akhter, Ghulam Abbas.
- 43 Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: 2000) p. 186.
- 44 The organization was headed by many people like Hameed Asghar Shaheen, Azam Saeedi, Shahid Kareem, and Shahida Naz. Ibid., p. 187.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 Ibid., p. 187-88.
- 47 *Declaration of Oppressed Nations Movement*, Adopted on 2 October 1998 at Islamabad Hotel, Islamabad.
- 48 *Dawn* (Lahore: 13 October 2002) p. 13.
- 49 Ibid.
- 50 *Dawn* (Lahore: 1 November 2002) p. 3.
- 51 Ibid.
- 52 See for details *Kaynat (Goli Number)* (Bahawalpur: 3 July 1972).
- 53 Qari Munas Baloch int: 21/06/2001.
- 54 M Afzel Masood Khan, *Manshur-o-programme Pakistan Siraiki Party* (Multan: 1993) p. 12-13.
- 55 Qari Munas Baloch int: 21/06/2001.
- 56 Mumtaz Dar int: 08/04/2001.

## Appendix I

Christopher Shackle, Professor of Modern Languages of South Asia, School of Oriental and African Studies, has observed close relation between the Siraiki language and Punjabi in morphologically.<sup>1</sup> However, the significant differences between these two languages cannot be overlooked:

Especially in the verbal system, as in the expanded conjugation-stems of transitive and passive verbs and the extensive use of forms with suffix pronouns both features analogous with Sindhi as well as in the distinctive sigmatic formation of the future... it is, especially in phonology that Siraiki differs most radically from the standard Majhi Punjabi of the Lahore area, the most obvious differences, clear to even the most unsophisticated speakers, are the retention of voice aspirates in Siraiki, as in Urdu and Sindhi, contrasting with the reduction of voiced aspiration to tone in Punjabi, and above all, the Siraiki set of implosive consonants, a phonological feature shared only with Sindhi (these are /g j d b/ contrasting with the explosive set /g j d d b/. only latter are found in Punjabi and Sindhi).<sup>2</sup>

Like Shackle, many other scholars and linguists have observed that the Siraiki and Punjabi share a wide range of vocabulary. Siraiki intellectuals claim that this common vocabulary is acquired directly from Arabic and Persian and has nothing to do with Punjabi.<sup>3</sup>

Zamaan Jafery in *S.S.B. and National Question*, firmly supports the autonomy of regional nationalities in the four provinces of Pakistan. He also differentiates Siraiki from Punjabi. According to him, it differs from Punjabi in the use of pronominal suffixes, the morphology of the future tense, the distinctive feature of the negative verbs, the inflexion of verbs, synthetic and infinitive forms of the passive.<sup>4</sup>

Jafery points out that the phenomenon of pronominal suffixes can be understood by taking an example of a Siraiki word مرہیں (they will beat you). Such expression in the Punjabi can be given by using



three words, *اوہ مارن گے*. Addition of suffix-s trans-form the Siraiki word from *مرین* to *مریش*, which is expressed in the Punjabi by the use of four words, *اوہ اوہنوں مارن گے* (they will beat you). Hence the Siraiki word specifically placed subject along with the object. This suffixing of 's' also points out the differences in the structure of the future tense between the Siraiki and the Punjabi. The word *مریش* is a future tense. However suffixing of '-g,' (*گے*, *گا*) in the Punjabi transforms the sentence into future tense. Hence *مریش* will be expressed in the Punjabi as: *اوہنوں مارن گے*

Moreover, the word *سی* (e.g. *آسی*), is employed in the Siraiki for building a future tense. While the same word is used in the Punjabi for expressing past tense. For instance, *اوہ آیا سی* (He had come). These differences can further be understood by considering the inflexions of the future tense of the verb. For instance:

Siraiki: *ویسوں قیسوں ویسوں ویسوں ویسوں ویسوں*

Punjabi: *جانواں گے جانواں گا جاؤ گے جائیں گے جان گے جاوے گا یا جاؤ گا*

Negative verb also sets both languages poles apart, for instance:

Siraiki: *نئے کھادا نہیں کھادا توہے کھادا نوہی کھادا نہیں کھادا نہی کھادا*

Another prime difference between the two languages is the verb 'to be', which can best be understood in the light of two inflexion of a basic infinitive.

Siraiki: *ہس ہائیں ہادی ہادے ہائم ہاے*

Punjabi: *اودھے پاس ہیگا سی ہیغے سن وغیرہ*

Its negative forms in the Siraiki are:

Siraiki: نہی ناخص ناوی ناوھے ناھیں نہی

However, in the Punjabi language, negative form is obtained by the addition of **نہیں** to the positive words.

Another difference between both languages lies in the form of passive verb. For instance, in both the Punjabi and Urdu, passive verb can be obtained by adding infinitive (like **جانا**) to the verb, only changing its additional verb without disturbing the original word. Take the example of a Punjabi word **کھاوا** (past tense of infinite **کھانا**). Its passive infinitive (**کھاوا جانا**) can be obtained by adding infinitive **جانا** to **کھاوا**. However in the Siraiki language, alterations in the passive verb are brought within the verb itself. For instance take the passive verb, **روٹیاں کھوئیں** (bread will be eaten), which in the Punjabi is expressed as **روٹیاں کھاویاں جان گئیاں**. Moreover, in the Siraiki, a new infinitive can be obtained by making some adjustments within the infinitive, e.g., *Mariljen* is a passive infinitive, which is obtained by minor adjustments in **مارن** (active infinitive). The Siraiki language also has a distinctive feature of converting transitive to verbal-ad-verbial. Like an active infinitive **رکھن** is expressed as **رکھاون** in its transitive form and its verbal-ad-verbial form **رکھاو** can be obtained by minor adjustments. Dr Mehr Abdul Haq, a noted Siraiki linguist, points out the unique identity of a language as:

According to the universal principles and laws of philology, the only way to know the agreement and disagreement in the languages is to take into consideration, verbs and prepositions by ignoring nouns and adjectives. Because the basic structure and root of a language can only be known through the inflexions of verbs. After that, through masculine, feminine, orders of words, inflexions of pronouns, and lastly through nouns and adjectives. But, at the same time, the nouns and adjectives alone cannot trace the family of a language, because the various languages keep on borrowing words from one another. These words, however can become the property of a language if the forms and meanings of these words are changed in to that particular language of which these have become the part.<sup>5</sup>

While Siraiki shows the characteristics of both Punjabi and Sindhi, it deserves to be treated as a distinct language due to its disagreement with the Punjabi, in terms of the inflexion and forms of the verb, and for morphological differences with Sindhi.



**TABLE 1**  
**Siraiki-Punjabi Relation**

<b>Siraiki</b>	کھاوس	کھوئیں	کھوئی	کھوئے	کھادم	کھدوس
<b>Punjabi</b>	کھادا	کھادا	کھادا	کھادا	کھادا	کھادا

Source: Sheikh Ikramul Haq, *Arz-e-Multan* (Multan:1972) p.379.

**TABLE 2**  
**Siraiki-Arabic Relation**

Siraiki word	Meaning in Urdu	Arabic source	Meaning in Urdu (from Arabic)
کروہ	لوٹا	کروہ	گول
کٹف	شانہ	شانہ	کٹف
وصل	پیاز	بسل	پیاز
تھوم	لہن	فوم	لہن
قمیض	قمیض	قمیض	قمیض

Source: Sheikh Ikramul Haq, *Arz-e-Multan* (Multan:1972) p. 360.

**TABLE 3**  
**Siraiki-Persian Relation**

Siraiki word	Meaning in Urdu	Persian Source	Meaning in Urdu (from Persian)
استادہ	لوٹا	افتابہ	لوٹا
ڈول	مٹی کا برتن	ڈول	مٹی کا برتن (ڈول)
ملائی	بالائی	بالائی	بالائی
ہمام دستہ	ہمام دستہ	ہا دل دستہ	ہمام دستہ
زال	عورت، بیوی	زال	عورت
گر مالہ	گر مالہ	گل مالہ	گر مالہ

Source: Sheikh Ikramul Haq, *Arz-e-Multan* (Multan:1972) p.360.



**TABLE 4**  
**Siraiki-Sindhi Relation**

Urdu	Siraiki and Sindhi
بھائی	ادا
بیوی	زال
بھینس	مینہ
خرگوش	سیرو
نانی	اڈ
منہ	وات
گھڑے	ڈلا
سالن	بوڑ
خرفہ	لوٹوک

Source: Sheikh Ikramul Haq, *Arz-e-Multan* (Multan:1972) p. 360.

TABLE 5

## Siraiki-Punjabi-Lahndha Relation

Digits	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Siraiki	ہک	ڈو	ترائے	چار	پنچ	چھی	ست	اٹھ	نوں	ڈہ
Lahndha	ہک	دوے	ترائے	چار	پن	چھے	ست	اٹھ	نوں	واہ
Punjabi	اک	دو	ترائے	چار	پنچ	چھے	ست	اٹھ	نو	دس
Sindhi	ہیکو	با	ترائے	چار	پنچ	چھو	ست	اٹھ	ناؤ	ڈھ

Source: Sheikh Ikramul Haq, *Arz-e-Multan* (Multan:1972) p.381-382.

TABLE 6

## Siraiki-Punjabi-Lahndha Relation

Parts of Body	Hand	Foot	Nose	Eye	Teeth	Hair	Ear	Head	Tongue
Siraiki	ہتھ	پیر	نک	اکھ	ڈند	وال	کن	سر	جھ
Lahndha	ہتھ	پیر	نک	اکھ	دند	وال	کن	سر	جھ
Punjabi	ہتھ	پیر	نک	اکھ	دند	وال	کن	سر	جیبھ
Sindhi	ہتھ	پیر	نک	اکھ	دند	وال	کن	سر مٹھ	جھپھ

Source: Sheikh Ikramul Haq, *Arz-e-Multan* (Multan:1972) p. 382.



**ENDNOTES**

- 1 Christopher Shackle, *Siraiki: A Language Movement in Pakistan*. Modern Asian Studies (ii, 3) (Great Britain: 1977) p. 389.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Paper read by Mehr Abdul Haq. See for details Kamal, Umer, *Pehli kul Pakistan Siraiki adabi conference* (Multan: 1975) p. 16.
- 4 Zamaan Jafery, *S.S.B. and National Question* (Multan: ?) p. 64.
- 5 Ibid., p. 70.

## Appendix II

### Kinship System in Siraiki Region

In the Siraiki speaking region of southern Punjab, a strong kinship system has eclipsed the caste system. The caste system flourished in the prosperous Ganges Valley and its nearby areas among the Hindus, built upon professions like the carpenter (*tarkhan*), the barber (*naie*), the butcher (*kasai*), the shoemaker (*mochi*) and so on. With time, these professions started being considered hereditary and served the interests of land lords by stopping class mobility. Over time, this social stratification lost its efficacy, and since the areas that now comprise present Siraiki region are economically underdeveloped, the kinship or *biradari* system flourished here instead of the caste system.

Hence "racial ethnicity", a prominent feature of the Rastafarian movement and the Jews' struggle in the Middle East, also pursued in the subcontinent by the Maratha and the Pathan during the reign of the later Mughals, cannot be considered the grounds or dynamics of Siraiki ethnic identity. Ethnologically, the roots of the population in the southern Punjab comes from the Semitic and Indo-Aryan races.<sup>1</sup> The two races mixed with each other over time and can no longer be distinguished from each other.<sup>2</sup> The area, therefore, is a multi racial one, consisting of numerous tribes and their subcategories. This is the reason cited by Siraiki nationalists to call themselves a "nation" rather than an ethnic group. Taj Muhammad Langha, while refusing to accept the Siraiki identity as an ethnic one says:

We are not an ethnic group, since this is primarily based on race. We have a multi-racial society that is why we are a nation (by any definition). Even then, we are ready to live within the Pakistani nationhood.<sup>3</sup>



Similarly, Mansur Kareem, Secretary General of the Pakistan Siraiiki Party at the time, also expressed similar views:

Our nation (Siraiiki) is more established in terms of language, culture and consciousness as compared to the Pakistani nationhood.<sup>4</sup>

The ancient tribes of the area are the *Kathia* and *Malli*.<sup>5</sup> Alexander had to face enormous difficulty in dealing with these brave warriors, whose descendents are supposed to be alive in the district of Sahiwal.<sup>6</sup> Similarly, the two tribes *Jhabel* and *Kutana*, arrived in this area most probably from Sindh and still speak the Sindhi language with a lilting mixture of the Siraiiki dialect. The *Jhabel* show great inclination towards religious teachings. The other two tribes, the *Kihal* and the *More* are both thought to have the same origin. They claim to have ancient links and subscribe to animistic beliefs. For this reason, they looked down upon by the Muslims.<sup>7</sup> Like the *Jhabel*, they also rely on fishing. The other tribes or *zat* living in the Siraiiki region include the *Jat*, *Rajput*, *Baloch*, *Pathan*, *Syed*, and *Qurieshi*, among others.

**The *Jat*** In some areas of southern Punjab, like Bahwalnagar, the *Jat* has become a symbol of pride rather than a clan or race,<sup>8</sup> since a majority of them are either big landholder or cultivators. The *Ranjaha* in the Sargodha district are one of the sub-divisions of the *Jat* to whom belong Dhido Ranjha, the hero of the famous romantic story, *Heer Ranjha*.<sup>9</sup> The *Jat* in Jhang district began to settle before the fourteenth century AD and their main branches in that region are the *Naul* and the *Nissowna*.<sup>10</sup>

Other important braches and sub-divisions of the *Jat* in the Siraiiki area include *Panhwar*, *Parihar*, *Chajra*, *Daha*, *Jhakkar*, *Joiya*, *Guraha*, *Bhatti*, *Massan*, *Bhutta*, *Sahu*, *Sial*, *Jangla*, *Thind*, *Samtia*, *Sehar*, *Sumra*, *Lohanch*, *Tammon*, *Traggar*, *Wain*, *Bosan*, *Kokhar*, and *Marral*.<sup>11</sup>

The *Kokher* had great influence in the north of Kabirwala district Khanewal, but they began to colonize during Humayun's reign.<sup>12</sup> In the fourteenth century they migrated to the bank of Chenab in the vicinity of Shorkot and then began to settle in the north and south along the river and Thall.<sup>13</sup> After a long rule of three centuries, the *Sial* were defeated by the Sikh army.<sup>14</sup>

*Rajbana*, *Bhorwana*, *Kamlana*, *Jangiana* are different divisions of the *Rajput Sial*, most of whom live in district Jhang.<sup>15</sup> Among them, the *Jangiana* call themselves Mian, while the others are called Mehr or Khan Sahib.<sup>16</sup>

**The Rajput** The *Rajput*, especially in the region of Bahwalnagar, represent a social status superior to the *Jat*.<sup>17</sup> They trace their descent from Munder Bunsī and Sunder Bunsī.<sup>18</sup> The *Punhwarh*, the *Chuhan* (with sub-divisions of the *Khalis Chuhan*, *Hamshira*, *Khichi*), and the *Kharal*, are their important sub-groups. The other branches of the *Rajput* include the *Gondal*, *Noon*, *Drig*, *Langah*, *Joya*, *Mitru*, *Khichi*, *Langrial*, *Daha* and *Bucha*. The *Langah* initially came from Sibi and established a dynasty in Multan and its nearby areas which flourished for nearly 80 years.<sup>19</sup>

**The Pathan** The *Pathan* is another important *biradari* in the Siraiki region. In the Multan district, their first settlement is recorded during the reign of Shah Jahan.<sup>20</sup> In Khanewal, they began to arrive from Kandahar in the times of Aurangzeb Alamgir.<sup>21</sup> Their mass migration to the district Layyah took place in the eighteenth century under Ahmad Shah Abdali.<sup>22</sup>

The *Afghan*, *Khakwani*, *Amchoozi* and *Ghouri* are main branches of the *Pathan* in Bahwalnagar.<sup>23</sup> In Mianwali, they can broadly be classified into *Niazi*, *Khattak* and *Baloch*. The *Niazi* arrived from the north-west and settled along the high banks of the Indus in Mianwali and Isakhel *tehsils*. The *Niazi* can further be divided into *Isakhel*, *Sarhang* and *Mushani*. The *Khattak* ruled before the *Niazi* in the north of Isakhel *tehsil* and now live mainly in the hilly areas of Mianwali. The *Bhangikhel* and the *Bani-Afghan* are two sub-divisions of the *Khattak*. Due to their bravery, they are considered fine soldiers for the army. The *Baloch Pathan* are not in great number in the area.<sup>24</sup>

A majority of the *Multani Pathan* are *Abdali* and *Durrani*. A handful of them like to converse in Pashto, but they bear no relation to their fellow tribesmen in NWFP or Afghanistan.<sup>25</sup> Further sub-classification of the *Pathan* in different parts of southern Punjab are the *Noon Pathan*, *Sadozai*, *Khakwani*, *Sherwani*, *Baber Malzai*, *Popalzai*, and *Khilji*, among others.

In Dera Ismael Khan, the *Pathan* tribes lost their unique



features and established matrimonial relations with the *Baloch* and the *Jat*, who came from the south and trans-Indus region.<sup>26</sup> The *Mutani Pathan* (*Alizai*, *Sadozai*, *Khawjakzai*, *Khakwani* and *Barakzai*) are supposed to be old inhabitants of this district according to historic documents.<sup>27</sup> In Layyah, the *Pathan* are represented by two main branches, i.e., the *Popalzai*, who came to this region at the end of the eighteenth century under Johan Khan, the chief of Ahmad Shah Abdali's forces in this area. The other branch of the *Pathan* is *Nasir*. As against the *Popalzai*, they live in towns. *Nasir Pathan*, by and large, work as *Qazi* (judge), like their elders who enjoyed the same privilege in the Mughal period.<sup>28</sup>

Like the *Jat* and *Rajput*, most of them are cultivators.<sup>29</sup>

**The *Baloch*** The *Baloch* came to the region probably in the later half of the fifteenth century, when the *Dodai* and, then the *Rind* intruded into Multan.<sup>30</sup> The *Baloch* are mainly *Rind* and *Korai*. Most of them are concentrated in Lodhran and its vicinity. Like the *Multani Pathan* the *Baloch* are also absorbed by the local culture and are hardly distinguishable.<sup>31</sup> They married into the local *Jat* but retained some cultural habits of the *Baloch* like maintaining long beards, and among *Rind* the bride traditionally dresses in white instead of red.<sup>32</sup>

The *Daudputra* claim to have a distinct ancestry, but some historical accounts trace them to *Baloch* origin. The other main sub-units of the *Baloch* in the Siraiiki region are the *Laghari*, *Lashari*, *Gopang*, *Chandio*, *Kosa*, *Dasti*, *Gurmani*, *Mirani*, *Lashkarani*, *Hoti*, *Kartani*, *Nutkani*, *Jatbi*, *Jaskani*, *Kora* and *Mardane Baloch*.<sup>33</sup> These *Baloch* are employed in the army while several of them are cultivators. Some of them like *Kosa* and *Dasti* are landlords and have great influence in political and social spheres in their respective areas.

**The *Syed*** The *Syed*, considerable in number in this region, enjoy great respect and admiration among the locals. The *Syed* migrated from Kaniguram (in Waziristan) and settled in Kotla Saadat in Multan *tehsil*.<sup>34</sup> Their main branches consist of the *Jilani* and the *Gardezi*. The *Jabli Syed* comprise several families in the nearby areas of Kahrur. They link themselves with the mountain Jabal in Arabia.<sup>35</sup>



As for the *Gilani*, their ancestor (Hazrat) Abdul Qadir Jilani also known as Sheikh Muhammad Ghaus was titled as Piran-e-Pir Sheikh Jahan Baksh, tenth in the pedigree from Abdul Qadir.<sup>36</sup> He migrated from Baghdad to Ucch during the reign of Amir Taimur. A *Langah* Sultan killed his son Pir Musa Pak Shahid in a raid in AD 1593. Since then, the head of the family was entitled as "Mukhdoom". The descendents of Musa Pak Shahid are respected by all local people of the region.<sup>37</sup>

The settlement of the *Gardezi*, in Khanewal is recorded in the thirteenth century.<sup>38</sup> They are also entitled "Hussaini" due to their lineage from Hazrat Imam Hussain and Sheikh Muhammad Yousaf, whose ancestor is Syed Muhammad Debach (grandson of Imam Hussain).<sup>39</sup> There are two branches of this family, the Mukhdoom of one has taken the title of Sheikh Raju and that of the other Sheikh Muhammad Yousaf.

The *Syed Gardezi* who were wealthy and influential, are losing their social position especially in the district of Multan.<sup>40</sup> Apart from the *Jilani* and the *Gardezi*, there are *Bukhari* (who claim to be Sumra by origin), *Dar Jamlier*, *Hamdani*, *Rizvi*, *Hashmi*, *Shami*, *Kirmani*, and others.<sup>41</sup> A majority of them are the custodian of the shrines and tombs which provides them with a launching pad for politics and social prominence.<sup>42</sup> The *Syed* family of Shahpur (Karor sub-division) enjoys enormous followings amongst the *Baloch*.<sup>43</sup>

**The *Qurieshi*** Throughout the Siraiki region, the *Qurieshi*, like the *Syed*, are held in great esteem and reverence. They link themselves to Bahauddin Zakariya, also known as Bahaul Haq, directly descended from the *Quriesh* tribe of Arabia, who was born at Kehror in AD 1149.<sup>44</sup> His great grandson, Rukn-e-Alam, is also respected for his pious character. Both these saints have beautiful shrines in the fort of Multan.

Another branch of the *Qurieshi* is the *Chisti*, although the latter also claim to have Mughal blood, being descended from Baba Farid Ganjshakar. They control vast lands in *tehsil* Bahwalnagar and *tehsil* Chistian.<sup>45</sup> Same is the case with the *Ar-Rais* or the *Arain*. They are believed to be the descendents of Abdud Dar Bin Qusa who migrated from central Punjab to Khanewal district in the thirteenth century.<sup>46</sup> The Satluj Valley Project provided them an

opportunity to settle down in Bahawalpur.<sup>47</sup>

The other branches of the *Qurieshi* are *Daudpotra*, *Abbasi*, *Siddique*, *Farooq Alvi*, *Nauhani*, and *Koraija*. Like the *Syed*, the *Qurieshi* are also *Pir* and *Sajadanashin*.

**Others** Some other important tribes and sub-tribes in parts of the Siraiiki region are the *Awan*, *Banghoor*, *Suggu*, *Khera*, *Ahir*, *Kanju*, *Noor*, *Butt*, *Sheikh*, *Han*, *Khagga*, *Kathia*, *Gujar*, *Dogar*, *Mughal*, *Mazari*, *Gorchani*, *Drishak*, *Saadat*, *Harral*, *Lak*, *Nagyana*, *Maliyar*, *Syalla*, *Tarrar*, *Kamboh*, *Magiana*, *Gillotar*, *Lali*, *Naul*, *Thahim*, and *Khoja*. The *China* has three sub-divisions, i.e., *Tareka*, *Mahramka*, *Azamka*. The *Tihar* can be further sub-divided into six branches, i.e., *Sukhera*, *Kalloka*, *Bhanaka*, *Miandka Hin*, *Sango-ka* and *Chadrar*. The *Dhuddi* has six categories: *Kadar*, *Katari*, *Chanan*, *Pakhiwar*, *Pannan* and *Wake*.

Most of the above mentioned *biradari* are mainly concerned with cultivation, except for the *Butt*, *Khoja* and *Sheikh* who form the bulk of the business community in the Siraiiki speaking region.

Since the racial stock of people inhabiting this region is derived from migrations from different parts of India and its neighbours over a long period of time, people do not display a psychological affinity to the Siraiiki identity but feel proud to call themselves *Pathan*, *Baloch*, *Jat*, *Rajput*, *Syed* and so on. The matrimonial relations are limited to their own tribe,<sup>48</sup> but this trend is fast changing with the passage of time. In fact, the *biradari* pose a great challenge to the process of Siraiiki identity formation, since the electoral process is determined by *biradari* affiliations.<sup>49</sup> It is one of the prime reasons behind the failure of Siraiiki activists in promoting the sense of a single nationality.

## ENDNOTES

- 1 This information is taken from the *1998 District Census Report of Multan* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 3, which only mentioned the region of Multan. However, Multan is viewed amongst the oldest inhabited areas of the Siraiki region. See M Hanif Raza, *Multan Past & Present* (Islamabad: 1988) p. 25-151, hence, we can analyze the filiations in the remaining Siraiki belt with the identical outlook.
- 2 *1998 District Census Report of Multan* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 3. And also see *1998 District Census Report of Khanewal* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 4.
- 3 Taj Muhammad Langha's reply to the author: 4/03/2001.
- 4 Mansur Kareem's reply to the author: 4/03/2001.
- 5 *1998 District Census Report of Sahiwal* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 3.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- 7 *1998 District Census Report of Layyah* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 9.
- 8 *1998 District Census Report of Bahawalnagar* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 18.
- 9 *1998 District Census Report of Sargodha* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 4.
- 10 *1998 District Census Report of Jhang* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 10.
- 11 *1998 District Census Report of Layyah* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 8.
- 12 *1998 District Census Report of Khanewal* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 5.
- 13 *1998 District Census Report of Jhang* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 9.
- 14 *Ibid.*
- 15 *Ibid.*
- 16 *Ibid.*
- 17 *1998 District Census Report of Bahawalnagar* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 18.
- 18 *Ibid.*, p. 17.
- 19 *1998 District Census Report of Khanewal* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 5.
- 20 *1998 District Census Report of Multan* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 4.
- 21 *1998 District Census Report of Khanewal* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 5.
- 22 *1998 District Census Report of Layyah* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 8.
- 23 *1998 District Census Report of Bahawalnagar* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 18.
- 24 *1998 District Census Report of Mianwali* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 7-8.
- 25 *1998 District Census Report of Multan* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 4.
- 26 *1998 District Census Report of D.I.Khan* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 8.
- 27 *Ibid.*
- 28 *1998 District Census Report of Layyah* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 8.
- 29 *Ibid.*
- 30 *1998 District Census Report of Multan* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 4.
- 31 *Ibid.*
- 32 *Ibid.*
- 33 *1998 District Census Report of Layyah* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 8.
- 34 *1998 District Census Report of Multan* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 3-4.
- 35 *Ibid.*, p. 4.
- 36 *Ibid.*
- 37 *Ibid.*, p. 5.
- 38 *1998 District Census Report of Khanewal* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 5.
- 39 *1998 District Census Report of Multan* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 5.
- 40 *Ibid.*
- 41 *1998 District Census Report of Layyah* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 8. And also see *1998 District Census Report of Bahawalpur* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 6.
- 42 *1998 District Census Report of Layyah* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 8.



43 1998 *District Census Report of Layyah* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 8.

44 1998 *District Census Report of Multan* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 5.

45 1998 *District Census Report of Bahawalnagar* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 18.

46 1998 *District Census Report of Khanewal* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 5.

47 1998 *District Census Report of Bahawalpur* (Islamabad: 2000) p. 6.

48 Abdul Ghani int: 08/03/2001.

49 Mumtaz Dar int: 08/03/2001.

## Appendix III

List of 90 leaders and political activists imprisoned during the  
Bahawalpur Province Movement (31 March- 24 April 1970).

### Arrests Before Firing (24 April 1970)

Sr. No.	Name	Punishment	Place of Confinement
1.	Ferzand Ali, (ex-Speaker Assembly)	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Gujranwala, Multan
2.	Justice Sardar Mehmood Khan	Three months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Multan
3.	Nizamud Din Haider	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Sialkot, Multan
4.	Seth Ubaidur Rahman (Vice Chairman of Municipal Committee)	Nine months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Sibbi
5.	Sardar Aslam Khan	One year rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Mach
6.	Mian Allah Nawaz	Nine months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Sakkar
7.	Abdul Rehman	One year rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Shahpur
8.	Abdul Khaliq	One year rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Multan
9.	Malik Faiz Muhammad Chunnur	One year rigorous imprisonment, and ten lashes	Bahawalpur, Mianwali
10.	Siddiq Sikandar	One year rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Campbelpur
11.	Muhammad Usman	One-and-a-half year rigorous imprisonment, and five lashes	Bahawalpur, Bunnu
12.	Syed Charagh Shah	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Multan
13.	Syed Sher Shah	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Jehlum

Sr. No.	Name	Punishment	Place of Confinement
14.	Faizul Hasan	One year rigorous imprisonment, and five lashes	Bahawalpur, Jehlum
15.	Mehmood Ahmad	One year rigorous imprisonment, and five lashes	Bahawalpur, Kasur
16.	Sahibzada Rafi Hasan Abbasi	One year rigorous imprisonment, and five lashes	Bahawalpur, Dera Ghazi Khan, Multan
17.	Iqbalur Rahman	One year rigorous imprisonment, and five lashes	Bahawalpur
18.	Mian Muhammad Nawaz	One year rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Rajanpur
19.	Ubaidur-Rehman Solangi	One year rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur
20.	Munshi Faiz Ahmad	Nine months rigorous imprisonment and five lashes	Bahawalpur, Jehlum
21.	Ishrat Abbas	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur
22.	Mubarak Ahmad	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Campbelpur
23.	Iqbal Akhter	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur
24.	Ijaz Jaffri	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Jehlum
25.	Bashir Ahmad	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur
26.	Mian Muhammad Ramzan	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur
27.	Muhammad Akbar	One month rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur
28.	Sheikh Zahoor Ahmad	One month rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur
29.	Zahoor Ahmad Khan	One month rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur
30.	Farooq Ahmad	One month rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur
31.	Javed Sultan	Released	Bahawalpur
32.	Abdul Rauf	Released	Bahawalpur



### Arrests After Firing

Sr. No.	Name	Punishment	Place of Confinement
33.	Syed Ahmad Nawaz Shah Gardezi (ex-minister)	One year rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Kot Lakhpat
34.	Shehzada Mamoonur Rasheed Abbasi	Ten year rigorous imprisonment and one lakh penalty	Bahawalpur, Sahiwal
35.	Allama Rehmatullah Arshad (ex-MPA)	One year rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Kot Lakhpat
36.	Munshi Muhammad Hasan Chughtai (Divisional Nazim Majlis Ahrar)	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Jhang
37.	Abdul Khaliq (Convener Mutahida Islami Mahaz)	Nine months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Gujranwala
38.	Mulana Ghulam Mustafa (Divisional Nazim Jamiat-Ulmai-e-Islam)	One year rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Mianwali
39.	Mian Muhammad Akhter	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Sargodha
40.	Ghulam Qasim	Nine months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Sahiwal
41.	Abdul Tawab	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Sahiwal
42.	Allah Bachaya	Nine months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Multan
43.	Altaf Qurieshi	Conditional release	Bahawalpur
44.	Anwar Ayub Gulzar	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Dera Ghazi Khan
45.	Hasan Baksh Abbasi	One year rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Campbelpur
46.	Qazi Abdul Karim Hashmi	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Faisalabad
47.	Mumtaz Ahmad	Six months rigorous	Bahawalpur, Mianwali
48.	Abdul Haq	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Shahpur
49.	Malik Khudda Bakhsh	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Dera Ghazi Khan
50.	Soofi Manzoor Ahmad	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Campbelpur
51.	Mian Abdul Hakim	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Sargodha

Sr. No.	Name	Punishment	Place of Confinement
52.	Faiz Bakhah Chishti	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Multan
53.	Bashir Ahmad	Nine months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Multan
54.	Mian Muhammad Abbasi	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Dera Ghazi Khan
55.	Muhammad Bilal	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Multan
56.	Muhammad Qasim	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Multan
57.	Niaz Ahmad	Nine months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Mianwali
58.	Abdul Rehman	Nine months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Multan
59.	Hafiz Nathoo	Nine months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Shahpur
60.	Allah Rakhia	Nine months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Faisalabad
61.	Allah Wasaya	One year rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Jehlum
62.	Muhammad Nawaz	One year rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Sahiwal
63.	Ishfaq Hussain Zaidi	One year rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Multan, Karachi
64.	Mian Abdul Majeed Fareedi	One year rigorous imprisonment	Rawalpindi
65.	Muhammad Rasheed	One year rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Sialkot
66.	Mushtaq Hussain Shah	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Multan
67.	Abdul Latif Shah	Two months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur
68.	Muhammad Jamil Ajmal	One month rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur
69.	Syed Mubashir Ali	One month rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur
70.	Mian Muhammad Shafi	One year rigorous imprisonment and lashes	Bahawalpur
71.	Gul Muhammad Abbasi	One year rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur



Sr. No.	Name	Punishment	Place of Confinement
72.	Sahabzada Wasiq	One year rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Jhang
73.	Hafiz Muhammad Habib	One year rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur
74.	Mian Subhan Arshad	Three months imprisonment	Bahawalpur
75.	Hafiz Abdul Majeed	Warning	Bahawalpur
76.	Shukat Ali	Warning	Bahawalpur
77.	Aziz Abid	Warning	Bahawalpur
78.	Muhammad Ahmad	Warning	Bahawalpur
79.	Ghulam Hasan	Nine months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Rajanpur
80.	Allah Buksh	Six months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Jhang
81.	Malik Rabnawaz	Three months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Ahmadpur Shrqia
82.	Abdul Khaliq	Three months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Ahmadpur Shrqia
83.	Muhammad Israfil	Three months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Ahmadpur Shrqia
84.	Muhammad Yousaf	Three months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Ahmadpur Shrqia
85.	Kusar Hussain Shah	Three months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Ahmadpur Shrqia
86.	Iltaf Hussain Shah	Three months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Ahmadpur Shrqia
87.	Muhammad Sadiq	Three months rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Ahmadpur Shrqia
88.	Siraj Ahmad	One month rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Ahmadpur Shrqia
89.	Khadim Hussain	One month rigorous imprisonment	Bahawalpur, Ahmadpur Shrqia
90.	Muhammad Akbar	One month rigorous imprisonment	Khanpur, Rahim Yar Khan

Ms Tahira Massod's entry was banned in Bahawalpur Division and cases against her were registered under the Martial Law Regulation No. 5,12,14,16,40,60,100.

Source: *Kaynat (Goli No)* (Bahawalpur: 3 July 1972) p.107-08.



بہاولپور کے بیس ارکان اسمبلی کے مختصر نامہ کا کس

1882 - 1883  
Your Obedient Servants,  
John A. McCallister

14  
 15  
 16  
 17  
 18  
 19  
 20  
 21  
 22  
 23  
 24  
 25  
 26  
 27  
 28  
 29  
 30  
 31  
 32  
 33  
 34  
 35  
 36  
 37  
 38  
 39  
 40  
 41  
 42  
 43  
 44  
 45  
 46  
 47  
 48  
 49  
 50  
 51  
 52  
 53  
 54  
 55  
 56  
 57  
 58  
 59  
 60  
 61  
 62  
 63  
 64  
 65  
 66  
 67  
 68  
 69  
 70  
 71  
 72  
 73  
 74  
 75  
 76  
 77  
 78  
 79  
 80  
 81  
 82  
 83  
 84  
 85  
 86  
 87  
 88  
 89  
 90  
 91  
 92  
 93  
 94  
 95  
 96  
 97  
 98  
 99  
 100

۱۱ سید محمد حسین - حسن آباد  
۱۲ سید محمد حسین - حسن آباد  
۱۳ سید محمد حسین - حسن آباد

[illegible]

ایم ایف بی آر - ۲۰۱۹-۲۰۲۰، ایم ایف بی آر - ۲۰۲۰-۲۰۲۱، ایم ایف بی آر - ۲۰۲۱-۲۰۲۲ اور ایم ایف بی آر - ۲۰۲۲-۲۰۲۳ کے رکن رہ چکے ہیں۔ ذیل صفحات کو پیدوار اسیل اور نثری پاکت تین اسیل دلوں کی رکعت کا اسرار حاصل ہوا گا



## Appendix VI

## پنجب اور بہاولپور کا مشترکہ بحیث سیاسی رہنماؤں کی احتجاجی قرارداد

۱۔ دو ہفتہ بعد کی جلسہ - ۲۰۰۱ء - سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۲۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۳۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۴۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۵۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۶۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۷۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۸۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۹۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۱۰۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین

۱۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۲۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۳۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۴۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۵۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۶۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۷۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۸۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۹۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۱۰۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین

- ۱۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین
- ۲۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین
- ۳۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین
- ۴۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین
- ۵۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین
- ۶۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین
- ۷۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین
- ۸۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین
- ۹۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین
- ۱۰۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین

۱۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۲۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۳۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۴۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۵۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۶۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۷۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۸۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۹۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین  
۱۰۔ سیرا کے سب سے بڑے اور اہم ترین

## Appendix VII

## سرائیکی آدم شماری کا معیار

اسے کہ سنی معنی حقیقت ہے جو دنیا دے تمام مذہب مکمل وچ وکھ والے لوکاں بارے جملہ کتنی آہندہ کی زبان آہندہ کے گھروں دی تعداد آہندہ کے تعلیمی معیار تے دیگر کو اکتاف حاصل کیے ویندے من تاں جو آہندہ ترقی تے وسائل دے ودھارے بارے حقیقی سطح آتے منصوبہ بندی کیتی ونجے۔ پر اسانے ملک وچ موجودہ جبری آدم شماری کیتی ویندی پئی اے۔ ایندے او معاندنی جیرے جو دنیا بھر وچ ہوندن۔ موجودہ آدم شماری دا مقصد ملک بھر وچ پنجاب دی حاکمیت قائم کر کے جیندے نتیجہ وچ سندھی، بلوچی تے پشتون بھرا ایندا بائیکاٹ کر چکین۔ پنجابی افسر شاہی سرائیکی علاقے تے وسائل اتے اپنا قبضہ بحال رکھن دی خاطر سرائیکی زبان دا خانہ شامل نی پئی کریندی چوڑاں جو 1981ء دی آدم شماری وچ سرائیکی زبان دا پنجابی زبان توں وکھرا اندراج موجودہ۔ علم اے ہے جو سرائیکی توں کم بولن والیاں زبانیں کون آدم شماری وچ شامل کر کھدا گئے۔ ایندے نال نال سرکاری ریڈیو، ٹیلی ویژن توں سرائیکی پروگرام آندے پین تے اسلامیہ یونیورسٹی، بہاول پور توں ایم اے سرائیکی باقاعدہ پڑھائی وی ویندی پئی اے۔ پر ول وی سرائیکی زبان کون تسلیم نی کیتا ویندا پیا۔ ایندے علاوہ آدم شماری واسطے ڈو طرح دے فارم چھپواتے کھتے جن جیندے نال آدم شماری دا تمام عمل مشکوک تے جو کس قہی گئے۔ سرائیکی مردم شماری ایکشن کمیٹی انہاں حقائق دی روشنی وچ اپنے آپ کوں حق بجانب سمجھدی ہے جو آدم شماری دے خلاف احتجاج کرے تے تحریک چلاوے۔ ایں لحاظ نال موجودہ آدم شماری غیر قانونی، غیر آئینی تے انسانی حقوق دے سراسر منافی ہے۔ ایں واسطے سرائیکی ایکشن کمیٹی بین الاقوامی راستے عامر کون اپیل کریندی اے جو جو کس آدم شماری دے انہز کیتے کھتے نتائج کون تسلیم نہ کرے۔ نال ای سرائیکی ایکشن کمیٹی ایں پمفلٹ دے ذریعے اقوام متحدہ، ورلڈ بینک، آئی ایم ایف تے بے عالمی مالیاتی اداریاں توں مطالبہ کریندی اے جو متعصب پنجابی بیورو کریسی دے جرم وچ شریک نہ تھین تے آدم شماری واسطے کوئی مالی عداوت نہ ڈیون۔

## سرائیکی آدم شماری ایکشن کمیٹی

## Appendix VIII

جاگ سرائیکی جاگ  
سرائیکی خانہ کے بغیر مردم شماری نامنظور  
عظیم دھرتی ————— عظیم زبان  
عظیم تہذیب کے چار کروڑ وارث

مردم شماری میں سرائیکی زبان کا خانہ ختم  
۴ کروڑ سرائیکی قوم کے لئے موت کا پروانہ جاری ہو گیا۔

- بے ضمیر ملک دشمن سرائیکی دشمن پنجابیوں نے غافل سرائیکی قوم کو مردم شماری کے ذریعے قتل عام کا مکمل بندوبست کر لیا ہے۔ اکتوبر ۱۹۷۱ء میں سرائیکی قوم کا گلا گھونٹ کر انہیں ہمیشہ کے لئے دفن کر دیا جائیگا۔
- سرائیکی دھرتی کے وارث تو تم سے تمہاری دھرتی جینی جا رہی ہے۔
- ☆ جس سرائیکی کی بجائے پنجابی شمار کر کے تمہاری زمینیں، تمہارے وسائل، تمہاری زبان اور ترقیاتی بجٹ عمل طور پر ہڑپ کرنے کا منصوبہ بنایا جا چکا ہے۔
- ☆ ۸۱ء کی مردم شماری میں سرائیکی زبان موجود تھی۔ اب ہلاک و میار پنجابی، شماری زبان اور تمہاری شناخت کو ختم کرنے کا فارمولا بنا چکے ہیں۔
- ☆ سرائیکیو تم یوں ہی سوئے رہو گے؟
- ☆ سرائیکیو تمہاری زبان کافی جا رہی ہے۔
- ☆ سرائیکیو تمہارے گلے پر چھری پھیری جا رہی ہے۔
- ☆ سرائیکیو تمہاری ماں بولی۔ ماں دھرتی پر پنجابی غاصب قبضہ کرنے والا ہے۔
- ☆ سرائیکیو اب وقت آچکا ہے پنجابی دشمنوں اور ان کے ایجنٹوں کو جو مردم شماری کرنے تمہارے گھروں پر آئیں۔ انہیں مار بھگاؤ۔ سرائیکی نسل کشی کرنے والوں سے نکرا جاؤ ورنہ تمہاری داستان نہ ہوگی داستانوں میں۔

جاری کردہ شعبہ نشر و اشاعت پاکستان سرائیکی پارٹی

ہائی کورٹ روڈ ملتان۔ فون 511941





۱۰۔ یہ بات میں قوت ہے استعمال کو جائز سمجھتا ہے۔ ایسا نہ ہونے دے گا۔ کیونکہ ایسا ہونے سے پاکستانی قوموں کا ایک دوسرے پر انحصار اور اعتماد بڑے گا اور وفاق متوازن ہو گا۔ ایسا توازن حکمرانوں کو متزلزل اور غیر متوازن کر دینے کی وسعت رکھتا ہے۔ درحقیقت پاکستان میں ہر بڑی تبدیلی پاکستان کے وفاقی ڈھانچے میں تبدیلی کی منظر ہے۔

### بھراؤو!

ہمارے آقا عوام کے حق میں ہر تبدیلی کو روکنے پر مامور ہیں۔ انہی حکمرانوں کا خیال ہے کہ کراچی میں سرانگی خون کی بولی کھیلے جانے سے سرانگیستان میں بھی ایسا ہی کھیل چلا جائے گا۔ اور اس طرح کراچی سے ملنے جلتے حالات سرانگیستان میں پیدا ہو سکیں گے، اور اس طرح مہاجر صوبے کو سرانگیستان صوبے سے جوڑا جاسکے گا۔ ان کے خیال میں سرانگی عوام مہاجر صوبے کی حمایت کرنے لگیں گے۔۔۔۔۔ لیکن پھر اوو! حقیقت یہ ہے کہ سرانگی عوام مہاجر صوبے کو ہر صورت مسترد کر چکے ہیں۔ سرانگی قومی وحدت کی حمایت ملک بھر کی تمام قوم پرست جماعتیں کرتی ہیں۔ جبکہ مہاجروں کو کسی طور بھی قوم تسلیم نہیں کیا جاسکتا۔ کیونکہ سارے ہندوستان، جو ایک کثیر القومی ملک ہے، سے آئے ہوئے مہاجر ایک قوم نہیں ہیں۔ اس کے علاوہ سرانگی عوام اس قدر باشعور ہیں کہ پاکستان کے قومی سوال کو تاریخی اور سماجی ارتقاء کے حوالے سے دیکھتے ہیں اور جانتے ہیں کہ سرانگی سوال پاکستان کی دیگر مظلوم قوموں کی جدوجہد سے الگ نہیں۔ بعداً مہاجر دہشت گردوں کو چاہیے کہ وہ اپنے آقاؤں کے کہنے پر پر امن سرانگی لوگوں کا قتل عام بند کریں کیونکہ اس میں کوئی شک نہیں کہ بہادر سرانگی عوام نے اپنی آزادی اور امن کی خاطر کسی بھی بڑی قربانی سے دریغ نہیں کیا اور نہ آئندہ کریں گے۔

پاکستان سرانگی پارٹی عوام کو اس بات کا احساس دلانا چاہتی ہے کہ وہ حاکموں کی سازشوں کا شکار نہ ہوں اور پر امن رہیں۔ تاکہ صوبہ سرانگیستان کے آئینی حصول کے لئے ہم خیال سیاسی جماعتوں، جمہوری حلقوں اور سرانگی و صیب میں راستے عامہ کو ہموار کیا جاسکے۔ اس کے علاوہ سرانگی عوام پارٹی کی طرف سے ترتیب دیئے گئے جلسے جلوسوں اور مظاہروں میں شرکت کریں تاکہ عوامی دباؤ کے تحت سرانگیستان صوبہ کا قیام عمل میں لایا جاسکے۔

میاں منصور کریم سیال

سیکرٹری جنرل

پاکستان سرانگی پارٹی





## Appendix XI

### **PAKISTAN OPPRESSED NATIONS MOVEMENT (PONM)**

*Declaration of Oppressed Nations Movement  
(Adopted on 2-10-98 at Islamabad Hotel, Islamabad)*

The federation of Pakistan came into existence in 1947 through the amalgamation of the historical national homelands of the **Bengalis, Sindhis, Punjabis, Pushtoons, Seraikis and Balochs**. The association of these nations into a single federal state was based on the social contract of 1940, Pakistan resolution that recognised the historical and geographical existence of the nations and homelands of the would be constituents of the new state granting them their autonomous and sovereign states.

Fifty years down the road, the federation of Pakistan is passing through a grave period of multiple crisis wherein the federation is in tatters, economic collapse stares us in the face social disorder of immense magnitude is rampant all over the country and state-patronised sectarian armed bands are threatening to impose fascist rule over this our benighted land and under the false cloak of religion. As if on day one of the establishment of the new country, a clique of pre-imperialist reactionary politicians and bureaucrats mainly belonging to the dominant nation started stage by stage, implementing a coup plan to usurp the newly won sovereignty of the country, sell it to the imperialists and rule roughshod over the oppressed people of the whole country as a colony of the imperialist masters and as a colony of their own. During the course of last 50 years they have brought the country to the verge of collapse. The state apparatus has virtually abdicated its duty of securing honour, life and property of its citizens and providing education, health and housing and other amenities for its inhabitants.

#### **The Crisis of Federation**

A state derives its legitimacy and power from the people. A federation derives its strength from the federating units. In Pakistan, the constant denial that it is a multinational country of five nations comprising of **Punjabis, Sindhis, Balochs, Pashtoons and Siraikis** has been the root cause of failure of the state and the Federation.

Unfortunately the myopic rulers, under the influence of the most populous and the most powerful province, have constantly used force and applied instruments like martial laws and "doctrine of necessity" and hypocritical slogans of "Pakistan Nation", "Brotherhood" and "Muslim Ummah" and "religion" etc. to swindle rob and deny the people of the federating units of their political, economic, cultural and human rights. They have destroyed all legal, constitutional and administrative structures and have virtually turned the land of the so-called pure into a no man's land of lawlessness, loot, plunder, hooliganism and state-patronised terrorism against unarmed and helpless citizens.

With a clear understanding that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with this our country or our peoples, we have gathered here since yesterday to ponder over the question as to how to correct the listing ship of the country, so that we the people of federating nations of Pakistan can save our peoples and our common country from the impending threat to their very existence, so that we can live in peace and harmony and can develop and prosper. Having pondered over and considered the whole situation we hereby resolve as under -

- \* Urgent steps be taken to bring into being a new order based on the following principles.
- \* Pakistan is a multinational country comprising of five nations namely **Punjabis, Sindhis, Balochs, Pushtoons and Seraikis** with their respective five homelands with existence of five thousand years.
- \* All federating units including **Seraikistan** be autonomous and sovereign and will be referred to as states in the terms and spirit of the 1940 resolution.
- \* These states shall be the fountain heads of all power including finance and the federation shall be vested with only those powers which the states confer on it by mutual agreement and consent.
- \* The **Pushtoon** federal unit shall be known as **Pakhtoonkhwa** and the **Seraiki** federal unit as **Seraikistan**.
- \* **Languages:**  
**Pushto, Seraiki, Balochi, Sindhi and Punjabi** languages should be declared as national languages and each language and culture of the federating nations be given equal opportunity and resources for development and progress.
- \* **Defence:**  
Each federating nations should have proper and adequate representation in the defence forces roughly commensurate with its population.
- \* The principle of parity and equal representation to the people of all the federating nations in the federal bodies, services and other institutions should be made applicable with full force in the new order.
- \* Matters requiring settlement among the above nations (including **Baloch and Pushtoon**) shall be amicably settled by mutual negotiations under the principles of justice, fair play and historical background in the interests of the concerned oppressed nations.

Curtsey: **PAKISTAN SIRAIKI PARTY**, Central Secretariat 2523/9/H Near High Court Multan.

# تولید

## تولید

- ۱- تولید...
- ۲- تولید...
- ۳- تولید...
- ۴- تولید...
- ۵- تولید...
- ۶- تولید...
- ۷- تولید...
- ۸- تولید...
- ۹- تولید...
- ۱۰- تولید...
- ۱۱- تولید...
- ۱۲- تولید...
- ۱۳- تولید...
- ۱۴- تولید...
- ۱۵- تولید...
- ۱۶- تولید...
- ۱۷- تولید...
- ۱۸- تولید...
- ۱۹- تولید...
- ۲۰- تولید...
- ۲۱- تولید...
- ۲۲- تولید...
- ۲۳- تولید...
- ۲۴- تولید...
- ۲۵- تولید...
- ۲۶- تولید...
- ۲۷- تولید...
- ۲۸- تولید...
- ۲۹- تولید...
- ۳۰- تولید...
- ۳۱- تولید...
- ۳۲- تولید...
- ۳۳- تولید...
- ۳۴- تولید...
- ۳۵- تولید...
- ۳۶- تولید...
- ۳۷- تولید...
- ۳۸- تولید...
- ۳۹- تولید...
- ۴۰- تولید...
- ۴۱- تولید...
- ۴۲- تولید...
- ۴۳- تولید...
- ۴۴- تولید...
- ۴۵- تولید...
- ۴۶- تولید...
- ۴۷- تولید...
- ۴۸- تولید...
- ۴۹- تولید...
- ۵۰- تولید...
- ۵۱- تولید...
- ۵۲- تولید...
- ۵۳- تولید...
- ۵۴- تولید...
- ۵۵- تولید...
- ۵۶- تولید...
- ۵۷- تولید...
- ۵۸- تولید...
- ۵۹- تولید...
- ۶۰- تولید...
- ۶۱- تولید...
- ۶۲- تولید...
- ۶۳- تولید...
- ۶۴- تولید...
- ۶۵- تولید...
- ۶۶- تولید...
- ۶۷- تولید...
- ۶۸- تولید...
- ۶۹- تولید...
- ۷۰- تولید...
- ۷۱- تولید...
- ۷۲- تولید...
- ۷۳- تولید...
- ۷۴- تولید...
- ۷۵- تولید...
- ۷۶- تولید...
- ۷۷- تولید...
- ۷۸- تولید...
- ۷۹- تولید...
- ۸۰- تولید...
- ۸۱- تولید...
- ۸۲- تولید...
- ۸۳- تولید...
- ۸۴- تولید...
- ۸۵- تولید...
- ۸۶- تولید...
- ۸۷- تولید...
- ۸۸- تولید...
- ۸۹- تولید...
- ۹۰- تولید...
- ۹۱- تولید...
- ۹۲- تولید...
- ۹۳- تولید...
- ۹۴- تولید...
- ۹۵- تولید...
- ۹۶- تولید...
- ۹۷- تولید...
- ۹۸- تولید...
- ۹۹- تولید...
- ۱۰۰- تولید...

هستند که در این کتاب به شرح آمده است

(تولید) تولید





## Selected Bibliography

### Official Reports

- 1998 District Census Report of Bahawalpur*, Islamabad, 2000.  
*1998 District Census Report of Bahwalnagar*, Islamabad, 2000.  
*1998 District Census Report of Dera Ismael Khan*, Islamabad, 2000.  
*1998 District Census Report of Jhang*, Islamabad, 2000.  
*1998 District Census Report of Khanewal*, Islamabad, 2000.  
*1998 District Census Report of Khushab*, Islamabad, 2000.  
*1998 District Census Report of Layyah*, Islamabad, 2000.  
*1998 District Census Report of Lodhran*, Islamabad, 2000.  
*1998 District Census Report of Mianwali*, Islamabad, 2000.  
*1998 District Census Report of Multan*, Islamabad, 2000.  
*1998 District Census Report of Pakpatten*, Islamabad, 2000.  
*1998 District Census Report of Rajenpur*, Islamabad, 2000.  
*1998 District Census Report of Sahiwal*, Islamabad, 2000.  
*1998 District Census Report of Sargodha*, Islamabad, 2000.  
*1998 Provincial Census Report of Sindh*, Islamabad, 2000.  
*Imperial Gazetteer of India—Punjab* (volume ii), Lahore, 1976.  
*Pre-investment Report of Bahawalnagar*, Lahore, 1993.  
*Pre-investment Report of Bahawalpur*, Lahore, 1993.  
*Pre-investment Report of Bhakkar*, Lahore, 1993.  
*Pre-investment Report of D.G.Khan*, Lahore, 1993.  
*Pre-investment Report of D.I.Khan*, Lahore, 1993.  
*Pre-investment Report of Jhang*, Lahore, 1993.  
*Pre-investment Report of Leiah*, Lahore, 1993.  
*Pre-investment Report of Mianwali*, Lahore, 1993.  
*Pre-investment Report of Muzaffargarh*, Lahore, 1993.  
*Pre-investment Report of Pakpatten*, Lahore, 1993.  
*Pre-investment Report of Rajanpur*, Lahore, 1993.  
*Pre-investment Report of Sahiwal*, Lahore, 1993.  
*Pre-investment Report of Vehari*, Lahore, 1993.

### Pamphlets and propaganda material

Address of Taj M Langha (13 April 1996) in Multan.

- Address of Taj M Langha (14 April 1994) in Ahmedpur Sheqia. Multan.  
 Address of Taj M Langha (11 April 1999) in Multan.  
*Adem shumari ke khelaf Siraiiki awam sa apeel.*  
 Khan, Umer Kamal, *Pehli kul Pakistan Siraiiki adabi conference*, Multan, 1975.  
 Khan, M Afzel Masood, *Manshur-o-programme Pakistan Siraiiki Party*, Multan, 1993.  
*Munshur Siraiiki Student Ferderation.*  
*Merdum shumari ya Siraiiki kum da ketl*, Multan.  
*Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (Declaration of Oppressed Nations Movement)*, 2-10-98, Islamabad.  
*Pakistan Siraiiki Party ki panch sala karkerdegi*, Multan, 1994.  
*Pakistan Siraiiki Party thy salana carguzari report* (8<sup>th</sup> April 1996-12<sup>th</sup> April 1997).  
*Siraiiki bheravo.*  
*Siraiiki Suba Mahaz.*  
*Siraiiki Suba*, Multan.  
*Siraiiki khana da bagher murdum shumari na munzur*, Multan.

### Newspapers

- |   |                               |
|---|-------------------------------|
| <i>Dawn</i>                             | January, 2001. Oct-Nov, 2002. |
| <i>The Civil &amp; Military Gazette</i> | February, 1951.               |
| <i>Jhang</i>                            | May, 1970.                    |
| <i>Jasaret</i>                          | May, 1992.                    |
| <i>Nawai-e-waqt</i>                     | March, 2001.                  |
| <i>Pakistan</i>                         | July-August, 1992.            |
| <i>Kaynat</i>                           | July, 1972.                   |
| <i>Pakistan Times</i>                   | February, 1970.               |
| <i>Frontier Post</i>                    | August, 1992.                 |

### Encyclopedia

- Encyclopedia Encarta* (Microsoft-2001).  
*Encyclopedia Britannica* (Microsoft-2001).  
 Barnard, Alan and Spencer, Jonathan (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology*, N.Y., 1996.

### Articles from Journals

- Ahmed, Feroz, *Ethnicity, State and National Integration*, *Asian Survey*, xx, 6 (June 1984).  
 Ahmed, M Ismael, "Urdu ur Siraiiki zubanuan ka izafi haruf ur ala'mat ki irtakai dastan". *Samel* (7, 8), Bahawalpur (July, August - 2000).

- Ali, Mubarak, *Hindustan ur Roheela. Tariekh* (4), Lahore (January - 2000).
- Ali, Mubarak, *Hindustani mu'ashera ur nazriat ka tesadum. Tariekh* (2), Lahore (July - 1999).
- Alvi, Hamza, "The Rural Elite and Agricultural Development in Pakistan". Robert D Stevens, Hamza Alvi and Peter Bertocci (eds.), *Rural Development in Bangladesh and Pakistan*, The University of Hawaii Press, 1976.
- Alvi, Hamza, "Colonialism and the Rise of Capitalism" (?).
- Alvi, Hamza, "Formation of Social Structure of South Asia under the Impact of Colonialism" (?).
- Alvi, Hamza, "Pakistan Ammerica Fugi Ta'luqat", Translation by Tahir Kamran in *Tariekh* (4), Lahore (January - 2000).
- Alvi, Hamza, "Authoritarianism and Legitimation of State Power in Pakistan", in Subrata Mitra (ed), *The Post Colonial State in South Asia*, London and New York, 1990.
- Alvi, Hamza, "Politics of Ethnicity in India and Pakistan", in Alvi & Harriss (ed), *Sociology of Developing Societies: South Asia*, 1989.
- Alvi, Hamza, "Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan", *Pakistan Progressive*, Vol. 9 (1), 1987.
- Alvi, Hamza, "Pakistani Qumiat ki ilaqae bunyad", Translation by Tahir Kamran in *Tariekh* (2), Lahore (July - 1999).
- Faik, Habeeb, "Kul Pakistan Siraiki adebi conference", *Siraiki Adeb* (5) (May - 1988).
- Galtung, Johan, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", *Journal of Peace Research* (8), 1971.
- Inayatullah, "Politics of Ethnicity and Separatism in South Asia", Centre for South Asian Studies—University of the Punjab, Lahore.
- Laghari, Serdar Najumud Din Khan, "Qumi ur ilah' qai zubanuan ka meslah". *Akhter* (25), Multan (7 August 1969).
- Lecture by Taj M Langha, "Siraiki adeb qumi tehriek da bagher perwan na'e charh sukda", *Siraiki Awaz* (9), Khanpur (1-9 October 1995).
- Lecture by Taj M Langha, "Siraiki ta'riekhi tur per ilah' da kum hain", *Samel* (6,7), Bahawalpur (May, June - 1990).
- Rashdi, Mahtab Akber, "Siraiki Sindhi suqafati reshtea", *Siraiki Adeb* (5) (May - 1988).
- Shackle, Christopher, *Siraiki: A Language Movement in Pakistan*. Modern Asian Studies (ii, 3), Great Britain, 1977.
- Sultana, Roshan, "Siraiki tel-o-wasab da tehzihi pesea-manzir", *Siraiki* (7, 8) Bahawalpur (January-June 1991).
- Taunsvi, Tahir, "Siraiki dian anjumena ta idara", *Siraiki Adeb* (5) (May 1988).



**Books**

- Ahmed, Akbar S, *Pakistan Society*, Karachi, 1986.
- Ahmed, Azizuddin, *kia ham ekethy reh saqtain hain*, Lahore, 1998.
- Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1996 (Re-printed).
- Ali, Mubarak, *Almia-e-Tariekh*, Lahore, 1999.
- Ali, Mubarak, *Jagirdari*, Lahore, 1996.
- Ali, Mubarak, *Tariekh kia kehti hai*, Lahore, 1998.
- Ali, Serdar Shauket, *The National Question in Pakistan*, Lahore(?).
- Alvi, Hamza, *Jagirdari Ur Samraj*. Translated by Tahir Kamran, Lahore, 2000.
- Askeri, Dilawer(ed), *Punjab ka da'rulhakumet ur Siraiiki suba ka musla*, Lahore, 1991.
- Brass, Paul, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*, New Delhi, 1991.
- Burke, S M, and Salim Al-Din Quraishi, *The British Raj in India*, Karachi, 1995.
- Dani, Hassan, "Sindhu-Sauvira: A Glimse into the Early History of Sind" in Hamida Khuro (ed.), *Sind Through the Centuries*, Karachi, 1981.
- Durrani, Ashiq M Khan, *History of Multan*, Multan, 1991.
- Faridi, Mulana Noor Ahmed Khan, *Tariekh-e-Multan*, Multan, 1972.
- Gankovsky, Yuri V, *Peoples of Pakistan*, Translated by Mirza Ishfaq Beg, *Pakistan ki qumiatain*, Lahore, 2000.
- Gillani, Syed Muhammad Aulad Ali, *Muraka-e-Multan*, Lahore, 1995 (Re-printed).
- Haq, Sheikh Ikramul, *Arz-e-Multan*, Multan, 1972 .
- Ibbetson, Denzil , *Punjab Castes* (1916), Translated by Yasir Jawad, *Punjab ki Zatain*, Lahore, 1998.
- Ikram, S M, *A History of Muslim Civilization in India and Pakistan*, Lahore, 1993.
- Istrange, G Lee, *Jugrafiya-e-khilafat-e-Mashriqi*, Translated by M Jamelur Rahman, Lahore, 1987.
- Jafery, Zaman, *S.S.B and National Question*, Multan.
- Jalal, Ayesha, *The Sole Spokesman*, Lahore, 1995.
- Kennedy, Paul, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, Lahore, 1996 (Re-printed).
- Khan, Ahmad Nabi, *Multan: History and Architecture*, Islamabad, 1983.
- Khan, Javed Ahsan, *Siraiiki Sukafet*, Multan, 1995.
- Malik, Iftikhar H, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan*, Lahore, 1997.
- Mirani, Akrem, *Greater Thel*, Multan, 1994.
- Mirani, Akrem, *Siraiiki Dhaes*, Lahore, 1987.

- Nadiem, Ihsan H, *Portrait of Sindh*, Lahore, 2002.
- Nadiem, Ihsan H, *Thar*, Lahore, 2001.
- Nadvi, Syed Abu Zafar, *Tariekh-e-Sindh*, Lahore, 1997.
- Nayak, Pandev (ed), *Pakistan Society and Politics*, Dehli, 1984.
- Noman, Umer, *Pakistan: A Political and Economic History Since 1947*, London, 1990.
- Panhwar, M H, *Chronological Dictionary of Sind (From Geological Times to 1539 AD)* Jamshoro, 1983.
- Rahman, Mushtaqur, *Land and Life in Sindh, Pakistan*, Lahore, 1993.
- Rahman, Tariq, *Language and Politics in Pakistan*, Karachi, 2000.
- Rahman, Tariq, *Language, Education and Culture*, Karachi, 1999.
- Raza, M Hanif, *Multan—Past and Present*, Islamabad, 1988.
- Raza, Rafi (ed), *Pakistan in Perspective—1947-1997*, Karachi, 1997.
- Rizvi, Hasan Askari, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, Lahore, 2000.
- Saeed, Saeed Ahmad, *Tariekh-o-Ta'rif: Zila Rahim Yar Khan*, Lahore, 1981.
- Sayeed, Khalid bin, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase*, Karachi, 1960.
- Sayeed, Khalid bin, *Politics in Pakistan*, N.Y., 1980.
- Shafi, Maulvi M, *Sanaded-e-Sindh*, Lahore, 1970.
- Shah, Syed Nazir Ali, *Sadiqnama*, Multan, 1997(Re-printed).
- Syed, Anwar, *Pakistan: Islam, Politics and National Solidarity*, Lahore, 1984.
- Tareen, Rubina, *Multan ki adbi va tehzibi zindgi main sufia karam ka hessa*, Multan, 1989.

### Interviews

- Taj M Langha, President of Pakistan Siraiki Party, Multan.
- Mansur Kareem, former Secretary General of Pakistan Siraiki Party, Multan.
- Mumtaz Dar, General Secretary (Punjab) Pakistan Siraiki Party, Mailsi.
- Azmet Khan, Siraiki political activist, Mianwali.
- Qari Munas Baloch, Secretary General of Tanzemia Bahalia Bahawalpur Suba, Bahawalpur.
- Abad Ahmad Khan, Acting Union Nazim, Mailsi.
- Abdul Sattar, political activist of Pakistan Siraiki Party, Multan.
- Mahmood Hayat Khan, former PPP MPA and adviser to CM Punjab (Oct 1993-Nov.1996), Mailsi.
- M Sadiq Jeri, Siraiki linguist, Mailsi.
- Abdul Ghani, PPP political activist, Mailsi.
- Naveed Islam Khan, local businessman and political activist, Multan.
- Munir Ahmad Khan, Scientist at Cotton Research Centre, Multan.

**Websites**

*Islamic Glossary*. Website: <http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/reference/glossary/term.HIJRAH.html>.

*Prayer Profile: The Multani of India*. Website: [http://www.ksafe.com/profiles/p\\_code5/1485.html](http://www.ksafe.com/profiles/p_code5/1485.html).

Gardezi, Hassan N, *Siraiki Language and Its Poetics: An Introduction*. Website: [http://www.punjabilok.com/misc/literature/siraiki\\_language\\_and\\_%20Poetics.htm](http://www.punjabilok.com/misc/literature/siraiki_language_and_%20Poetics.htm).

Siraiki. Website: <http://www.worldscriptures.org/pages/siraiki.html>.

"Multani poets relive memories of struggle", *Indian Express* (Bombay : 27 January 1998). Website: <http://www.indianexpress.com/ie/daily/19980127/02651164.html>.

*Kandhari: The Language*. Website: <http://www.afghanhindu.info/language.htm>.



# Index

## A

A K Baloch, 89  
 Abadkar, 47, 55, 60, 61, 65, 69, 75, 83, 84, 107, 111, 117, 118, 119, 121  
 Abbasi, 44, 54, 72, 86, 103, 104, 109, 110, 134, 138, 139, 140, 141  
 Abdul Majid Kanju, 114  
 Abdullah Jamaldini, 33  
 Adabi Sangat, 32, 90  
 Afghan, 17, 18, 20, 34, 54, 96, 101, 131, 157  
 Afghanistan, 34, 46, 52, 54, 131  
 Afzel Masood, 62, 64, 74, 82, 120, 153  
 Ahle-Hadees, 57, 59, 60  
 Ahmad Shah Abdali, 53, 131, 132  
 Ahmadpur Sharqia, 114  
 Air Marshall Noor Khan, 105, 119  
 Aitchison College (Lahore), 23  
 Akbar, 19, 20  
 Akhter Vahid, 87  
 Akram Mirani, 74, 79, 81, 82, 94, 101  
 Ali Haider, 84  
 All India Muslim League (AIML), 26  
 All-Pakistan Siraiiki Literary Conference, 91  
 All-Parties Action Committee (APAC), 105  
 Allama Rahmatullah Arshad, 67, 81  
 Allama Talut, 86  
 Altaf Hussain, 32  
 Amir Khusru, 51  
 Andrew Jukes, 85  
 Anjuman-e-Abadkaran, 107  
 Arab, 50, 63, 101  
 Ashahar, 50  
 Attock, 23  
 Aulad Ali Khan, 86, 99  
 Aurangzeb, 18, 19, 20, 36, 131  
 Awami League, 31, 33

Awami Party in Sindh, 97  
 Ayub Khan, 42, 74, 106  
 Azat Jamaldini, 33  
 Azizur Rahman, 86

## B

Babar, 54  
 Bahalia Bahawalpur Suba (BBS), 113  
 Bahauddin Zakariya, 52, 57, 60, 70, 84, 92, 95, 133  
 Bahawalpur, 9, 43, 44, 47, 49, 50, 54, 55, 61, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 72, 73, 76, 77, 79, 81, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 95, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 152, 153, 154, 156  
 Bahawalpur Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI), 73  
 Bahawalpur Industrial Estate (BIE), 72  
 Bahawalpur Mutahidda Mahaz (Bahawalpur United Fron, 106  
 Bahawalpur Province Movement, 61, 69, 103, 110, 117, 137  
 Bahlol Lodhi, 17  
 Bahwalnagar, 43, 44, 49, 50, 61, 72, 73, 103, 107, 130, 131, 133, 152  
 Baloch Academy, 33  
 Baloch Educational Society, 33  
 Balochi, 33, 49, 115  
 Balochistan, 33, 41, 49, 52, 61, 67, 116  
 Balochistan National Party, 116  
 Balochki, 45, 87  
 Bamozai, 54  
 Bangladesh, 16, 81, 154  
 Bannu, 24  
 Bareilvi, 57, 59, 60  
 Bazm-e-Saqafat, 88

Benazir Bhutto, 114  
 Bengali, 19, 29, 30, 31, 42, 67, 88, 109  
 Bengali language movement, 29  
 Bhakkar, 44, 50, 81, 152  
 Bible, 19, 86  
 Bihar, 22  
 Brahman dynasty, 44, 50, 56  
 Brahmapur, 50  
 Brahvi, 33  
 British, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26,  
     34, 37, 39, 40, 43, 45, 47, 53, 54, 55,  
     56, 65, 84, 85, 86, 103, 155  
 British army, 22, 55  
 Bullehe Shah, 19, 84

## C

Calcutta, 22  
 Campbelpur, 69, 137, 138, 139  
 Central Asia, 16, 17, 18, 51, 52, 83  
 Chach, 50  
 Chakma, 16  
 Chakwal, 23  
 Changiz Khan, 51  
 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, 30, 65, 81  
 Chaudhry Ferzand Ali, 66, 81, 105, 106,  
     109, 112, 119  
 Chaudhry Nazir Ahmed, 107  
 Cholistan, 85, 112  
 Congress, 40  
 Convention League, 105  
 Council League, 105  
 Cutch Gundava, 44

## D

Dara Shikoh, 19, 36  
 Daudputra, 54, 55, 132  
 Daultana, 48  
 Deccani, 19  
 Delhi, 18, 20, 36, 51, 155  
 Denzil Ibbetson, 45, 56, 62, 63  
 Deobandi, 57, 59  
 Dera Ismael Khan, 43, 44, 49, 50, 71,  
     92, 98, 110, 132, 152  
 Derewali, 87  
 Devnagiri script, 86, 94  
 Dilshad Kalanchvi, 94, 101  
 Diwan Sawan Mal, 54  
 Dravidian, 19, 101

## E

Ecathmy Siraiiki Adab, 94  
 Edwards College (Peshawar), 23

## F

Faisalabad, 71, 72, 79, 139, 140  
 Fatehpur Sikri, 18  
 Feroz Tughlaq, 19

## G

G M Syed, 32  
 General Ayub Khan, 30, 104  
 George Grieson, 85  
 Ghiasuddin Tughlaq, 51  
 Ghulam Muhammad, 28, 41  
 Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, 116  
 Ghulam Mustafa Khar, 110  
 Giasuddin Balban, 17  
 Government College (Lahore), 23  
 Gujranwala, 72, 79, 137, 139  
 Gul Khan Naseer, 33

## H

Hafiz Rahmat Khan, 18, 20  
 Hafizur Rahman, 86, 87  
 Haji Saifullah, 112  
 Hasanul Haidiri, 89  
 Hassan H Gardezi, 83  
 Hindi, 26, 96  
 Hindko, 87  
 Hindus, 40, 96, 129  
 Hiun Tsang, 50

## I

Iluttamish, 19  
 India, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24,  
     25, 26, 27, 29, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 48,  
     49, 53, 56, 62, 81, 94, 119, 134, 152,  
     154, 155, 157  
 Indian Civil Services (ICS), 24  
 Indo-Aryan, 19, 129  
 Iran, 16, 41, 46, 52, 53  
 Iraq, 57  
 Islam, 29, 36, 40, 52, 53, 56, 57, 82,  
     105, 108, 109, 117, 139, 156, 157  
 Ismaili sect, 50, 51

## J

- Jacobabad, 49  
 Jaghadali, 87  
 Jahangir, 20  
 Jam Taj M Berda, 113  
 Jamait Ulema-e-Pakistan, 108  
 Jamait Ulema-i-Islam, 34  
 Jamait-e-Islami, 108  
 Jamait-Ulema-i-Islam, 105  
 Jamal Koreja, 108, 109  
 Jamshoro, 62, 92, 156  
 Jat, 44, 45, 46, 55, 130, 131, 132, 134  
 Jatkai, 45, 87  
 Jehlum, 69, 137, 138, 140  
 Jet, 45  
 Jhang, 39, 43, 44, 47, 49, 50, 58, 63, 69,  
 81, 110, 130, 131, 135, 139, 141,  
 152, 153  
 Justice Fazel Akbar, 104

## K

- Kabirwala, 54, 130  
 Kabul, 50, 54  
 Kachhi, 49  
 Kahrar, 50, 132  
 Kalhora, 46  
 Kandahar, 23, 50, 131  
 Kandhari, 96, 101, 157  
 Karachi, 32, 33, 36, 37, 39, 40, 42, 62,  
 68, 74, 87, 91, 96, 99, 100, 101, 114,  
 119, 120, 140, 155, 156  
 Karamat Ali, 70  
 Karmatian, 50, 56  
 Kashan, 52  
 Khairpur, 44, 49, 67, 84, 100  
 Khakwani, 54, 131, 132  
 Khan Abdul Qayum, 105  
 Khan Ghaffar Khan, 34  
 Khanewal, 133  
 Khanpur Katora, 114  
 Khashmiri, 19  
 Khushab, 44, 50, 152  
 Khushal Khan Kattak, 19  
 Khwaja Farid Ganjshakar, 52  
 Khwaja Nazimuddin, 30, 66  
 Khyber, 49  
 Kishlu Khan, 51  
 Kohat, 24

- Kot Karor, 52  
 Kshatriya, 17

## L

- Lahnda, 85, 87  
 Langha, 9, 51, 52, 61, 64, 90, 93, 95, 99,  
 100, 108, 113, 114, 116, 117, 120,  
 129, 135, 152, 153, 154, 156  
 Larkana, 44  
 Lathkhana, 33  
 Layyah, 43, 44, 49, 50, 52, 63, 64, 74,  
 81, 131, 132, 135, 152  
 Liaquat Ali Khan, 41  
 Lodhran, 43, 44, 49, 50, 54, 64, 116,  
 132, 152  
 Lord Cornwallis, 22  
 Lord McCauley, 23  
 Ludden, 48  
 Lutf Ali (Bahawalpur), 84

## M

- Madras, 22  
 Ma'dud Qurieshi, 105  
 Maharashtra, 20  
 Mahmood Ghaznavi, 50  
 Mahmood Hayat Khan, 69, 75, 81, 82,  
 156  
 Mahmood Khan Achakzai, 116  
 Maharaja Ranjit Singh, 54  
 Mailsi, 9, 54, 60, 62, 156  
 Majid Kanju, 111, 114  
 Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam, 108  
 Malik Kabir Khan, 51  
 Malik Mumtaz Hussain, 116  
 Manzur Ahmad Bohar, 114  
 Maratha, 18, 20, 25, 129  
 Marathi, 20  
 Mazher Arif, 97  
 Mehr Abdul Haq, 88, 90, 99, 100, 123,  
 128  
 Merri-Bughti, 49  
 Mian Nizamuddin Haider, 106, 109, 112,  
 119  
 Mian Sajid Pervaiz, 113  
 Mianwali, 24, 39, 44, 49, 50, 69, 74,  
 101, 131, 135, 137, 139, 140, 152,  
 156  
 Mongol, 51, 52, 56, 101  
 Moscow, 72



Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), 113  
 Mubarak Ali, 10, 23, 36, 37, 39, 40  
 Mughal, 20, 36, 37, 40, 52, 84, 95, 132, 133, 134  
 Muhajir, 27, 32, 48, 55, 60, 61, 62, 65, 68, 69, 75, 76, 83, 104, 105, 106, 107, 114, 117, 118, 119, 156, 157  
 Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), 32, 114  
 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 26, 27, 66  
 Muhammad Ghouri, 51  
 Muhammad Hayat Bhutta, 113  
 Muhammad Khan Junejo, 113  
 Muhammad-bin-Qasim, 51  
 Mukhdoom M Hassan Shah Bukhari, 111  
 Mukhdoom Noor Muhammad, 66, 81, 108, 112  
 Mukhdoom Shah Mahmood, 23  
 Mukhlisur Rahman, 109  
 Mulraj, 55  
 Multan, 9, 23, 39, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 62, 63, 64, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 99, 100, 101, 110, 111, 112, 113, 116, 119, 120, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 131, 132, 133, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157  
 Multani, 46, 47, 49, 54, 55, 62, 84, 87, 88, 101, 131, 132, 157  
 Mumbai, 22, 39  
 Mumtaz Academy, 94  
 Mumtaz Dar, 19, 36, 37, 62, 87, 99, 118, 120, 136, 156  
 Musa Pak Shahid, 57, 60, 133  
 Mushtaq Ahmad Ghurmani, 30, 65  
 Mushtaq Hussain Gadi, 88  
 Muslim, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 36, 37, 40, 41, 48, 50, 83, 98, 104, 105, 107, 109, 155  
 Muzaffargarh, 39, 43, 44, 49, 69, 88, 152  
 Muzaffargarhi, 87

## N

Nadir Shah, 53  
 Nassiruddin Kubacha, 51

National Alliance, 116  
 National Awami Party, 33, 34, 105  
 Nauroz Khan, 33  
 Nawab Muzaffer Khan, 54  
 Nawab of Bahawalpur, 47, 54, 55, 65, 66, 106  
 Nawab Sadiq Ali Khan, 103  
 Nawab Sarfraz Khan, 54  
 Nawaz Sharif, 115  
 Nazir Ali Shah, 88, 99  
 Nehru, 21, 37  
 Nizamuddin Haider, 106, 109, 112, 119  
 Noor Ahmed Faridi, 89  
 North-West Frontier Province, 34, 86

## O

One-Unit, 32, 34, 67, 68, 77, 89, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108  
 Orrisa, 22

## P

Pakhtoonkhaw, 115  
 Pakhtun, 17, 19, 22, 34, 83, 86  
 Pakhtunistan, 34  
 Pakistan, 9, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 55, 56, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 74, 76, 81, 82, 87, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 128, 130, 153, 154, 155, 156  
 Pakistan Awami Jamhuri Ittehad, 113  
 Pakistan Awami Jamhuri Party, 113  
 Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), 105  
 Pakistan National Party (PNP), 114  
 Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM), 115  
 Pakistan People's Party, 32, 109, 114  
 Pakistan Siraiki Party, 9, 19, 61, 62, 64, 74, 82, 87, 90, 114, 117, 120, 130, 153, 156  
 Pakpattan, 43, 44, 49, 50, 61  
 Pali, 94  
 Pashto, 24, 33, 34, 49, 131  
 Paul R Brass, 16  
 Persian kings, 53  
 Pervaiz Musharraf, 42

Peshawar, 23, 50  
 Prince Abdul Karim, 33  
 Prince Abdul Karim of Qalat, 33  
 Punjab, 9, 17, 19, 20, 23, 24, 30, 34, 35,  
   37, 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 53,  
   55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67, 69,  
   70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 79, 81, 83,  
   84, 85, 86, 87, 90, 92, 94, 97, 98, 99,  
   100, 104, 105, 106, 110, 112, 116,  
   119, 129, 130, 131, 133, 152, 154,  
   155, 156, 157  
 Punjabi, 16, 19, 27, 29, 30, 33, 40, 46,  
   47, 48, 49, 61, 63, 70, 74, 76, 84, 85,  
   87, 88, 91, 92, 93, 96, 99, 100, 104,  
   106, 107, 115, 121, 122, 123, 124,  
   127, 157

## Q

Qalat, 33, 67, 68  
 Qari Allah Buksh Munas Baloch, 110,  
   111  
 Qari Nurul Haq Qurieshi, 113, 120  
 Qazi Fakhruddin Razi, 85  
 Qazi Qutbuddin, 52  
 Qudratullah Shahab, 88  
 Quetta, 67, 68, 89  
 Quran, 37, 86, 88  
 Quriesh, 50, 133

## R

Rajanpur, 43, 44, 49, 50, 81, 97, 113,  
   138, 141, 152  
 Rajput, 20, 25, 44, 45, 130, 131, 132,  
   134  
 Rawalpindi, 24, 41, 45, 140  
 Razia Sultana, 17, 51  
 Republican Party, 105  
 Riasti, 47, 87  
 Riaz Hashmi, 88, 110, 113  
 Richard Burton, 85  
 Rohail Khund, 18, 20

## S

Sabzawar, 52  
 Sachal Sarmast of Khairpur, 84  
 Sadiq Jeri, 46, 62, 63, 96, 99, 101, 156  
 Sadiqabad, 72, 100  
 Saeed Jalal, 52  
 Saeedur Rasheed Abbasi, 104, 110

Sahi dynasties, 50  
 Sahiwal, 43, 44, 47, 49, 50, 58, 61, 81,  
   130, 135, 139, 140, 152  
 Sanskrit, 37, 94, 96, 101  
 Sardar Akhtar Mengal, 116  
 Sardar Illyas Khan, 107  
 Sargodha, 43, 44, 47, 49, 50, 58, 61,  
   110, 130, 135, 139, 152  
 Saudi Arabia, 60  
 Sauvira, 44, 47, 62, 155  
 Sauviraki, 47  
 Savistan, 44, 62  
 Sehwan Sharif, 44  
 Seth Ubaidur Rahman, 105, 106, 110,  
   111, 119, 137  
 Shagird Sanjh (Students Association), 98  
 Shah Abdul Latif, 19, 86  
 Shah Dana Shahid, 57, 60  
 Shah Jahan, 20, 53, 131  
 Shah Rukn-i-Alam, 53, 57, 60, 84  
 Shams Tabrezi, 52  
 Sheikh Bahauddin Zakariya, 52, 57, 60  
 Sheikh Ikramul Haq, 46, 62, 63, 93, 94,  
   100, 101, 124, 125, 126, 127  
 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, 29  
 Sheikh Yusuf Gardezi, 51  
 Sher Muhammad Marri, 33  
 Shia, 51  
 Shujabad, 54  
 Siharas Rai, 50  
 Sikander Hayat, 26  
 Sikh, 16, 17, 20, 37, 54, 55, 66, 103,  
   131  
 Sindh, 23, 25, 32, 39, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46,  
   47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 58, 61, 62, 67,  
   76, 86, 87, 97, 116, 130, 152, 156  
 Sindhi, 19, 22, 32, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49,  
   83, 87, 90, 112, 115, 121, 123, 124,  
   126, 127, 130, 154  
 Sindhi Adabi Sangat, 32  
 Sindhi language, 42, 46, 87, 90, 130  
 Sindhu Desh, 32  
 Siraiki Academy, 89, 90, 100  
 Siraiki Adabi Board, 90, 100  
 Siraiki Adabi Majlis, 88, 90, 100, 112  
 Siraiki Conference, 91, 113  
 Siraiki Lawyers Forum, 113  
 Siraiki Library, 94  
 Siraiki Lok Sanjh, 97

- Siraiki Lok Tamasha (Siraiki People's Theatre), 98
- Siraiki National Alliance (SNA), 114
- Siraiki National Party (SNP), 114
- Siraiki Qaumi Mahaz, 113
- Siraiki Qaumi Movement (SQM), 114
- Siraiki Qaumi Tehrik, 113
- Siraiki Qaumi Wahdat Committee, 114
- Siraiki Research Centre, 95
- Siraiki Sangat, 91
- Siraiki Student's Federation, 90
- Siraiki Suba Mahaz (SSM), 113
- Siraiki Suba Movement, 116
- Siraiki Trimit Sanjh (Siraiki Women's Association), 98
- Siraikistan, 60, 61, 114, 115, 116, 117
- Sirro, 44, 45, 86
- Socialist Siraikistan National Front, 114
- Sri Lanka, 16
- Subcontinent, 16, 18, 21, 23, 46, 48, 52, 65, 84, 129
- Sudra, 17
- Sukkur, 44, 49
- Sultan Bairam Shah, 51
- Sunni, 59
- Syed Ahmed Nawaz Shah, 68, 119
- Syed Dynasty, 51
- Syed Khizar Khan, 51
- Syed M Rafiq, 109
- Syed Mahmood Hassan, 66
- T**
- Tabish Alveri, 107, 110
- Tahir Taunsvi, 57, 84, 99, 100, 101
- Tahira Masood, 106
- Taj M Langha, 61, 64, 90, 93, 95, 100, 108, 113, 114, 152, 153, 156
- Tamil Eelam, 16
- Tamil separatists, 16
- Tanzemi-a-Bahalia Bahawalpur Suba, 110
- Tariq Rahman, 10, 16, 36, 39, 40, 42, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 119, 120
- Thalchhari, 87
- Thali, 49
- Thar, 45, 62, 94, 156
- Trading Cooperation of Pakistan (TCP), 74
- Trevor Bomford, 85
- U**
- Ubaidullah Sindhi, 87
- Ucch, 47, 100, 133
- Uchi, 47, 87, 101
- Umer Kamal Khan, 100, 112, 120
- Urdu, 24, 26, 29, 32, 33, 40, 48, 49, 57, 61, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, 96, 101, 106, 121, 123, 124, 125, 126, 153
- USA, 72
- Ustaman Gall (People's Party), 33
- V**
- Vaisya, 17
- Vehari, 43, 44, 48, 49, 60, 81, 152
- W**
- Waris Shah, 19
- Warna Wananda, 33
- Wicholo, 44
- Wilayet Gardezi, 114
- Y**
- Yahya Khan, 103, 104, 109
- Yousuf Raza Gillani, 58
- Z**
- Ziauddin Barni, 18
- Ziaul Haq, 42
- Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 32, 89





NCA PUBLICATIONS

# RE-THINKING PUNJAB

## The Construction of Siraiki Identity

What may be the first attempt in Pakistan at intellectually interrogating the process of ethnic or subnational identity formation, "Re-thinking Punjab" is a ground breaking study.

Originally conceived as a postgraduate dissertation at the History Department of Government College, Lahore, the work has, over the last three years, developed into a more complex argument cross cutting history and cultural studies.

In tracing the genealogy of the Siraiki nationalist movement, the book examines the role of the British rulers of India who gave the language a lexicon in 1849 (prepared by Richard Burton), as part of an attempt to translate the Bible into the vernacular. The process thereby conferred a separate identity on the regions where the language was spoken.

But it was as late as the 1930s that Muslim subnational identity started being discussed in the Sarhad and in southern Punjab, and only in 1960s when the local intelligentsia concurred upon the word "Siraiki" as the correct referent instead of a number of other, similar words like Riyasati, Multani, Lahnda, Jatki, and Hindko which were part of current usage.

The book argues that although there was a gradual build up in the literary corpus, the counterpoint came in 1975 with the All Pakistan Siraiki Literary Conference. While the meeting was focused on establishing the independence of the language, it also provided the first forum to offer political resistance to the administrative move to introduce Punjabi into local schools as a medium of instruction. Henceforth, an antiquity and an independent status was claimed for the language then had to step out from under the shadow of both Punjabi and Sindhi whose dialect it had long been considered.

The book examines the pivotal role of the literateurs, the writers and poets of the language, who helped imagine a separate identity for the Siraiki peoples before it was ever deployed politically.

Cover: Detail from Painting by Ahmad Ali Manganhar

History/Cultural Studies

ISBN---696-8623-09-4

Price---Rs 295